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We are entering an era in which federated information systems are widely used
to share information and computation. Federated systems support new services
and capabilities by integrating computer systems across independent adminis-
trative domains. Each domain has policies for security, but does not fully trust
other domains to enforce them. This dissertation explores, in two parts, the chal-
lenge of designing and building federated information systems that are secure
and reliable while supporting mutually distrusting participants.
First, this dissertation presents Fabric, a new system and language for build-
ing secure federated information systems. Fabric allows heterogeneous network
nodes to securely share information and computation despite mutual distrust. It
uses optimistic, nested transactions to ensure global consistency, and has a peer-
to-peer dissemination layer for better availability and load balancing. Fabric’s
high-level programming language provides a rich, Java-like object model, and
keeps distribution and persistence largely transparent to programmers. It sup-
ports data shipping and function shipping: both information and computation
can move between nodes to meet security requirements or to improve perfor-
mance. Confidentiality and integrity policies on objects are enforced through a
combination of compile-time and run-time mechanisms. Results from building
Fabric applications suggest that Fabric has a clean and concise programming
model, offers good performance, and enforces security.
Next, this dissertation examines the security implications of providing refer-
ential integrity in a federated system. Referential integrity ensures that named
resources can be accessed when needed. This is an important property for re-
liability and security. However, the attempt to provide referential integrity can
itself lead to security vulnerabilities that are currently not well understood. This
dissertation identifies three such referential security vulnerabilities, and formal-
izes security conditions corresponding to their absence. A language model cap-
tures key aspects of programming distributed systems with named, persistent
resources in the presence of an adversary. A new type system is proved to en-
force the conditions for referential security.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Distributed information systems network computers together to provide fast,
efficient access to data and computation. We rely on complex, distributed in-
formation systems for many important activities. Government agencies, banks,
hospitals, schools, and many other enterprises use distributed information sys-
tems to manage information and interact with the public.
These systems often have security requirements, of which there are three
central goals: confidentiality, that information be protected from unauthorized
disclosure; integrity, that information be protected from unauthorized modifica-
tion; and availability, that information be protected from loss of use [18]. Viola-
tions of these requirements can have financial, legal, and ethical consequences.
Current practice does not offer general, principled techniques for implementing
the functionality of these systems while also satisfying their security require-
ments.
The trend towards integration makes the security problem ever more im-
portant and difficult. Whereas distributed information systems are operated by
individual administrative domains, federated systems provide new services and
capabilities by connecting these systems together. However, each domain has
its own policies for security, and does not fully trust other domains to enforce
them. Future information systems will need to function correctly and securely
despite having code and data distributed across these trust boundaries.
This dissertation examines in two ways the challenge of designing and build-
ing federated information systems that are secure and reliable. The first half
presents the design and implementation of Fabric, a platform for building fed-
erated information systems with confidentiality and integrity assurances.
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While Fabric offers confidentiality and integrity assurances, these alone are
not sufficient for building secure and reliable federated systems. The challenge
is made more difficult because information is not merely bits—it has structure.
Information resources use names to refer to other, perhaps remote, resources.
For example, web pages can have hyperlinks to other pages, tuples in relational
databases can have foreign keys that refer to other tuples in the database, and
objects in distributed object systems can point to other objects in the system.
The precise details of how references are represented are not germane, so we
refer to all these constructs collectively as references. Similarly, we use the term
objects to refer generically to information resources that are connected by refer-
ences, whether web pages, database tuples, or distributed objects. Regardless
of the kind of system, security and reliability vulnerabilities are created when
references cross trust boundaries in a distributed system.
The second half of this dissertation identifies three kinds of referential security
vulnerabilities, a class of availability vulnerabilities that appear in federated in-
formation systems with persistent information. It formally characterizes these
vulnerabilities and explores a language-based approach for modelling, analyz-
ing, and preventing them.
1.1 Example
Epidemiological research is one domain that would benefit from a secure, fed-
erated information system. Because of patient confidentiality concerns, re-
searchers have limited access to epidemiological data in the US and Canada,
especially for STIs such as HIV/AIDS. When available, data sets are highly
regional—often restricted to a single city—and in some cases must be obtained
in person or hand-delivered by courier. The data is incomplete because it does
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Figure 1.1: A medical example
not include full patient records. Instead, it is derived from population surveys
and diagnosis forms that are unable to fully anticipate researchers’ needs [75]. A
secure, federated information system would allow researchers to directly mine
patient records for real-time epidemiological trends while protecting patient
confidentiality.
To illustrate the challenges, consider the scenario in Figure 1.1. A patient, Al-
ice, has two doctors—a general practitioner and a psychiatrist—and has given
consent for her medical record to be used anonymously for research. The med-
ical record is kept in a federated information system. This not only provides re-
searchers with direct access to her medical data, but her two doctors at separate
medical institutions can securely and quickly share her medical information.1
1The ability of doctors to effectively collaborate on patient information is important. Accord-
ing to a 1999 Institute of Medicine study, at least 44,000 US deaths annually result from medical
errors, with incomplete patient information identified as a leading cause [40].
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Automated sharing of patient data poses difficulties. First, the security and
privacy policies of the two institutions must be satisfied (as mandated by the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [34] in the US),
restricting which information can be shared or modified by the two institutions.
While Alice’s doctors might have access to her complete medical record, the
researchers’ view of the record should not contain any personally identifying
information, such as Alice’s address or phone number.
Second, the patient record may be updated by both institutions as treatment
progresses, yet the record should be consistent and up to date when viewed by
the researcher and from the two institutions. It is inadequate to simply transmit
a copy of the record in a common format such as XML, because the copy and the
original are likely to diverge over time. Instead, the researcher and institutions
should have easy, secure, consistent and efficient access to what is logically a
single patient record.
Third, the record is likely composed of several objects, with references to
other, perhaps remote, objects. For example, an object representing a prescrip-
tion might refer to an object at a pharmaceutical company, identifying the pre-
scribed drug and providing information about it, such as contraindications, side
effects, and drug interactions. This is useful, because when the pharmaceu-
tical company adds new information about the drug, it is instantly reflected
in Alice’s medical record. However, the referential integrity of Alice’s record is
now dependent on the pharmaceutical company: information in Alice’s medi-
cal record becomes missing if the drug information is deleted or is temporarily
unavailable. It is therefore important that either the pharmaceutical company
be trusted to enforce this referential integrity, or that users of Alice’s medical
record be prepared for a potential failure in referential integrity.
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1.2 Contributions of this dissertation
1.2.1 Secure federated computation and storage
This dissertation presents the design and implementation of Fabric, a federated
system that supports secure, shared access to information and computation, de-
spite distrust between cooperating entities. The goal of Fabric is to make secure
distributed applications much easier to develop, and to enable the secure inte-
gration of information systems controlled by different organizations.
To achieve this goal, Fabric provides a shared computational and storage
substrate implemented by an essentially unbounded number of Internet hosts.
As with the Web, there is no notion of an “instance” of Fabric. Two previously
non-interacting sets of Fabric nodes can interact and share information without
prior arrangement. There is no centralized control over admission: new nodes,
even untrustworthy nodes, can join the system freely.
Untrustworthy nodes pose a challenge for security. The guiding principle for
security in Fabric is that one’s security should never depend on components of
the system that one does not trust. Fabric provides security assurance through
a combination of mechanisms at the language and system levels.
Fabric gives programmers a high-level programming abstraction in which
security policies and some distributed computing features are explicitly visible
to the programmer. Programmers access Fabric objects in a uniform way, even
though the objects may be local or remote, persistent or non-persistent, and
object references may cross between Fabric nodes.
The Fabric programming language is an extension to the Jif programming
language [53, 56], in turn based on Java [30]. Fabric extends Jif with support for
distributed programming and transactions. Like Jif, Fabric has several mech-
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anisms, including access control and information-flow control, to prevent un-
trusted nodes from violating confidentiality and integrity. All objects in Fabric
are labelled with policies from the decentralized label model (DLM) [54], which
expresses security requirements in terms of principals (e.g., users and organi-
zations). Object labels prevent a node that is not trusted by a given principal
from compromising the security policies of that principal. Therefore, Fabric has
fine-grained trust management that allows principals to control to what extent
other principals (and nodes) can learn about or affect their information.
To achieve good performance while enforcing security, Fabric supports both
data shipping, in which data moves to where computation is happening, and
function shipping, in which computations move to where data resides. Data
shipping enables Fabric nodes to compute using cached copies of remote ob-
jects, with good performance when the cache is populated. Function shipping
enables computations to span multiple nodes. Inconsistency is prevented by
performing all object updates within transactions, which are exposed at the lan-
guage level. The availability of information, and scalability of Fabric, are in-
creased by replicating objects within a peer-to-peer dissemination layer.
Of course, there has been much previous work on making distributed sys-
tems both easier to build and more secure. Prior mechanisms for remotely
executing code, such as CORBA [61], Java RMI [62], SOAP [33] and web ser-
vices [50], generally offer only limited support for information security, consis-
tency, and data shipping. J2EE persistence (EJB) [23] provides a limited form
of transparent access to persistent objects, but does not address distrust or dis-
tributed computation. Peer-to-peer content-distribution and wide-area storage
systems (e.g., [20, 42, 65, 68]) offer high data availability, but do little to ensure
that data is neither leaked to nor damaged by untrusted users, nor do they en-
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sure consistency of mutable data. Prior distributed systems that enforce con-
fidentiality and integrity in the presence of distrusted nodes (e.g., [12, 80, 81])
have not supported consistent computations over persistent data.
Fabric integrates many ideas from prior work, including compile-time and
run-time information flow, access control, peer-to-peer replication, and opti-
mistic transactions. This unique integration makes possible a higher-level pro-
gramming model that simplifies reasoning about security and consistency. In-
deed, it does not seem possible to provide a high-level programming model
like that of Fabric by simply layering previous distributed-systems abstractions.
Several new ideas were also needed to make Fabric possible:
• A programming language that integrates information flow, persistence,
transactions, and distributed computation.
• A trust ordering on information-flow labels, supporting reasoning about
information flow in distributed systems.
• An integration of function shipping and data shipping that also enforces
secure information flows within and among network nodes.
• A way to manage transactions distributed among mutually distrusting
nodes, and to propagate object updates while enforcing confidentiality
and integrity.
Fabric does not require application developers to abandon other standards
and methodologies; it seems feasible for Fabric to interoperate with other stan-
dards. In fact, Fabric already interoperates with existing Java application code.
It seems feasible to implement many existing abstractions (e.g., web services)
using Fabric. Conversely, it seems feasible to implement Fabric nodes by encap-
sulating other services such as databases. We leave further work on interoper-
ability to the future.
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1.2.2 Referential security
Fabric provides confidentiality and integrity through a combination of
information-flow control and access control. However, experience building
Fabric applications has revealed security and reliability vulnerabilities result-
ing from object references.
References create security issues because they introduce dependencies be-
tween different parts of the system. We say that a system has referential integrity
if a reference can be relied upon to continue pointing to the same object. This
is both an availability and an integrity property. Referential integrity fails when
an object is deleted while a reference to it still exists, resulting in a dangling ref-
erence (an availability failure), or when the reference points to a different object
altogether (an integrity failure). Because Fabric does not address availability,
Fabric programs can encounter dangling references.
Referential integrity appears in many guises. We use the term in a more
general sense than in the database literature, where referential integrity is an
important aspect of the relational model [17]. The Web is a system whose lack
of referential integrity is well known: the referent of a hyperlink can be deleted,
leading to the familiar “404” error. Referential integrity is also an important
property for programming language design; in programming languages that
lack referential integrity, such as C, dangling pointers are a serious problem. To-
day, many languages have automatic garbage collection, allowing the automatic
reclamation of memory while preserving referential integrity.
While absolute referential integrity is desirable, it cannot be achieved in a
federated system such as Fabric: referential integrity is necessarily limited by
the trustworthiness of the node (or nodes) storing the referent object. Therefore,
we generalize referential integrity to systems where nodes are partially trusted.
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In a federated system, referential integrity must be balanced against other
security and reliability properties. Indeed, violations of referential integrity are
only the first of three referential security vulnerabilities considered in this disser-
tation. In a system with referential integrity, a reference to an object is a promise
to the referrer that the object will not move or disappear. It must be persis-
tent. Therefore, reachability implies persistence, as in various object-oriented
databases (e.g., [4,8]) and also in marshalling mechanisms such as Java serializa-
tion. However, if all reachable objects are persistent, objects can become acciden-
tally persistent because they are unexpectedly reachable. Accidental persistence
can inflate resource consumption, leading to poor performance and system fail-
ure. This problem is familiar to programmers that have used Java serialization.
Avoiding accidental persistence is our second goal.
The third goal is preventing what we call storage attacks. Referential integrity
prevents discarding reachable objects. But this gives an adversary a means to
mount a denial-of-service attack. The adversary creates references to objects in-
tended to be discarded, preventing reclamation and perhaps exhausting avail-
able storage space.
In summary, the second part of this dissertation studies the problem of pro-
gramming in distributed object systems while preventing three kinds of referen-
tial vulnerabilities: dangling pointers that violate referential integrity, acciden-
tal persistence that leaks storage, and storage attacks that consume resources.
While recent work has explored programming models and languages for build-
ing federated systems (e.g., [42]), these referential vulnerabilities have not been
clearly identified or addressed in prior work.
This dissertation formalizes referential vulnerabilities in terms of security
properties corresponding to their absence. These referential security properties are
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formalized in the context of a simple programming language that captures the
key elements of distributed programming in a federated system with persistent
information and pointers. A new type system is defined to enforce these se-
curity properties, ensuring that the system is secure and reliable. Because these
properties can be viewed as integrity properties, the language must also enforce
integrity in the information-flow sense. The correctness of security enforcement
by the type system has been proved.
1.3 Dissertation outline
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the de-
sign and implementation of Fabric. Chapter 3 turns to the problem of referential
security and presents a type system for its enforcement. Chapter 4 concludes.
The material in Chapter 2 is joint work with Michael George, Krishnaprasad
Vikram, Xin Qi, Lucas Waye, and Andrew Myers, and is adapted from [48]. The
work on referential security is joint work with Andrew Myers.
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CHAPTER 2
FABRIC: SECURE FEDERATED COMPUTATION AND STORAGE
Fabric is a system and language for building secure federated information
systems. It is a decentralized system that supports secure, shared access to infor-
mation and computation, despite mutual distrust between cooperating entities.
It has a high-level programming language that makes distribution and persis-
tence largely transparent to programmers. Fabric supports both data shipping
and function shipping: data and computation can move between nodes to meet
security requirements or to improve performance. Fabric provides a rich, Java-
like object model. Objects are labelled with confidentiality and integrity policies
that are enforced through a combination of compile-time and run-time mecha-
nisms. Optimistic, nested transactions ensure consistency across all objects and
nodes. A peer-to-peer dissemination layer helps to increase availability and
to balance load. Results from applications built using Fabric suggest that Fabric
has a clean, concise programming model, offers good performance, and enforces
security.
2.1 System architecture overview
Each Fabric node takes on one of the three roles depicted in Figure 2.1:
• Storage nodes (or stores) store objects persistently and provide object data
when requested.
• Worker nodes perform computation, using both their own objects and pos-
sibly copies of objects from storage nodes or other worker nodes.
• Dissemination nodes provide copies of objects, giving worker nodes lower
latency access and offloading work from storage nodes.
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Figure 2.1: Fabric architecture
Although Fabric nodes serve these three distinct roles, a single host machine
can have multiple Fabric nodes on it, typically colocated in the same Java VM.
For example, a store typically has a colocated worker, allowing the store to in-
voke code at the worker with low overhead. This capability is useful, for ex-
ample, when a store needs to evaluate a user-defined access-control policy to
decide whether an object update is allowed (Section 2.3.5). It also gives the
colocated worker the ability to efficiently execute queries against the store. Sim-
ilarly, a worker node can be colocated with a dissemination node, making Fabric
more scalable.
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2.1.1 Security and assumptions
The design of Fabric is intended to allow secure sharing of computations and
information, despite the presence of adversaries that control some Fabric nodes.
The security goal of Fabric is the decentralized security principle: the security of a
Fabric user should not depend on any part of the system that the user does not
trust. (Equivalently, the security of a user should only depend on components
of the system that the user trusts.)
Fabric users are able to express complete or partial trust in Fabric nodes. If
a user expresses trust in a node, the compromise of that node might harm the
security of that user. The goal of Fabric is to ensure that the degree of trust
expressed bounds the degree to which security might be violated from the per-
spective of that user.
Assumptions
The security of any system depends on the assumptions made about the threats
it is designed to defend against. The threat assumptions that Fabric makes are
typical and weak, so the adversaries considered are typical, if not more power-
ful. This strengthens the security assurances of Fabric.
Compromised nodes are assumed to be malicious. They can give the out-
ward appearance of a well-behaved node while behaving maliciously. Although
Fabric provides a programming language with information-flow security, mali-
cious behaviour is not constrained by the language. The runtime exposes more
information than what is available at the language level, and malicious nodes
can misuse the information they receive from the runtime, such as object iden-
tifiers, object version numbers, and cryptographic keys.
Misuse of information can include leaking confidential information or pro-
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viding corrupt information to other nodes. However, without the appropriate
cryptographic keys, nodes are assumed to be unable to learn encrypted content
or forge digital signatures. As with most work on distributed systems, Fabric
does not attempt to control read channels [78], timing channels, or termination
channels.
Network adversaries are assumed to be unable to read or fabricate network
messages on trusted channels. This assumption is justified by the use of SSL
for all store–worker and worker–worker communication. Adversaries can learn
information from the size, existence, and timing of network messages. As with
most work on distributed systems, Fabric ignores these covert channels. Net-
work adversaries can also prevent the delivery of messages. The availability of
services written using Fabric depends on an assumption that network messages
are eventually delivered.
2.1.2 Storage nodes
Storage nodes (stores) persistently store objects and, on request, provide copies
of object data to worker nodes and dissemination nodes. Access control pre-
vents nodes from obtaining data they should not see. The mechanism for this is
described briefly here; details are given in Section 2.3.5.
Every object has an associated label describing the confidentiality and in-
tegrity requirements of the object’s data (Section 2.2.3). When a worker requests
a copy of an object from a store, the store examines the confidentiality part of
the object’s label. If the worker is trusted enough to read the object, then the
store can securely send the worker an unencrypted copy of the object (though
the network channel is of course encrypted by SSL).
This access-control mechanism works by treating each Fabric node as a prin-
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cipal that tracks how much it trusts the nodes with which it interacts. Trust re-
lationships are created by the delegation mechanisms described in Section 2.2.1.
After a worker fetches an object, it can perform computations using this
cached copy, perhaps modifying its state. When the transaction containing these
computations completes, the worker commits object updates to the stores that
hold objects involved in the transaction. The transaction succeeds only if it is se-
rializable with other transactions at those stores. As with object fetch requests,
the store also enforces access control on update requests based on the degree of
trust in the worker and the integrity policies in these objects’ labels.
2.1.3 Worker nodes
Workers execute Fabric programs, which are typically written in the Fabric lan-
guage. Programs may incorporate code written in other languages, such as the
Fabric intermediate language, FabIL. However, such code is considered trusted:
a worker running such code must trust it to maintain the security and consis-
tency of the objects it uses. A worker only executes trusted code if it is stored
on its local file system. In principle, mobile code (code provided by other nodes)
can be downloaded and executed if the code is written in Fabric, and compiled
and signed by a node that the worker trusts. The design described in this dis-
sertation has been extended in [3] to add partial support for mobile code.
Fabric could, in principle, provide certifying compilation [58], allowing Fab-
ric nodes to check that compiled code obeys the Fabric type system—and there-
fore that it correctly enforces access control and information-flow control—
without relying on trusting the compiler or the node that runs it. The design
and implementation of this feature are left to future work.
Fabric programs modify objects only inside transactions, which the Fabric
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programming language exposes to the programmer as a simple atomic con-
struct. Transactions can be nested, which is important for making code compo-
sitional. During transactions, object updates are logged in an undo/redo log,
and are rolled back if the transaction fails. Such failures can happen because of
inconsistency, deadlock, or an application-defined failure.
A Fabric program may be run entirely on a single worker that issues requests
to stores (or to dissemination nodes) for objects that it needs. This data-shipping
approach makes sense if the cost of moving data is small compared to the cost of
computation, and if the objects’ security policies permit the worker to compute
using them.
When data shipping does not make sense, function shipping may be used in-
stead. Execution of a Fabric program may be distributed across multiple work-
ers, by using remote method calls to transfer control to other workers. Remote
method calls in Fabric differ from related mechanisms such as Java RMI [62] or
CORBA [61]:
• The receiver object on which the method is invoked need not be located at
the remote worker (more precisely, cached at it) at the time of the call. In
fact, the receiver object could be cached at the caller, at the callee, or at
neither. Invocation causes the callee worker to cache a copy of the receiver
object if it does not yet have a copy.
• The entire method call is executed in its own nested transaction. The ef-
fects of this transaction are not visible to other code running on the remote
node until the commit of the top-level transaction containing the nested
transaction. The commit protocol (Section 2.4.3) causes all workers par-
ticipating in the top-level transaction to commit the sub-transactions that
they executed as part of it.
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• Remote method calls are subject to compile-time and run-time access-
control checks. The caller side is checked at compile time to determine
if the callee is trusted enough to enforce security for the method; the callee
checks at run time that the calling node is trusted enough to invoke the
method that is being called and to see the results of the method (Sec-
tion 2.2.5).
Fabric workers are multithreaded and can concurrently serve requests from
other workers. Pessimistic concurrency control (locking) is used to isolate trans-
actions in different threads from each other.
One important use of remote calls is to invoke an operation on a worker
colocated with a store. Since a colocated worker has low-cost access to persis-
tent objects, this can improve performance substantially. This idea is analogous
to a conventional application issuing a database query for low-cost access to
persistent data. In Fabric, a remote call to a worker that is colocated with a store
can be used to achieve this goal, with two advantages compared to database
queries: the worker can run arbitrary Fabric code, and information-flow secu-
rity is enforced.
2.1.4 Dissemination nodes
Objects are cached at dissemination nodes, to prevent stores with popular ob-
jects from becoming bottlenecks. Rather than requesting objects from remote or
heavily loaded stores, workers can request objects from dissemination nodes.
Objects are disseminated at the granularity of object groups, thereby amortizing
the costs associated with fetching remote objects (Section 2.3.2).
On request, stores provide object data in encrypted form to dissemination
nodes. Receiving encrypted objects does not require as much trust, because the
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fields of the object are not visible without the object’s encryption key, which
dissemination nodes do not possess in general.
Fabric has no prescribed dissemination layer; workers may use any dissem-
ination nodes they choose, and dissemination nodes may use whatever mecha-
nism they want to find and provide objects. In the dissemination layer provided
with the current Fabric implementation, the dissemination nodes form a peer-
to-peer content distribution network based on FreePastry [69]. However, other
dissemination architectures can be substituted if the interface to workers and
stores remains the same.
To help keep caches up to date, workers and dissemination nodes are im-
plicitly subscribed to any object group they read from a store. When any object
in the group is updated, the store sends the updated group to its subscribers.
The dissemination layer is responsible for relaying group updates to workers
that have read them. A transaction that has read out-of-date data can then be
aborted and retried by its worker on receipt of the updated group. Updated
groups are delivered to their subscribers on a best-effort basis.
2.2 The Fabric language
Fabric offers a high-level language for building distributed programs with
information-flow security. It is an extension to the Jif programming lan-
guage [53,56], which also enforces secure information flow and has been used to
build significant systems (e.g., [12, 14, 16, 36]). Fabric adds three major features
to Jif:
• Nested transactions ensure that computations observe and update objects
consistently, and provide clean recovery from failures.
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• Remote method calls (remote procedure calls to methods) allow dis-
tributed computations that span multiple workers.
• Remote objects are accessed transparently, as if they are local objects.
While these features may seem unusual, they are not new.1 The contribution
of Fabric, however, is in combining these features with information-flow secu-
rity. This requires new mechanisms to ensure that, for example, transactions do
not leak confidential information, and remote calls are properly authorized. To
support compile-time and run-time enforcement of secure distributed compu-
tation, Fabric also adds a new trust ordering on information-flow labels.
2.2.1 Principals
Principals in Fabric represent entities with authority, privilege, or trust. This
includes users, roles, groups, organizations, privileges, and Fabric nodes. As in
Jif [53], they are manifested in the Fabric programming language as objects with
the built-in type principal.
Expressing trust: acts-for
Trust relationships between principals are represented by the acts-for rela-
tion [55]. If a principal p acts for principal q, any action by principal p can be
considered to come from principal q as well. These actions include statements
made by principal p. Thus, this acts-for relationship means q trusts p completely.
We write this relationship more compactly as p ≽ q. The acts-for relation ≽ is a
pre-order (transitive and reflexive).
There is a most-trusted top principal ⊺ that acts for all other principals, and a
least-trusted bottom principal  that all principals act for. The operators ∧ and ∨
1Argus [47] has the first two, for example.
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can be used to form conjunctions and disjunctions of principals. The conjunctive
principal p ∧ q represents the joint authority of p and q, and acts for them both:
p ∧ q ≽ p and p ∧ q ≽ q. The disjunctive principal p ∨ q represents the disjoint
authority of p and q. Both p and q act for the disjunctive principal p ∨ q (i.e.,
p ≽ p ∨ q and q ≽ p ∨ q). The conjunctive and disjunctive principal operators are
both commutative and associative.
Object representation of principals
The Fabric model of principals is similar to the model in Jif 3.0 [14].
Principals are represented as objects that inherit from the abstract class
fabric.lang.security.Principal.2 Instances of any subclass can be used as
principals. Like other Fabric objects, principals can be distributed and persis-
tent.
Principals control their acts-for relationships by implementing a method
p.delegatesTo(q), which tests whether q directly acts for p. This allows a
principal to say who can directly act for it. The Fabric runtime system at each
worker node automatically computes and stores the transitive closure of these
direct acts-for relationships in a security cache (Section 2.3.8). The runtime sys-
tem also exposes operations for notifying it that acts-for relationships have been
added, which causes the acts-for cache to be updated conservatively to remove
any information that might be stale. In general, worker nodes may have differ-
ent partial views of the acts-for relation. The monotonicity of the label system
ensures that security decisions based on these partial views are sound: any acts-
for relationships that a worker has not observed would only make its security
decisions more permissive [55].
2Instances of fabric.lang.security.Principal can be implicitly cast to the built-in type
principal, and vice versa.
20
The Fabric runtime also supports the revocation of acts-for relationships.
Supporting revocation involves a trade-off between security and performance
(or availability), a challenge commonly encountered in the design of public-key
infrastructures. To ensure sound authorization decisions, revocation notifica-
tions must rapidly propagate to all who might rely on the revoked authority.
However, rapid propagation comes at a performance cost, and the propagation
mechanism itself can be vulnerable to denial-of-service attack.
Fabric does not guarantee immediate notification of revoked acts-for rela-
tionships. A worker with a cached copy of principal p will not see a revoca-
tion of “q acts for p” until it receives an updated copy of p. This can happen
through object subscriptions (Section 2.3.10). However, the subscription mech-
anism only operates on a best-effort basis. In the worst case, the worker will not
receive the updated p until a transaction attempts to commit, after having ob-
served the revoked acts-for relationship. As with any transaction that observes
stale data, the transaction is rolled back and retried with the new version of p.
Node principals
Principals can use acts-for relationships to specify the degree to which they
trust Fabric nodes. Fabric nodes are represented as first-class objects in Fab-
ric that can be implicitly converted to principal objects that represent the node.
For example, a storage node might be represented as a variable s of type
fabric.worker.Store. The test s actsfor p would then test whether a prin-
cipal p trusts s. This would always be the case if the principal p were stored at
store s.
Fabric has a built-in way to authenticate worker nodes as corresponding
to their Fabric worker-node objects. This is accomplished using X.509 certifi-
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cates [37] that include the node’s public key and the oid of its principal object
(Section 2.3.4). Whether the certificates of a given certificate authority are ac-
cepted is decided by the Fabric node receiving them.
Authority
When running, Fabric code can possess the authority of a principal, and may
carry out actions permitted to that principal, such as declassifying information
to lower its confidentiality, or endorsing information to raise its integrity. As in
Jif, code can obtain the authority of a principal p in two ways. In both cases, the
code must be compiled and signed by a node that acts for p.
First, a class can declare it has authority by using a clause authority(p).
A method of the class can then claim this authority with a clause where
authority(p). Second, authority can be delegated via a method call, if the
method being called is annotated with a clause where caller(p). Such meth-
ods with delegated authority can only be called from code that possesses the
authority of p. While this model of delegating authority has similarities to Java
stack inspection [76], it differs in that authority is statically checked except at re-
mote method calls, where the receiver checks that the calling node is sufficiently
trusted (Section 2.2.5).
Principals express their security concerns by labelling information with
information-flow policies.
2.2.2 Labels
Information security in Fabric is provided by information-flow control. All
information is labelled with information-flow policies. These labels are prop-
agated through computation using compile-time type checking, but run-time
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checks are used for dynamic policies and to deal with untrusted nodes. There
are two kinds of policies: confidentiality policies and integrity policies. While
these policies are similar to those in Jif, they have a subtly different interpreta-
tion in Fabric because of the federated nature of the system.
Confidentiality and integrity policies
Confidentiality policies and integrity policies are built up from reader policies
and writer policies, respectively. These, in turn, have two components: owners
and subjects. The owner of a policy specifies the principal whose information is
being governed by the policy. The subject specifies the principal who can act on
(learn or affect) that information.
The reader policy alice→bob, for example, says that principal alice owns the
policy and that she permits principal bob to indirectly learn about (or directly
read) information that is labelled with the policy. If bob is trustworthy, however,
he will not leak this information to untrusted third parties, because the informa-
tion is not his to disclose. Therefore, alice is trusting bob to not inappropriately
leak information labelled with the policy alice→bob.
Similarly, the writer policy alice←bob means that alice permits bob to indi-
rectly affect (or directly modify) the labelled information; she is trusting bob to
not inappropriately taint that information with data from untrusted sources.
Owners are implicitly subjects in their own policies. A principal is a reader
for a reader policy o → r if the principal acts for o ∨ r. A principal is a writer for
a writer policy o ← w if the principal acts for o ∨ w. So, the policy alice→bob
is equivalent to alice→bob∨alice, also written as alice→bob,alice. Similarly,
alice←bob is equivalent to alice←bob∨alice, also written alice←bob,alice.
A confidentiality policy is a set of reader policies, all of which are enforced
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simultaneously; a principal can learn about a value only when it is a reader for
all reader policies in the value’s confidentiality policy. An integrity policy is a set
of writer policies; a principal can affect a value only when it is a writer for any
writer policy in the value’s integrity policy.
A label is simply a set of confidentiality and integrity policies, such as
{alice→bob;bob←alice}. These decentralized labels [55] keep track of whose se-
curity is being enforced, which is useful for Fabric, where principals need to
cooperate despite mutual distrust.
Declassification and endorsement
Information-flow security policies are expressed in terms of principals, which is
important because it enables the integration of access control and information-
flow control. A key use of this integration is for authorizing the downgrading
of information-flow policies through declassification (for confidentiality) and
endorsement (for integrity).
For example, on a worker w trusted by alice (i.e., w ≽ alice), information
labelled with the policy alice→bob can be explicitly declassified by code that is
running with the authority of alice, removing that policy from the label.
Information-flow ordering
The Fabric compiler checks information flows at compile time to ensure that
both explicit and implicit [25] information flows are secure. To do this, it uses
Jif’s information-flow ordering ⊑, which captures when information flow is secure:
if L1 ⊑ L2, then information labelled L1 can securely flow to (or be relabelled
with) L2. The relationship L1 ⊑ L2 can be read “L1 flows to L2”.
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(a) Reader policies (b) Writer policies
Figure 2.2: Orderings on reader and writer policies
Reader policies Figure 2.2a depicts how the acts-for relation and information-
flow ordering relate for reader policies. Information flows upwards in the di-
agram. The information-flow ordering is covariant in both the owner and the
subject. For example, we have {alice→ bob} ⊑ {charlie→ dora} exactly when
charlie ≽ alice (owner covariance) and dora ≽ bob ∨ alice3 (subject covari-
ance).
As a value flows through a program, the set of principals that can declassify
or read should only get smaller (unless the value is declassified or the principal
hierarchy changes). Owner covariance is important because it ensures control
of declassification is not lost. The new owner acts for the old owner, so any
principal having the authority to declassify under the new policy also had that
authority under the old policy. Subject covariance ensures information is not
leaked; the new subject acts for the old subject, so any principal able to read
under the new policy also had that ability under the old policy.
Therefore, the least reader policy, at the bottom of Figure 2.2a, describes in-
formation that is completely public: { → }. The greatest reader policy, at the
top of the figure, describes information that is completely secret: {⊺→ ⊺}.
3The subject covariance condition is technically dora ∨ charlie ≽ bob ∨ alice, but the dis-
junction with dora is omitted because it is satisfied by owner covariance.
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Writer policies Integrity works the opposite way, because integrity policies
allow flow from trusted sources to untrusted recipients. Integrity policies reflect
the set of principals that could have endorsed or modified a value. To be safe,
this should only get larger (unless the value is further endorsed or the principal
hierarchy changes).
Figure 2.2b shows how the acts-for relation and information-flow ordering
relate for writer policies. Information flows downwards in the diagram. The
information-flow ordering is contravariant in both the owner and the subject.
The relationship {alice ← bob} ⊑ {charlie ← dora} holds exactly when we
have alice ≽ charlie (owner contravariance) and bob ≽ dora∨charlie4 (subject
contravariance).
Owner contravariance ensures those principals who have endorsed the la-
belled information are reflected in the new owner. The old owner acts for the
new owner, so any principal who may have endorsed to the old policy could
also have endorsed to the new policy. Subject contravariance ensures those
principals who have affected the labelled information are reflected in the new
subject. The old subject acts for the new subject, so any principal able to modify
under the old policy also has that ability under the new policy.5
Therefore, the least writer policy, at the top of Figure 2.2b, describes infor-
mation that is completely uncorrupted: {⊺ ← ⊺}. The greatest writer policy,
at the bottom of the figure, describes information that is completely corrupted:{ ← }. While this ordering is opposite of the intuitive ordering for integrity,
we still refer to information labelled { ← } as having low integrity, and infor-
mation labelled {⊺← ⊺} as having high integrity. Similarly, phrases such as lower
integrity and higher integrity refer to the intuitive ordering.
4The subject contravariance condition is technically bob ∨ alice ≽ dora ∨ charlie, but the
disjunction with alice is omitted because it is satisfied by owner contravariance.
5See [54] for more justification of these rules.
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Figure 2.3: Orderings on the space of labels
Labels Information labelled L1 can flow to another label L2 if every reader
policy in L1 can flow to every reader policy in L2, and every writer policy in L1
can flow to every writer policy in L2.
Figure 2.3 depicts the information-flow ordering on labels.6 Information
flows upwards in the diagram. The least label, at the bottom of the figure, de-
scribes information that can flow anywhere, because it is public and completely
uncorrupted: { → ;⊺ ← ⊺}. The greatest label, at the top of the figure, de-
scribes information that can flow nowhere, because it is completely secret and
completely corrupted: {⊺→ ⊺;← }.
Formally, the information-flow ordering is a pre-order over the set of labels.
The equivalence classes of labels form a bounded join-semilattice, where lifted
set unions are joins.7 The equivalence classes of confidentiality policies form a
sub-semilattice, as do the equivalence classes of integrity policies.
6Whereas Figure 2.2 shows each of the spaces of confidentiality and integrity policies in two
dimensions, in Figure 2.3 they are each collapsed to one dimension for clarity.
7A meet operator can be defined as well to obtain a full lattice. See [54] for details.
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1 int {alice→bob} x;
2 int {alice→bob, charlie} y;
3 x = y; // OK: bob ≽ (bob ∨ charlie)
4 y = x; // Invalid
5 if (charlie actsfor bob) {
6 y = x; // OK: charlie ≽ bob, so (bob ∨ charlie) ≽ bob
7 }
Figure 2.4: Code example illustrating information-flow rules
Example The code in Figure 2.4 illustrates these rules. The assignment from
y to x (line 3) is secure because the information in y can be learned by fewer
readers (only bob rather than both bob and charlie). The assignment from x
to y (line 4) is rejected by the compiler, because it permits charlie to read the
information. However, the second assignment from x to y (line 6) is allowed
because it occurs in a context where charlie is known to act for bob, and can
therefore already read any information that bob can.
Trust ordering
Fabric extends the DLM by defining a second ordering on labels, the trust or-
dering, which is useful for reasoning about the enforcement of policies by a par-
tially trusted platform. A label L1 may require at least as much trust as a label
L2, which we write as L1 ≽ L2 by analogy with the trust ordering on princi-
pals. If L1 requires at least as much trust as L2, then any platform trusted to
enforce L1 is also trusted to enforce L2. This happens when L1 describes confi-
dentiality and integrity policies that are at least as strong as those in L2; unlike
in the information-flow ordering, integrity is not opposite to confidentiality in
the trust ordering.
Therefore, both confidentiality and integrity use the same rules in the trust
ordering. As shown in Figure 2.2, they are covariant in both the owner and the
subject; required trust increases upwards in the diagram. Both {alice → bob} ≽
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{charlie→ dora} and {alice← bob} ≽ {charlie← dora} are true exactly when
alice ≽ charlie and bob ≽ dora ∨ charlie.
Figure 2.3 depicts the trust ordering on labels, and how it relates to the
information-flow ordering. Required trust increases rightwards in the diagram.
In the trust ordering, the least label (leftmost in the figure) describes informa-
tion that requires no trust to enforce its security, because it is completely public
and completely corrupted: { → ; ← }. The greatest label (rightmost in the
figure) is for information that is completely secret and completely uncorrupted:{⊺→ ⊺;⊺← ⊺}.
2.2.3 Object labels
Like in Jif, each field in a Fabric object can have a different label that the compiler
uses to control the flow of the information contained in that field. For efficiency,
these field labels are summarized into a single object label that governs the use
of information in that object at run time. This label determines which storage
nodes can store the object persistently and which worker nodes can cache and
compute directly on the object. It also controls which object groups an object
may be part of and which key objects may be used to encrypt it for dissemina-
tion.
An object with label Lo may be stored securely on a store n if the store is
trusted to enforce Lo. Recalling that n can be used as a principal, this condition
is captured formally using the trust ordering on labels:
{⊺→ n;⊺← n} ≽ Lo (2.1)
To see this, suppose Lo has a confidentiality policy {p → q}, which is equivalent
to {p→ p∨q}. Condition 2.1 holds exactly when ⊺ ≽ p (always true) and n ≽ p∨q,
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which implies n ≽ p or n ≽ q—either p must trust n, or p must believe that n
is allowed to read things that q is allowed to read. Conversely, if Lo has an
integrity policy {p← q}, we require the same condition, n ≽ p∨ q—either p trusts
n, or p believes that n is allowed to affect things that q is. Therefore we can write
L(n) to denote the label corresponding to node n, which is {⊺ → n;⊺ ← n}, and
express condition 2.1 simply as L(n) ≽ Lo.
The object label is defined as the trust-ordering join of the object’s field labels.
This is a safe but conservative summary that can prohibit some secure flows
at run time; however, per-field precision can be recovered by introducing an
additional level of indirection in the object graph.
Fabric classes may be parameterized with respect to labels or principals, so
different instances of the same class may have different labels. This feature, in-
herited from Jif, allows implementation of reusable classes, such as data struc-
tures that can hold information with different labels.
By design, Fabric does not provide persistence by reachability [4] because it
can lead to unintended persistence. Therefore, constructors are annotated to
indicate the store on which the newly created object should be made persistent.
The call new C@s(...) creates a new object of class C on the store identified
by the variable s. Except for reserving oids,8 no communication with the store
is needed until commit. If the store of an object is omitted, the new object is
created at the same store as the object whose method calls new. Objects may
have non-final fields that are marked transient. These transient fields are not
saved persistently, which is similar to their treatment by Java serialization [32].
8This is done in batch ahead of time, so the communication cost for this can be amortized
across many objects.
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2.2.4 Tracking implicit flows
Information can be conveyed by program control flow. If not controlled, these
implicit flows can allow adversaries to learn about confidential information from
control flow, or to influence high-integrity information by affecting control flow.
Fabric controls implicit flows through the program-counter label, written pc,
which captures the confidentiality and integrity of control flow. The program-
counter label works by constraining side effects; to assign to a variable x with
label Lx, Fabric requires pc ⊑ Lx. If this condition does not hold, either informa-
tion with a stronger confidentiality policy could leak into x, or information with
a weaker integrity policy could affect x.
Implicit flows cross method-call boundaries, both local and remote. To track
these flows, object methods are annotated with a begin label that constrains the
program-counter label of the caller, as well as the effects of the method. The
pc of the caller must flow to the begin label, which in turn must flow to the
label of any variables assigned by the method. This ensures that the caller’s pc
can flow to the method’s assignments. Implicit flows via exceptions and other
control-flow mechanisms are also tracked [53].
Because implicit flows are controlled, untrusted code and untrusted data
cannot affect high-integrity control flow unless an explicit downgrading action
is taken, using the authority of the principals whose integrity policies are af-
fected. Furthermore, because Fabric enforces robustness [13], untrusted code
and untrusted data cannot affect information release. Thus, Fabric provides
general protection against a wide range of security vulnerabilities.
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1 void m1{alice←} () {
2 Worker rw = findWorker("bob.example.org");
3 if (rw actsfor bob) {
4 int{alice→bob} data = 1;
5 int{alice→} y = m2@rw(data);
6 }
7 }
8
9 int{alice→bob} m2{alice←} (int{alice→bob} x) {
10 return x+1;
11 }
Figure 2.5: A remote call in Fabric
Figure 2.6: Compile-time and run-time checks for remote calls
2.2.5 Remote calls
Distributed control transfers are always explicit in Fabric. Fabric introduces the
syntax o.m@w(a1,...,an) to signify a remote method call to the worker node
identified by variable w, invoking the method m of object o. If the syntax @w is
omitted, the method call is always local, even if the object o is not cached on the
current node (in which case, the object will be fetched and the method invoked
locally). Figure 2.5 shows example code in which, at line 5, a method m1 calls
a method m2 on the same object, but at a remote worker that is dynamically
looked up using its hostname.
Remote method calls are subject to both compile-time and run-time check-
ing. Figure 2.6 illustrates the checks made. The compiler permits a call to a re-
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mote method only if it can statically determine that the call is secure, as shown
on the left side of the figure. Information sent to a receiver worker rw can be
read by rw, so all information sent in the call (the object, the arguments, and the
implicit flow) must have labels Ls where Ls ⊑ {⊺ → rw}. For example, in Fig-
ure 2.5, the variable data, with label {alice→ bob}, can be passed to method m2
only because the call happens in a context where it is known that rw ≽ bob, and
hence {alice→ bob} ⊑ {⊺→ rw}.
Information received from rw can be affected by it, so by a similar argument,
all information returned from the call must have labels Lr where {⊺← rw} ⊑ Lr.
The recipient of a remote method call has no a priori knowledge that the
caller is to be trusted, so run-time checking is needed. When a call occurs from
caller worker cw to receiver worker rw, the receiver checks all information sent
or received at label L (including implicit flows), to ensure that {⊺← cw} ≽ L. For
example, in Figure 2.5, the method m2 has a begin label that requires the integrity{alice ←}. Therefore, when bob.example.org receives the remote call to m2, it
will check that the calling worker has the authority of alice, thereby ensuring{⊺ ← cw} ≽ {alice ←}. The compiler makes additional checks to ensure that
these run-time checks themselves do not leak information.
2.2.6 Transactions
All changes to Fabric objects take place inside transactions, to provide concur-
rency control and ensure consistency of reads and writes. A transaction is in-
dicated in Fabric code by the construct atomic { S }, where the transaction
body S is a sequence of statements. The semantics is that the statement S is
executed atomically and in isolation from all other computations in Fabric. In
other words, Fabric enforces serializability of transactions.
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Accesses to mutable fields of Fabric objects are not permitted outside trans-
actions. Reads from objects that occur outside transactions are each treated as
its own transaction.
If a transaction body throws an exception, the transaction is considered to
have failed, and is aborted. If the body terminates successfully, its side effects
become visible outside its transaction. Failure due to conflict with other transac-
tions causes the atomic block to be retried automatically with exponential back-
off. If the maximum number of retries is exceeded, the transaction is terminated.
Transactions may also be explicitly retried or aborted by the programmer. A
retry statement rolls back the enclosing atomic block and restarts it from the
beginning; an abort statement also rolls back the enclosing atomic block, but
results in throwing the exception UserAbortException. Aborting a transaction
creates an implicit flow; therefore, Fabric statically enforces that the pc of the
abort is lower than or equal to the pc of the atomic block: pcabort ⊑ pcatomic.
Exceptions generated by the transaction body are checked similarly.
Atomic blocks may be used even during a transaction, because Fabric al-
lows nested transactions. This allows programmers to enforce atomicity with-
out worrying about whether their abstractions are at “top level” or not. Atomic
blocks can also be used as a way to cleanly recover from application-defined
failures, via abort.
Multi-worker computations (i.e., computations with remote calls) take place
in atomic, isolated transactions that span all the workers involved. The Fabric
runtime system ensures that when multiple workers use the same object within
a transaction, updates to the object are propagated between them as necessary
(Section 2.4.1).
Transactions are single-threaded; new threads cannot be started inside a
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transaction, though a worker may run multiple transactions concurrently. This
choice was made largely to simplify the implementation, though it maps well
onto many of the applications for which Fabric is intended.
Fabric uses a mix of optimistic and pessimistic concurrency control. In the
distributed setting, it is optimistic, because worker nodes compute on cached
copies of objects that may be out of date, and a distributed two-phase com-
mit protocol [31] ensures consistency at commit time. However, to coordinate
threads running on the same worker, Fabric uses pessimistic concurrency con-
trol, in which threads acquire locks on objects.
Though distributed deadlocks may occur in Fabric, there are standard tech-
niques (e.g, edge chasing [11]) for detecting and avoiding them in a non-
federated context. We leave to future work the design and implementation of a
secure deadlock-detection mechanism for a federated system like Fabric.
2.2.7 Java interoperability
Fabric programs can be written using a mixture of Java, Fabric, and FabIL (the
Fabric intermediate language). FabIL is an extension to Java that supports trans-
actions and remote calls, but not information-flow labels or static information-
flow control. More concretely, FabIL supports the atomic construct and gives
the ability to invoke methods and constructors with annotations @w and @s re-
spectively. Transaction management is performed on Fabric and FabIL objects
but not on Java objects, so the effects of failed transactions on Java objects are
not rolled back.
FabIL and Java code is considered trusted, and workers only execute trusted
code that is stored on their local file system. Therefore, the use of FabIL or
Java code in Fabric programs offers lower assurance to principals who trust the
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nodes running this code. This is compatible with the decentralized security
principle, because the effects of trusted code is confined to these principals.
FabIL can be convenient for code whose security properties are not accu-
rately captured by static information-flow analysis, making the labels of the full
Fabric language counterproductive. An example is code implementing cryptog-
raphy.
2.3 The Fabric runtime system
This section describes the features of the Fabric runtime system for supporting
single-worker transactions. Section 2.4 extends these features with support for
multi-worker transactions and remote calls.
2.3.1 Object model
Information in Fabric is stored in objects. Fabric objects are similar to Java ob-
jects; they are typically small and can be manipulated directly at the language
level. Fabric also has array objects, to support larger data aggregates. Like Java
objects, Fabric objects are mutable and are equipped with a notion of identity.
Naming
Objects are named throughout Fabric by object identifiers (oids). An object iden-
tifier has two parts: a store identifier, which is a fully qualified DNS hostname,
and a 64-bit object number (onum), which identifies the object on that node.
An object identifier can be transmitted through channels external to Fabric, by
writing it as a uniform resource locator (URL) with the form fab://store/onum,
where store is a fully qualified DNS hostname and onum is the object number.
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An object identifier is permanent in the sense that it continues to refer to the
same object for the lifetime of that object, and Fabric nodes always can use the
identifier to find the object. If an object moves to a different store, acquiring an
additional oid, the original oid still works because the original store is respon-
sible for keeping a forwarding pointer in a surrogate object. Long forwarding
chains of surrogate objects can reduce performance and reliability; path com-
pression can be used to avoid this [22, 28, 38].
Knowing the oid of an object gives the power to name that object, but not
the power to access it: oids are not capabilities [26]. If object names were capa-
bilities, knowing the name of an object would confer the power to access any
object reachable from it. To prevent covert channels that might arise because
adversaries can see object identifiers, object numbers are generated by a crypto-
graphically strong pseudo-random number generator. Therefore, an adversary
cannot probe for the existence of a particular object, and an oid conveys no in-
formation other than the name of the node that persistently stores the object.
Fabric uses DNS to map hostnames to IP addresses, but relies on X.509 cer-
tificates to verify the identity of the named hosts and to establish secure SSL
connections to them. Therefore, certificate authorities are the roots of trust and
naming, as in the Web.
Fabric applications can implement their own naming schemes using Fabric
objects. For example, a naming scheme based on directories and path names is
easy to implement using a persistent hash map.
Labels
Every object has an associated object label that summarizes the confidential-
ity and integrity requirements associated with the object’s data. It is used for
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information-flow control and to control access to the object by Fabric nodes.
The object label is defined as the trust-ordering join of the labels of the fields in
the object’s class. This join is computed by the compiler, where possible. How-
ever, some of this computation is performed by the Fabric runtime system. For
example, if the compiler determines that an object label depends on a class pa-
rameter, which can happen when a field label uses a class parameter, then part
of the object-label computation must be done at run time, when the object is
constructed.
Classes
Every Fabric object, including array objects, contains a ClassRef, which is a
reference to the object’s class that is paired with the SHA-256 hash of the class’s
code. For classes stored in Fabric, the reference is the oid of a class object, a Fabric
object that represents the object’s class in the Fabric language and contains the
class’s code. For other classes, the reference is simply the Java fully qualified
name of the class.
The ClassRef creates an unforgeable binding between each object and the
correct code for implementing that object. When objects are received over the
network, the expected hash in the object’s ClassRef is checked against the actual
hash of the object’s class.
Versions
Fabric objects can be mutable. Each object has a current version number, which
is incremented when a transaction that updates the object is committed. The
version number distinguishes current and old versions of objects. If worker
nodes try to compute with out-of-date object versions, the transaction will fail
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on commit and will be retried with the current versions. The version number is
an information channel with the same confidentiality and integrity as the fields
of the object; therefore, it is protected by the same mechanisms.
2.3.2 Object groups
On a store, objects are associated with object groups containing a set of related
objects. Object groups are the unit of object distribution: when an object is
requested by a worker or dissemination node, the entire group is pre-fetched
from the store, amortizing the cost of store operations over multiple objects. Ev-
ery object in the object group is required to have the same security policy, so
that the entire group can be treated uniformly with respect to access control,
confidentiality, and integrity. The binding between an object and its group is
not permanent; the store constructs object groups as needed and discards infre-
quently used object groups. To improve locality, the store tries to create object
groups from objects connected in the object graph.
2.3.3 Dissemination and encryption
To avoid placing trust in the dissemination layer, disseminated object groups
are encrypted using a symmetric key and signed with the public key of the
originating store. The symmetric encryption key is stored in a key object that is
not disseminated and must be fetched directly from its store. When an object
group is fetched, the dissemination node sends the oid of the key object and the
random initialization vector needed for decryption. Key objects are ordinarily
shared across many disseminated object groups, so workers should not need to
fetch them often.
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A B
B’s server certificate:[B, kpubB ]CA
A’s principal certificate chain:[A’s principal oid, kpubA ]
SA
, [SA, kpubSA ]CA
B’s principal certificate chain:[B’s principal oid, kpubB ]SB , [SB, kpubSB ]CA
Phase I(Client-authenticatedSSL handshake∗ )
Phase II
∗For simplicity, only certifi-
cate messages are shown in
the SSL handshake.
Figure 2.7: Authentication protocol sequence. Node A is connecting to node B.
Disseminated object groups are identified by dissemination nodes based on
the oid of a contained object called the head object. The oid of the head object is
exposed in the object group, but other oids in the object group (and the contents
of all objects) are hidden by encryption.
2.3.4 Node authentication
Workers and stores authenticate each other when communicating over the net-
work. The goal of authentication is to establish the principal oid (i.e., the oid of
the principal object) of the remote host, so that it can be used in authorization
checks. Figure 2.7 shows a protocol sequence diagram for the mutual authenti-
cation of nodes A and B. Authentication occurs in two phases.
In the first phase, A connects to B and performs a client-authenticated SSL
handshake. Each node B that is capable of receiving connections has a server
certificate, which is an X.509 certificate signed by a certificate authority (CA).
This certificate binds B’s DNS hostname to B’s public key, and is therefore simi-
lar to an SSL certificate for the web. Whether the certificates of a given CA are
accepted is decided by the Fabric node receiving them.
Every node A has a principal certificate for performing SSL client authentica-
40
tion. This is an X.509 certificate that binds A’s principal oid to A’s public key. The
certificate is signed by the storage node that stores the principal object. With the
store’s server certificate, this gives a CA-rooted certificate chain for the oid of
A’s principal object.
After a successful SSL handshake, A knows it has contacted the correct node,
because it knows the remote node has B’s private key. Similarly, B knows A’s
principal oid, because of SSL client authentication, so A is authenticated to B.
In the second phase, B completes the mutual authentication by sending its
principal certificate to A. This authenticates B if A can validate the certificate’s
signature, and can match the public key in the certificate with the one in B’s
server certificate.
Once the principal object of a remote node is established, it can be used in
authorization checks.
2.3.5 Authorization checks
A Fabric node performs authorization checks to ensure confidentiality and in-
tegrity are maintained when sending or receiving data over the network. Stores
perform authorization checks in a fresh top-level transaction on a colocated
worker. When a worker w requests an object with label L, the store ensures
that the worker is trusted to enforce the confidentiality part of L by checking
L ⊑ {⊺ → w}. Similarly, when the worker commits an update to the object, the
store ensures that the worker is trusted to enforce the integrity part of L by
checking {⊺← w} ⊑ L.
Workers perform analogous checks when receiving an object from a store,
and when committing an object to a store. The authorization checks for remote
calls are the run-time checks described in Section 2.2.5.
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2.3.6 Transaction management and object locking
Every thread in the worker has a transaction manager that holds transaction
state. The copy of each Fabric object at a worker has a reader-writer lock for
isolating transactions in different threads from each other.
Each object also contains a version number that its store increments when it
commits an update to the object. These are used to ensure consistency at commit
time, as described below.
During computation, the transaction manager logs the version numbers of
objects that are read or written, and the identities of the objects that are created.
It acquires read locks for objects that are read, and write locks for objects that
are written or created. The first write to an object during a transaction also logs
the prior state of the object in an object history so that the transaction manager
can restore the object’s state in case the transaction aborts.
Because transactions can be nested, transaction logs and object histories are
hierarchical. When a local sub-transaction is created, it inherits the locks held by
its parent. When the sub-transaction commits, its log is merged with the parent
transaction log, and its locks are transferred to the parent transaction. If the sub-
transaction aborts, it discards its log, relinquishes the locks it has acquired, and
restores the state of the objects it has modified.
To reduce logging overhead, the copy of each object at a worker has a reader
stamp, which is a reference to the last transaction that read the object. No logging
needs to be done for a read access if the current transaction matches the reader
stamp. Similarly, each object has a writer stamp for the last transaction that mod-
ified the object, and no logging is needed if the current transaction matches the
writer stamp. Obtaining the write lock clears the reader stamp.
When a worker commits a top-level transaction, it initiates a two-phase com-
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mit protocol [31] with the stores for the objects accessed during the transaction.
The information sent to each store includes the version numbers of objects ac-
cessed during the transaction and the new data for written objects. The store
checks that its authoritative version numbers match the version numbers re-
ported by the worker, to ensure the transaction used up-to-date information.
For security, the store also performs the authorization checks described in Sec-
tion 2.3.5 to ensure that the worker is trusted to modify the written objects.
2.3.7 Memory management
To conserve memory, cached objects may be evicted if they have no uncommit-
ted changes. In the current implementation, cached objects are evicted auto-
matically by the Java runtime system, because they are referenced using a Java
SoftReference object. When an object is modified or created, its eviction is pre-
vented by creating a hard reference to the object in the transaction log. This hard
reference is destroyed when the transaction aborts or commits.
2.3.8 The security cache
The Fabric runtime system caches the results of acts-for tests and label compar-
isons. This memoization mechanism is adapted from Jif [14] and reduces the
overhead of these dynamic tests.
The contents of the cache is the same as in Jif. Separate caches are kept for
positive and negative results of acts-for tests and label comparisons. As with
Jif, soundness is maintained by clearing the negative caches when a principal
delegation is added, and by removing the positive-cache entries that depend on
any principal delegation that is removed.
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In Fabric, the security cache is tied to the transaction manager, to ensure that
the use of the security cache does not introduce unsoundness. Each transaction
has its own security cache, and because transactions can be nested, the security
cache is hierarchical. When a sub-transaction is created, it inherits the cache
entries from its parent. When the sub-transaction commits, its cache is merged
with the parent cache; if the sub-transaction aborts, its cache is discarded. This
ensures that the security cache of the parent transaction is isolated from changes
to the principal hierarchy made in an aborted sub-transaction.
2.3.9 Handling failures of optimism
Computations on workers run transactions optimistically, which means that a
transaction can fail in various ways. The worker has enough information to roll
the transaction back safely in each case. At commit time, the system can detect
inconsistencies that have arisen because another worker has updated an object
that was accessed during the transaction. The stores inform the workers which
objects involved in the transaction were out of date; the workers then flush their
caches of the stale objects before retrying the transaction.
Another possible failure is that the objects read by the transaction are already
inconsistent, breaking invariants on which the application code relies. Broken
invariants can lead to errors in the execution of the application. Incorrectly com-
puted results are not an issue because they will be detected and rolled back at
commit time. Exceptions may also result, but as discussed earlier, exceptions
also cause transaction failure and rollback. Finally, an application’s computa-
tion might diverge rather than terminate. Fabric handles divergence by retrying
transactions that are running too long. On retry, the transaction is given more
time in case it is genuinely a long-running transaction. By geometrically grow-
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Figure 2.8: The object-subscription mechanism
ing the retry timeout, the expected running time is inflated by only a constant
factor.
Because Fabric has subscription mechanisms for refreshing workers and dis-
semination nodes with updated objects, the object cache at a worker should
tend to be up-to-date, and inconsistent computations in an application can be
detected before a transaction completes.
2.3.10 Object subscriptions
To help keep caches up to date, workers and dissemination nodes are implicitly
subscribed to any object group they read. Figure 2.8 illustrates this subscription
mechanism. When a worker reads an object group from a dissemination node
(1), it becomes subscribed to the group (2). Workers and dissemination nodes
that read directly from a store (3) are similarly subscribed (4).
When any object in the group is updated (5), the store sends the updated
group to its subscribers (6). The dissemination layer is responsible for relaying
group updates to workers that have read them (7). Group updates are delivered
on a best-effort basis. On receipt of the updated group, a worker can abort and
retry any transaction that has read out-of-date data.
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2.4 Support for distributed computation
Fabric transactions can be distributed across multiple workers by executing re-
mote calls within a transaction. The whole transaction runs in isolation from
other Fabric transactions, and its side effects are committed atomically. The
ability to distribute transactions is crucial for reconciling expressiveness with
security. Although some workers are not trusted enough to read or write some
objects, it is secure for them to perform these updates by calling code on a suffi-
ciently trusted worker. This section describes the features of the runtime system
that support secure distributed transactions.
2.4.1 Writer maps
In a distributed transaction, an object can be shared and updated by multiple
workers. This is challenging. For consistency, workers need to compute on the
latest version of the shared object as it is updated. For performance, workers
should be able to locally cache objects that are shared but not updated. For
security, updates to an object with confidentiality L should not be learned by a
worker w unless L ⊑ {⊺→ w}. To allow workers to efficiently check for updates to
objects they are caching, without revealing information to workers not trusted
to learn about updates, Fabric introduces writer maps.
Every object used during a distributed transaction has a writer, which is the
worker that last updated the object during the transaction. The object’s writer,
therefore, stores the definitive copy of the object for the transaction. Every trans-
action has a writer map that records the writer for each object used in the trans-
action. The writer map is passed through the distributed computation along
with control flow.
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When a worker w updates an object, the object’s writer w′ is notified and
relinquishes the role. The notifying worker w becomes the new writer, and this
change is recorded in the writer map. Notification of the old writer w′ is not a
covert channel, because the program-counter label pc of the write must be lower
than the object’s label L, which the old writer is already trusted to read:
pc ⊑ L ⊑ {⊺→ w′}
The writer map contains two kinds of mappings: writer mappings and label
mappings. An update to object o at worker w adds a writer mapping with the
form hash(oid,tid,key) ↦ {w}key, where oid is the oid of object o, tid is the
identifier for the top-level transaction, and key is the encryption key for o, stored
in o’s key object. This mapping permits a worker that has the ability to read or
write o—and therefore has the encryption key for o—to learn whether there
is a corresponding entry in the writer map, and to determine which node is
currently the object’s writer. Nodes lacking the key cannot exploit the writer
mapping because without the key, they cannot verify the hash. Because the
top-level transaction id is included in the hash, they also cannot watch for the
appearance of the same writer mapping across multiple transactions.
Label mappings support object creation. The creation of a new object with
oid oid adds an entry with the form hash(oid) ↦ oidlabel, where oidlabel is the
oid of the object’s label, which contains the object’s encryption key. This second
kind of mapping allows a worker to find the encryption key for newly created
objects, and then to check the writer map for a mapping of the first kind.
The writer map is an append-only structure, so if an untrusted worker fails
to maintain a mapping, it can be restored. The size of the writer map is a side
channel, but the capacity of this channel is bounded by always padding out the
number of writer map entries added by each worker to the next largest power
47
of 2, introducing dummy entries containing random data as needed. Therefore
a computation that modifies n objects leaks at most lg lgn bits of information.
The writer map is threaded through the distributed computation along with
control flow: it is included in every remote-call request, and is returned with the
result of the call. Each worker in the computation keeps a local version number
for the writer map, and increments this version number when incorporating
new writer-map information from a remote-call request or a remote-call result.
During computation, while logging an object access, the transaction man-
ager checks the writer map. If a writer is found, the latest version of the object
is fetched from the writer, and for write accesses, the writer role is transferred.
To reduce overhead, the copy of each object at a worker has a writer-map
stamp, which records the version number of the writer map seen during the
previous access. No fetch needs to be done if the current writer-map version
number matches the writer-map stamp.
2.4.2 Distributed transaction management
To maintain consistency, transaction management must in general span multiple
workers. A worker maintains transaction logs for each top-level transaction it
is involved in. These transaction logs must be stored on the workers where the
logged actions occurred, because the logs may contain confidential information
that other workers may not see. For example, in the code below, the existence
of a or b in the transaction log can reveal the value of secret.
int x;
if (secret) x = a.f;
else x = b.f;
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Figure 2.9 illustrates the log structures that could result during a distributed
transaction involving three workers. Each transaction, including nested trans-
actions, is identified by a randomly generated transaction id (tid). (For clarity,
the figure uses sequential tids.) Each remote-call request includes the tids for
the call’s entire transactional context. This allows the receiving worker to syn-
chronize its transaction state with that of the calling worker.
In Figure 2.9a, a transaction (tid=01) starts on worker A, then calls code
on worker B, which starts a nested sub-transaction (tid=02) there. Because
the request from worker A includes the context ctxt=01, worker B knows that
tid=02 occurs within tid=01. The code then calls to worker C, starting an-
other sub-transaction (tid=03), which finally calls back to worker B, starting
sub-transaction tid=04. Conceptually, all the transaction logs together form a
single log that is distributed among the participating workers, as shown at the
bottom of the figure.
When worker B returns to worker C, it commits tid=04, resulting in the
state shown in Figure 2.9b. The procedure for committing a sub-transaction
with a distributed transaction log is the same as for a transaction with a non-
distributed log. To commit tid=04, worker B merges its portion of the log for
tid=04 with that of tid=03. Though worker C also has a portion of the log for
tid=03, the two parts are kept separate.
Figure 2.9c shows the state of the distributed transaction log after worker
C returns to worker B, and tid=03 has committed. Before returning, worker C
commits its portion of tid=03, so it merges its log for tid=03 with that of tid=02.
When control returns from a remote call, the worker always commits up to
the context in which the remote call occurred. Therefore, when worker B re-
ceives control, it also commits its portion of tid=03 so it can continue working
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Figure 2.9: Distributed transaction logs
within tid=02. This merges worker B’s portion of tid=03 (which includes en-
tries from tid=04) with tid=02.
The return from worker B to worker A is elided. The diagram looks like
that in Figure 2.9c, except worker B has merged tid=02 into tid=01. Although
a similar merge does not happen at worker C, this is not a problem, because the
merge will occur when worker C receives control again, or when the top-level
transaction commits. Figure 2.9d shows the former case. Worker A calls worker
B again, which starts tid=05 and calls worker C, starting tid=06.
When a worker receives a remote call, it compares its transactional context
with the one it receives. The worker synchronizes its transaction log by com-
mitting up to the most recent common ancestor of the two contexts, and starting
any transactions it has missed. Therefore, when worker C receives the remote
call, it compares its transactional context (01:02) with the one it receives (01:05).
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Figure 2.10: A hierarchical, distributed transaction
It commits up to the most recent common ancestor, tid=01, and starts the trans-
action it has missed, tid=05, before starting tid=06 for the incoming call.
When the top-level transaction commits, workers A, B, and C participate in a
hierarchical commit protocol to communicate with the stores of the objects they
have accessed, using their respective parts of the logs.
2.4.3 Hierarchical commit protocol
In general, a transaction may span worker nodes that do not trust each other.
This creates both integrity and confidentiality concerns. An untrusted node can-
not be relied to commit its part of a transaction correctly. More subtly, the com-
mit protocol might also cause an untrusted node to learn information it should
not. Just learning the identities of other nodes that participated in a transaction
could allow sensitive information to be inferred. Fabric’s hierarchical two-phase
commit protocol avoids these problems.
For example, consider a transaction that updates objects owned by a bank
and other objects owned by an airline, perhaps as part of a transaction in which
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a customer purchases an air ticket (see Figure 2.10). The bank and the airline do
not necessarily trust each other; nor do they trust the customer purchasing the
ticket. Therefore some computation is run on workers managed respectively by
the bank and the airline. When the transaction is to be committed, some updates
to persistent objects are recorded on these different workers.
Because the airline and the bank do not trust the customer, their workers
will reject remote calls from the customer—the customer’s worker lacks suffi-
cient integrity. Therefore, this scenario requires the customer to find a trusted
third party. As shown in the figure, a third-party broker can receive requests
from the customer, and then invoke operations on the bank and airline. Because
the broker runs at a higher integrity level than the customer that calls it, Fabric’s
endorsement mechanism must be used to boost integrity. This reflects a security
policy that anyone is allowed to make requests of the broker. It is the responsi-
bility of the broker to sanitize and check the customer request before endorsing
it and proceeding with the transaction.
The hierarchical commit protocol begins with the worker that started the
top-level transaction. It initiates commit by contacting all the stores for whose
objects it is the current writer in the writer map, and all the other workers to
which it has issued remote calls. These other workers then recursively do the
same, constructing a commit tree. This process allows all the stores involved in
a transaction to be informed about the transaction commit, without relying on
untrusted workers to choose which workers and stores to contact and without
revealing to workers which other workers and stores are involved in the trans-
action lower down in the commit tree. The two-phase commit protocol then
proceeds as usual, except that messages are passed up and down the commit
tree rather than directly between a single coordinator and the stores.
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Of course, a worker in this tree could be compromised and fail to correctly
carry out the protocol, causing some stores to be updated in a way that is incon-
sistent with other stores. However, a worker that could do this could already
have introduced this inconsistency by simply failing to update some objects or
by failing to issue some remote method calls. In our example above, the broker
could cause payment to be rendered without a ticket being issued, but only by
violating the trust that was placed in it by the bank and airline. The customer’s
power over the transaction is merely to prevent it from happening at all, which
is not a security violation.
Once a transaction is prepared, it is important for the availability of the stores
involved that the transaction is committed quickly. The transaction coordinator
should remain available, and if it fails after the prepare phase, it must recover
in a timely way. An unavailable transaction coordinator could become an avail-
ability problem for Fabric, and the availability of the coordinator is therefore
a trust assumption. To prevent denial-of-service attacks, prepared transactions
are timed out and aborted if the coordinator is unresponsive. In the example
given, the broker can cause inconsistent commits by permanently failing after
telling only the airline to commit, in which case the bank will abort its part
of the transaction. This failure is considered a violation of trust, but in keep-
ing with the security principles of Fabric, the failing coordinator can only affect
the consistency of objects whose integrity it is trusted to enforce. This design
weakens Fabric’s consistency guarantees in a circumscribed way, in exchange
for stronger availability guarantees.
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2.5 Implementation
The Fabric implementation uses a mixture of Java, FabIL, and Fabric code. Not
counting code ported to FabIL from earlier Java and Jif libraries, the implemen-
tation includes a total of 35k lines of code.
In addition to a common base of 7.7k lines of code supporting the worker,
store, and dissemination nodes, the worker is implemented as 3.8k lines of Java
code and 3.1k lines of FabIL code; the store is 1.9k lines of Java; and the dissem-
ination layer is 1.2k lines of Java code. In addition, some of the GNU Classpath
collection libraries have been ported to FabIL for use by Fabric programs (an-
other 6.3k lines of code),
The Fabric compiler, supporting both Fabric and FabIL source files, is a 11k-
line extension to the Jif 3.3 compiler [56], itself a 30k-line extension to the Poly-
glot compiler framework [59].
Implementing Fabric in Java has the advantage that it supports integration
with and porting of legacy Java applications, and access to functionality avail-
able in Java libraries. However, it limits control over memory layout and pre-
vents the use of many implementation techniques. In an ideal implementation,
the virtual machine and JIT would be extended to support Fabric directly. For
example, the Java SoftReference capability that is used for eviction could be
implemented with fewer indirections. We leave VM extensions to future work.
2.5.1 Store
The current store implementation uses Berkeley DB [60] as a backing store in
a simple way: each object is entered individually with its onum as its key and
its serialized representation as the corresponding value. Because stores cache
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both object groups and object versions in memory, and because workers are able
to aggressively cache objects, the performance of this simple implementation is
reasonable for the applications we have studied. For write-intensive workloads,
object clustering at the backing store is likely to improve performance; we leave
this to future work.
It is important for performance to keep the representation of an object at a
store and on the wire compact. Therefore, references from one object to another
are stored as onums rather than as full oids. A reference to an object located at
another Fabric node is stored as an onum that is bound at that store to the full
oid of the referenced object. This works well assuming most references are to an
object in the same store.
2.5.2 Dissemination layer
The current dissemination layer is built using FreePastry [69], extended with
proactive popularity-based replication based on Beehive [64]. The popularity-
based replication algorithm replicates objects according to their popularity, with
the aim of achieving a constant expected number of hops per lookup.
One standard configuration of Fabric worker nodes includes a colocated dis-
semination node to which dissemination-layer requests are directed; with this
configuration, the size of the dissemination layer scales in the number of worker
nodes.
2.5.3 Memory management
The current implementation uses Java’s SoftReference feature for memory
management. To achieve this, the FabIL compiler translates each class into a
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pair of classes, a Proxy class and an Impl class, that follow the delegation de-
sign pattern. Conceptually, Fabric objects refer to each other through Proxy
instances. Each such instance has a SoftReference to its corresponding Impl,
and contains code that delegates to the Impl. The Impl class contains the actual
class code, and its instances are the actual objects.
If an object has not been modified, its Impl object will only be accessible
through the SoftReferences in its Proxy objects. This gives the JVM discretion
to collect the Impl when there is memory pressure. When an object is created or
modified, a direct reference to its Impl is added to transaction log, preventing
the Impl from being garbage-collected.
Figure 2.11 shows a FabIL class C and its Java translation. The class C has two
fields x and y, and a method m that copies y to x and assigns a new C instance to y.
The class is translated into an interface C with a pair of nested classes, Proxy and
Impl, which implement the interface. The interface exposes a getter-setter pair
for each field (lines 2–3), and a method corresponding to each method declared
in the source class (line 4).
The Proxy class (lines 6–8) extends the superclass’s Proxy class. All Proxy
classes ultimately inherit from fabric.lang.Object. Proxy, which holds the
SoftReference to the corresponding Impl object. Each Proxy method dele-
gates to the Impl object. Line 7 shows the translation for the method m. It first
obtains the Impl object by calling fetch(). This will fetch the Impl object if the
JVM has evicted it from memory, or if the object has been updated by another
node in the transaction. Once it has the Impl object, the code then delegates to
it by calling the appropriate method.
The Impl class (lines 10–20) extends the superclass’s Impl class, and has
the actual field data (line 11) and the actual implementations of C’s methods.
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class C extends D implements I {
C x,y;
void m(Store s) { x = y; y = new C@s(); }
}
(a) FabIL class
1 interface C extends D, I {
2 C get$x(); C set$x(C val);
3 C get$y(); C set$y(C val);
4 void m(Store s);
5
6 static class _Proxy extends D._Proxy implements C {
7 void m(Store s) { ((C._Impl) fetch()).m(s); } ...
8 }
9
10 static class _Impl extends D._Impl implements C {
11 C x,y;
12 C get$x() {
13 TransactionManager.getInstance().registerRead(this);
14 return this.x;
15 }
16 void m(Store s) {
17 set$x(get$y());
18 set$y((C) new C._Impl(s).$getProxy());
19 } ...
20 } ...
21 }
(b) Java translation
Figure 2.11: A FabIL class and its Java translation
Field-accessor methods call into the transaction manager to register read/write
operations (line 13). Field accesses are translated into calls to the appropriate
accessor methods (line 17). New object instances are created by constructing an
Impl object, and immediately calling a $getProxy method to obtain its Proxy
(line 18).
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2.5.4 Unimplemented features
Most of the Fabric design described in this dissertation has been implemented in
the current prototype. A few features are not, though no difficulties are foreseen
in implementing them: distributed deadlock detection via edge chasing [11],
timeout-based abort of possibly divergent computations, timeout-based abort
of prepared transactions for availability, subscriptions, retry and abort state-
ments, path compression for pointer chains created by mobile objects, and
avoidance of read channels at dissemination nodes.
2.6 Evaluation
2.6.1 Course Management System
To examine whether Fabric can be used to build real-world programs, and how
its performance compares to common alternatives, we ported a portion of a
course management system (CMS) [7] to FabIL. CMS is a 54k line J2EE web
application written using EJB 2.0 [23], backed by an Oracle database. It has
been used for course management at Cornell University since 2005; at present,
it is used by more than 40 courses and more than 2,000 students.
Implementation CMS uses the model/view/controller design pattern; the
model is implemented with Enterprise JavaBeans using Bean-Managed Per-
sistence. For performance, hand-written SQL queries are used to implement
lookup and update methods, while generated code manages object caches and
database connections. The model contains 35 Bean classes encapsulating stu-
dents, assignments, courses, and other abstractions. The view is implemented
using Java Server Pages.
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We ported CMS to FabIL in two phases. First, we replaced the Enterprise Jav-
aBean infrastructure with a simple, non-persistent Java implementation based
on the Collections API. We ported the entire data schema and partially imple-
mented the query functionality of the model, focusing on the key application
features. Of the 35 Bean classes, five have been fully ported. By replacing com-
plex SQL queries with object-oriented code, we were able to simplify the model
code a great deal: the five fully ported classes were reduced from 3,100 lines
of code to 740 lines, while keeping the view and controller mostly unchanged.
This intermediate version, which we will call the Java implementation, took one
developer a month to complete and contains 23k lines of code.
Porting the Java implementation to FabIL required only superficial changes,
such as replacing references to the Java Collections Framework with references
to the corresponding Fabric classes, and adding label and store annotations. The
FabIL version adds fewer than 50 lines of code to the Java implementation, and
differs in fewer than 400 lines. The port was done in less than two weeks by
an undergraduate initially unfamiliar with Fabric. These results suggest that
porting web applications to Fabric is not difficult and results in shorter, simpler
code.
A complete port of CMS to Fabric would have the benefit of federated, secure
sharing of CMS data across different administrative domains, such as different
universities, assuming that information is assigned labels in a fine-grained way.
It would also permit secure access to CMS data from applications other than
CMS. We leave this to future work.
Performance The performance of Fabric was evaluated by comparing five dif-
ferent implementations of CMS: the production CMS system based on EJB 2.0,
the in-memory Java implementation (a best case), the FabIL implementation, the
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Page Latency (ms)
Course Students Update
EJB 305 485 473
Hilda 432 309 431
FabIL 35 91 191
FabIL/memory 35 57 87
Java 19 21 21
Table 2.1: CMS page load times (ms) under continuous load
FabIL implementation running with an in-memory store (“FabIL/memory”),
and a fifth implementation developed earlier using the Hilda language [77].
Comparing against the Hilda implementation is useful because it is the best-
performing prior version of CMS. The performance of each of these systems
was measured for some representative user actions on a course containing 55
students: viewing the course overview page, viewing information about all stu-
dents enrolled in the course, and updating the final grades for all students in
the course. All three of these actions are compute- and data-intensive.
All Fabric and Java results were acquired with the app server on a 2.6 GHz
single-core Intel Pentium 4 machine with 2 GB RAM. The Hilda and EJB results
were acquired on slightly better hardware: the Hilda machine had the same
CPU and 4 GB of memory; EJB results were acquired on the production config-
uration, a 3 GHz dual-core Intel Xeon with 8 GB RAM.
Table 2.1 shows the median time to perform three user actions under con-
tinuous load, for each of the measured systems. The first three measurements
in Table 2.1 show that the Fabric implementation of CMS runs faster than the
previous implementations of CMS. The comparison between the Java and non-
persistent FabIL implementations illustrates that much of the run-time over-
head of Fabric comes from transaction management and from communication
with the remote store.
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2.6.2 Travel example
Fabric can be used to build secure distributed applications, in which transac-
tions span mutually distrusting workers. To evaluate this use, we built a simple
prototype of the bank–airline example described in Section 2.4.3.
This application models an interaction between mutually distrusting users,
banks, and merchants. Each principal has security concerns: banks are con-
cerned that users and merchants only modify account balances in allowed ways,
and users and merchants are concerned that their accounts are modified only
when they decide to participate in a transaction.
These concerns are reflected in the labels placed on the objects implementing
banks, accounts, users, and merchants. These labels restrict the possible place-
ment of the data in the system. For example, a bank account is conceptually
represented as follows:9
class Account[principal bank] {
final Principal{bank←bank} user;
int{bank→user; bank←bank} balance; ...
}
To satisfy the integrity policy, accounts must be stored at a bank machine.
Some operations in the example require trusted code. For example, the
createAccount operation should be executable by any user, yet it must modify
the list of accounts, which the bank considers to be high integrity. Implementing
such operations requires information downgrading; static and runtime checks
force such code to be explicitly approved by the affected principals, and to exe-
cute on workers trusted by those principals.
9In actuality, the account balance is broken out into a separate object, to prevent the confi-
dentiality of the balance from tainting the account’s object label.
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total app tx log fetch store
Cold 9,153 10% 2% 12% 74% 2%
Warm 6,043 27% 3% 6% 61% 3%
Hot 840 46% 14% 24% 0% 17%
Table 2.2: Breakdown of OO7 traversal time (times in ms)
The application core is about 400 lines of Fabric code. Surrounding this core
is another 1,000 lines of Fabric code to provide a web interface built on a Fabric
port of SIF [14]. The labels and the trust relationships ensure its code and data
are mapped securely onto the available nodes. Because of the mutual distrust in
this example, transactions are committed using the hierarchical commit protocol
described in Section 2.4.3.
2.6.3 Run-time overhead
To evaluate the overhead of Fabric computation at the worker when compared
to ordinary computation on non-persistent objects, and to understand the effec-
tiveness of object caching at both the store and the worker, we used the OO7
object-oriented database benchmark [9]. We measured the performance of a
read-only (T1) traversal on an OO7 small database, which contains 153k objects
totalling 24 MB. Performance was measured in three configurations: (1) cold;
(2) warm, with stores caching object groups; and (3) hot, with both the store and
worker caches warmed up.
Table 2.2 summarizes these measurements and breaks down the running
times into time spent on application code (app), on local transaction process-
ing (tx), on logging reads and writes (log), on fetching objects from the store
(fetch), and on waiting for the store to process transaction messages (store).
The results show that caching is effective at both the worker and the store.
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However the plain in-memory Java implementation of OO7 runs in 66 ms,
which is about 10 times faster than the worker-side part of the hot traversal. Be-
cause Fabric is designed for computing on persistent data, this is an acceptable
overhead for many, though not all, applications. For computations that require
lower overhead, Fabric applications can always incorporate ordinary Java code,
though that code must implement its own failure recovery.
2.7 Related work
Fabric provides a higher-level abstraction for programming distributed sys-
tems. Because it aims to help with many different issues, including persistence,
consistency, security, and distributed computation, it overlaps with many sys-
tems that address a subset of these issues. However, none of these prior systems
addresses all the issues tackled by Fabric.
OceanStore [66] shares the goal with Fabric of a federated, distributed object
store. OceanStore is more focused on storage than on computation. It provides
consistency only at the granularity of single objects, and does not help with
consistent distributed computation. OceanStore focuses on achieving durabil-
ity via replication. Fabric stores could be replicated but currently are not. Un-
like OceanStore, Fabric provides a principled model for declaring and enforcing
strong security properties in the presence of distrusted workers and stores.
Prior distributed systems that use language-based security to enforce strong
confidentiality and integrity in the presence of distrusted participating nodes,
such as Jif/split [79], SIF [14], and Swift [12], have had more limited goals. They
do not allow new nodes to join the system, and they do not support consistent,
distributed computations over shared persistent data. They do use program
analysis to control read channels [79], which Fabric does not.
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DStar [80] controls information flow in a distributed system using run-time
taint tracking at the OS level, with Flume-style decentralized labels [41]. Like
Fabric, DStar is a decentralized system that allows new nodes to join, but does
not require certificate authorities. DStar has the advantage that it does not re-
quire language support, but controls information flow more coarsely. DStar
does not support consistent distributed computations or data shipping.
Some previous distributed storage systems have used transactions to im-
plement strong consistency guarantees, including Mneme [52], Thor [46] and
Sinfonia [1]. Cache management in Fabric is inspired by that in Thor [10]. Fab-
ric is also related to other systems that provide transparent access to persistent
objects, such as ObjectStore [43] and GemStone [8]. These prior systems do not
focus on security enforcement in the presence of distrusted nodes, and do not
support consistent computations spanning multiple compute nodes.
Distributed computation systems with support for consistency, such as Ar-
gus [47] and Avalon [35], usually do not have a single-system view of persistent
data and do not enforce information security. Emerald [6] gives a single-system
view of a universe of objects while exposing location and mobility, but does
not support transactions, data shipping or secure federation. InterWeave [74]
synthesizes data- and function-shipping in a manner similar to Fabric, and al-
lows multiple remote calls to be bound within a transaction, remaining atomic
and isolated with respect to other transactions. However, InterWeave has no
support for information security. The work of Shrira et al. [73] on exo-leases
supports nested optimistic transactions in a client–server system with discon-
nected, multi-client transactions, but does not consider information security.
MapJAX [57] provides an abstraction for sharing data structures between the
client and server in web applications, but does not consider security. Other
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recent language-based abstractions for distributed computing such as X10 [71]
and Live Objects [63] also raise the abstraction level of distributed computing
but do not support persistence or information-flow security.
Some distributed storage systems such as PAST [68], Shark [2], CFS [20], and
Boxwood [49] use distributed data structures to provide scalable file systems,
but offer weak consistency and security guarantees for distributed computation.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFINING AND ENFORCING REFERENTIAL SECURITY
Referential integrity guarantees that named resources can be accessed when
referenced. This an important property for reliability and security. In dis-
tributed systems, however, the attempt to provide referential integrity can itself
lead to security vulnerabilities that are not currently well understood.
In this chapter, we identify three kinds of referential security vulnerabilities
related to the referential integrity of distributed, persistent information. Secu-
rity conditions corresponding to the absence of these vulnerabilities are formal-
ized. A language model is used to capture the key aspects of programming
distributed systems with named, persistent resources in the presence of an ad-
versary. The referential security of distributed systems is proved to be enforced
by a new type system.
3.1 Language model
3.1.1 Modelling distributed computing as a language
We model referentially secure distributed computing using a core programming
language that we call λpersist . One motivation for a language-based model is
the popularity of high-level language-based models for distributed computing.
Similarly to λpersist , widely used middleware-based systems make distributed
and persistent information appear to be ordinary language objects: they aim
to make persistence and distribution more transparent. These systems include
CORBA [61], Java RMI [62], and J2EE/EJB [23]. Fabric and various other re-
search systems also take this approach (e.g., [5,6]). Prior work has also compiled
high-level programs to distributed realizations. This approach has been devel-
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oped for web applications (e.g., [12, 19, 72]) and for more general distributed
applications (e.g., [27,78]). We expect our language model will help with under-
standing the security of all such language-based systems.
In addition, λpersist should give insight into referential security in systems
that do not attempt to make persistence and distribution transparent, because
λpersist faithfully models referential security in such systems as well.
In λpersist , persistence, distribution, and communication are implicit but
are constrained by policy annotations. Programs in λpersist are assumed to be
mapped onto distributed host nodes in some way that agrees with these anno-
tations. This mapping could be done manually by the programmer, or automat-
ically by a compiler.
This implicit translation to a distributed implementation means that some
apparently ordinary source-level operations may be implemented using dis-
tributed communication and computation, much in the same manner as in Fab-
ric. For example, function application may be implemented as a remote pro-
cedure call. Similarly, following references at the language level may involve
communication between nodes to fetch referenced objects.
Although the concrete mapping from source-level constructs onto host
nodes is left implicit, we can nevertheless faithfully evaluate the security of
source-level computations. The key is to ensure that the system is secure un-
der any possible concrete mapping that is consistent with the policy annotations
in the source program. That is, any given computation or information might
be located on any host that satisfies the source-level security constraints. The
technical contribution of this chapter is to develop an effective system of such
source-level constraints, expressed as a type system.
Although we refer to λpersist as a source language, little attempt is made to
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make this language congenial to actual programming. In particular, the type
annotations introduced would be onerous in practice. They could be inferred
automatically using standard techniques, but we leave this to future work. One
can view the type system as describing a program (or system) analysis, and the
formal results of this chapter as a demonstration that this analysis achieves its
security goals.
3.1.2 Objects and references
Persistent objects are modelled in λpersist as records with mutable fields. The
fields of an object can point to other objects through references. References con-
tain the names of these mutable objects. References are not assignable as in
ML [51]; imperative updates are achieved by assigning to mutable fields.
The language has two types of references: hard and soft. A hard reference is
a reference with referential integrity: a promise that the referenced object will
not be destroyed if its host is trustworthy. Because of this promise, hard ref-
erences can only be created by trusted code. A soft reference does not create an
obligation to maintain the referenced object. When following a soft reference
or an untrusted hard reference, a program must be prepared to handle a failure
in case the referenced object no longer exists. For example, a garbage collector
may destroy objects reachable only via soft references. Hard links in Unix and
references in Java are examples of hard references. URLs, Unix symbolic links,
and Java SoftReference objects are examples of soft references.
This simple data model can represent many different kinds of systems, such
as distributed objects, databases, and the Web. The shared directory structure
shown in Figure 3.1 serves as a running example. Alice and Bob are travelling
together and are using the system to share photos and itineraries. The root
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Figure 3.1: Directory example
directory is kept on a host R. Alice and Bob keep their directory objects on their
own hosts, A and B, respectively. To share sightseeing ideas, they use a common
scratchpad stored on host U. Solid arrows in the figure represent hard references,
and dashed arrows are soft references. The a and p annotations are policies,
which we now explain.
3.2 Policies for persistent programming
3.2.1 Persistence policies
Referential integrity ensures that a pointer can be followed to its referent—that
there are no dangling pointers. In a federated system, referential integrity can-
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not be absolute, because the referenced object may be located on an untrusted,
perhaps maliciously controlled, host machine. Therefore, referential integrity
must be constrained by the degree of trust in the referenced host. This con-
straint is expressed by assigning each object a persistence policy expressing how
much it can be trusted to remain in existence.
The precise form of the persistence policy is left abstract. Persistence policies
p are assumed to be drawn from a bounded lattice (L,≼) of policy levels with least
element  and greatest element ⊺. If p1 ≼ p2 for two persistence policies p1 and
p2, then p2 describes an object at least as persistent as that described by p1.
While this description might seem to leave persistence policies too abstract
to be meaningful, they have a simple, concrete interpretation. Absent repli-
cation, objects are located only on host nodes that are trusted to enforce their
persistence policies, so a persistence policy p corresponds to a set of sufficiently
trusted host nodes H(p). Therefore, if p1 ≼ p2, then p2 must be enforceable by a
smaller set of hosts: H(p1) ⊇H(p2). In fact, it is reasonable to think of a policy p
as simply a set of hosts.
For example, in Figure 3.1, the root directory has persistence policy ⊺ and is
kept on host R, which is trusted to enforce this policy. Alice and Bob each have
a user directory with their own persistence policy (alice and bob, respectively)
and is stored on their own host (A and B, respectively). The shared scratchpad is
kept on an untrusted host U, which enforces the persistence policy .
Persistence policies are integrated into the type system of λpersist . The type
of an object reference includes a lower bound on the persistence policy of the
object it refers to; the type system ensures that the persistence of the object is
always at least as high as that of any reference pointing to it. Programs can
therefore use the persistence of a reference to determine whether the reference
70
can be trusted to be intact. This rule enables sound reasoning about persistence
and referential integrity as the graph of objects is traversed.
For example, in Figure 3.1, while Alice and Bob both have a hard reference
to the scratchpad, they must be prepared for a persistence failure when using
the reference. The type system of λpersist will ensure their code handles such a
failure. Any reference to the scratchpad must have a type with  persistence,
because it can be no higher than the  persistence of the scratchpad itself.
In λpersist , persistence is defined not by reachability, but by policy. This re-
solves by fiat one of the three problems identified earlier: accidental persistence.
Accidents are avoided by allowing programmers to express their intention ex-
plicitly. An object that is not intended to be persistent is prevented from being
treated as a persistent object.
3.2.2 Characterizing the adversary
Security involves an adversary, and is always predicated on assumptions about
the power of the adversary. In the kind of decentralized, federated system under
consideration, the adversary is assumed to control some of the nodes in the
system.
Different participants in a distributed system may have their own view-
points about who the adversary is, yet all participants need security assurance.
Therefore, a given adversary is modelled as a point α in the lattice of persistence
policy levels. In the host-set interpretation of persistence policies, α defines the
set of trusted hosts that the adversary does not control. If an object’s persistence
is not at least as high in the lattice as α, the adversary is assumed to have the
power to delete (i.e., violate the persistence of) that object, because it is poten-
tially stored at a host node controlled by the adversary.
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The formal results for the security properties enforced by λpersist treat the
adversary as an arbitrary parameter. Therefore, these properties hold for any
adversary.
3.2.3 Storage attacks and authority policies
We introduce the idea of storage attacks, in which a malicious adversary tries to
prevent reclamation of object storage by exploiting the enforcement of referen-
tial integrity. For example, in Figure 3.1, Bob has shared with Alice an album
containing the photos he has so far taken during their trip. Bob doesn’t consider
the album to be private, so others may create references to his album, as Alice
has done. However, an adversary that creates a hard reference to this album can
prevent Bob from reclaiming its storage.
To prevent such storage attacks, we ensure that hard references can be cre-
ated only in sufficiently trusted code. We introduce creation authority to ab-
stractly define this power to create new references. This is the only action re-
quiring some form of authority in our discussion, so for brevity, we refer to
creation authority simply as authority.
Like persistence policies, authority policies a are assumed to be drawn from
a bounded lattice (L,≼) of policy levels. Without loss of expressive power, they
are assumed to be drawn from the same lattice as persistence policies. Authority
prevents storage attacks because hard references can only be created to objects
whose authority policy a is less than or equal to the authority of the process ap.
That is, we require a ≼ ap.
A hard reference is a reference that should have referential integrity, so creat-
ing hard references requires authority. The adversary is assumed to have some
ability to create hard references, described by its authority level α. Soft refer-
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ences do not keep an object alive, so no creation authority is required to create
a soft reference.
In Figure 3.1, the root directory has the authority policy , so anyone can
create a hard reference to it. Bob’s philly album is large, so he has given it the
authority policy bob; only he can create hard references that prevent the album
from being deleted. Therefore, Alice’s reference to the album must be soft. Alice
has drafted an itinerary, giving it the authority policy {alice,bob} to indicate she
will persist the document for as long as Bob requires. Bob’s reference to the
itinerary, therefore, can be hard.
It may sound odd to posit control over creation of references. But a reference
with referential integrity is a contract between the referrer and the referent. For
example, the node containing the referent is obligated to notify the referrer if
the object moves. Entering into a contract requires agreement by both parties,
so it is reasonable for the node containing the referent to refuse the creation of a
reference.
3.2.4 Integrity
Thus far, the enumerated powers of the adversary include creating references to
low-authority objects and destroying objects with low persistence. Because the
adversary may control some nodes, the adversary can also change the state of
objects located at these nodes. This may in turn affect code running on nodes
not controlled by the adversary, if the adversary supplies inputs to that code, or
if the adversary affects the decision to run that code.
Integrity levels describe limitations on these effects of the adversary. An
integrity level w is drawn from a bounded lattice (L,≼) of policy levels; without
loss of expressive power, it is assumed to be the same lattice as for persistence
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and authority policies. The ordering ≼ corresponds to increasing integrity. If
w1 ≼ w2, an information flow from level w2 to w1 would be secure: more-trusted
information would be affecting less-trusted information.1
In λpersist , each variable and each field of an object has an associated integrity
level describing how trusted it is, and hence how powerful an adversary must
be to damage it. The integrity of a reference is the integrity of the field or vari-
able it was read from. Each object also has a persistence and an authority level,
which we can think of as the integrity of other, implicit attributes of the object.
For persistence, this implicit attribute is the existence of the object itself. For au-
thority, the attribute is the set of incoming references to the object. This unifying
view of different policies as different aspects of integrity explains why all three
kinds of policies can come from the same lattice.
The interpretation of these policies for integrity, authority, and persistence is
summarized in Figure 3.3.
3.2.5 Integrity of dereferences and garbage collection
An adversary can directly affect the result of a dereference in two ways. First,
if the reference has low integrity, the adversary can alter it to point to a differ-
ent object. Second, if the referent has low persistence, the adversary can delete
it. Therefore, the integrity of any dereference can be no higher than the in-
tegrity and persistence annotations on the reference. So, in Figure 3.1, if Alice
follows the reference from her docs directory to the scratchpad, she obtains an
untrusted result; the untrusted host U influences the result by choosing whether
to delete the scratchpad object.
More subtly, the adversary can manipulate hard references to influence the
1This ordering corresponds to the trust ordering described in Section 2.2.2.
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Figure 3.2: Authority affects integrity of dereferences. Alice is following her
soft reference to the philly album. An adversary can affect the outcome of the
dereference, because the album has low authority. (a) The untrusted host U has
a hard reference preventing philly from being garbage collected; Alice’s derefer-
ence succeeds. (b) Host U has removed its hard reference, allowing philly to be
garbage collected; Alice’s dereference fails.
garbage collector, and thereby indirectly affect the result of a dereference. For
example, in Figure 3.2a, Alice is following her soft reference to Bob’s philly
album. Bob has marked philly as only requiring low authority, allowing the
untrusted, adversarial host U to create a hard reference, and thereby prevent-
ing philly from being garbage-collected. Therefore, Alice’s dereference must
succeed.
However, in Figure 3.2b, the adversary U has removed its reference. Subse-
quently, philly has been garbage-collected, and Alice’s dereference fails. The
adversary has indirectly affected the outcome of the dereference. To account for
this, the integrity of Alice’s dereference must be no higher than the authority
required by philly.
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Integrity Authority Persistence Set of hosts⊺
“High”
Trusted, Untainted: “root”: Persistent:
No host nodesNo one No one can make No one can
can affect data a hard reference delete object
“Low”
Untrusted, Tainted: “anyone”: Transient:
All host nodesAnyone Anyone can make Anyone can
can affect data a hard reference delete object
Figure 3.3: Interpretations of the extremal policy labels
Variables x, y ∈ Var Policy levels w,a, p, ` ∈ L
Memory locations m ∈ Mem PC labels pc ∶∶= w
Labelled record types S ∶∶= {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s Storage labels s ∶∶= (a, p)
Labelled reference types R ∶∶= {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r Reference labels r ∶∶= (a+, a−, p)
Base types b ∶∶= bool ∣ τ1 pcÐ→ τ2 ∣ R ∣ soft R Types τ ∶∶= bw ∣ 1
Values v, u ∶∶= x ∣ true ∣ false ∣ ∗ ∣mS ∣ softmS ∣ λ(x ∶ τ)[pc]. e (∣ p)
Terms e ∶∶= v ∣ v1 v2 ∣ if v1 then e2 else e3 ∣ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ∣ v.x∣ v1.x ∶= v2 ∣ soft e ∣ e1∥e2 ∣ exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2∣ let x = e1 in e2
Figure 3.4: Syntax of λ0persist
3.2.6 Security properties
We now informally summarize how λpersist prevents the three referential vulner-
abilities discussed earlier: accidental persistence, referential integrity, and stor-
age attacks. The adversary is described by a single point in the lattice of policy
levels, describing the adversary’s ability to destroy, modify, and link to objects.
Accidental persistence is prevented because persistence is determined by poli-
cies expressing the programmer’s intent, rather than by reachability. Referential
integrity is maintained by a λpersist program with respect to a particular adver-
sary if following hard references whose persistence and integrity are above the
level of the adversary never leads to an object that has been destroyed by the
adversary or garbage-collected. Storage attacks are prevented if the adversary
is unable to change the set of high-authority objects that are reachable through
hard references.
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3.3 Types for persistent programming
To formalize the ideas introduced in the previous section, we introduce the
λpersist language, an extension to the simply typed lambda calculus. Its type
system prevents the referential vulnerabilities identified above. Figure 3.4 gives
the formal syntax of λpersist . We first focus on how it integrates policies for per-
sistence, authority, and integrity into its types.
3.3.1 Labels
We assume a bounded lattice (L,≼) of policy levels with least element  and great-
est element ⊺, from which integrity (w), authority (a), and persistence policies
(p) are drawn.
Objects and reference values are annotated with storage labels consisting of a
creation authority policy and a persistence policy. All non-unit types τ consist
of a base type b along with an integrity policy annotation w; fields and variables
thereby acquire integrity policies, because they are part of their types. Objects
do not have their own integrity labels because all of their state is in their fields,
which do.
The program-counter label pc [24] is an integrity level indicating the degree
to which the program’s control flow has been tainted by untrusted data. This
label restricts the side effects of code.
3.3.2 Example
Suppose we want to create a hierarchical, distributed directory structure, such
as in Figure 3.1. Each directory maps names to either strings, representing or-
dinary files, or to other directories, and contains a reference to its parent direc-
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tory (elided in the figure). To faithfully model ordinary file systems, directories
higher in the hierarchy should be more persistent: if they are destroyed, so is
everything below.
A fully general directory structure would require augmenting λpersist with
recursive and dependent types; for simplicity, these features have been omitted
from λpersist because they do not appear to add interesting issues. However, we
can capture the security of a general directory structure by using λpersist records
to build a fixed-depth directory structure with a fixed set of entry names for
each directory.
3.3.3 Modelling objects and references
The security policies of λpersist are about objects and references to them. There-
fore, λpersist extends the lambda calculus with records that represent the content
of objects. The record {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi} comprises a set of fields xi with corresponding
values vi. Records are not values in the language; instead, they are accessed via
references mS , where m is the identity of the object and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s gives its
base type. The storage label s is a pair (a, p). The authority label a is an upper
bound on the authority required to create a new reference to the referent object.
References to objects have labelled reference types {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r. A reference la-
bel r is a triple (a+, a−, p) that gives upper and lower bounds on the authority
required by the referent, and a lower bound on the persistence of the referent.
The upper authority label a+ prevents storage attacks. The lower authority label a−
prevents the adversary from exploiting garbage collection to damage integrity.
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3.3.4 Modelling distributed systems
The goal of the λpersist language is to model a distributed system in which code is
running at different host nodes. A single program written in λpersist is intended
to represent such a system. The key to modelling distributed, federated com-
putation faithfully is that different parts of the program can be annotated with
different integrity labels, representing the trust that has been placed in that part
of the code. To model a set of computations (subprograms Ð⇀ei ) executing at dif-
ferent nodes, the individual computations are composed in parallel (e1∥⋯∥en)
into a single λpersist program.
From the viewpoint of a given principal in the system, code with a low in-
tegrity label, relative to that principal, can be replaced by any code at all. For the
purposes of evaluating the security of the system, this code is in effect erased
and replaced by the adversary. Therefore the single-program representation
faithfully models a distributed system containing an adversary.
3.4 Accidental persistence and storage attacks
We present λpersist in two phases. In this section, we present λ0persist , a simplified
subset of λpersist that prevents accidental persistence and storage attacks.
3.4.1 Syntax of λ0persist
Figure 3.4 gives the syntax of λ0persist . The names x and y range over variable
names Var; m ranges over a space of memory addresses Mem; w, a, p, and `
range over the lattice L of policy levels; s ranges over the space of storage labelsL2; and r ranges over the space of reference labels L3.
Types in λ0persist consist of base types with an integrity label (bw), and also
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the unit type 1, which needs no integrity label. Base types include booleans,
functions, and two kinds of references to mutable records: hard (R) and soft
(soft R). The metavariable R denotes a labelled reference type.
The type τ1
pcÐ→ τ2 is an ordinary function type with a pc annotation that is
a lower bound on the pc label of the caller. It gives an upper bound on the
integrity of data the function affects, on the authority level of references the
function creates, and on the authority level of any references in the function
body.
Values include variables x, booleans true and false, the unit value ∗, typed
memory locations (references) mS , soft references softmS , functions λ(x ∶
τ)[pc]. e, and p-persistence failures p. A function λ(x ∶ τ)[pc]. e has one argu-
ment x with type τ . The pc component has the same meaning as that in function
types.
Terms include values v and u, applications v1 v2, if expressions
if v1 then e2 else e3, record constructors {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S , field selections v.x, field assign-
ments v1.x ∶= v2, soft references soft e, parallel composition e1∥e2, soft-reference
tests exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2, and let expressions let x = e1 in e2.
3.4.2 Example
Returning to the directory example in Figure 3.1, Bob can add to the itinerary
with the code below. It starts at the root of the directory structure, traverses
down to the itinerary, and invokes an add method to add a museum.
let home = root.bob
in exists home as bob:
let docs = bob.docs
itin = docs.itinerary
in itin.add "Rodin Museum"
else: ...
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The soft reference home to Bob’s home directory may have been snapped
by the garbage collector, so exists is used to determine whether the reference
is still valid. If so, the body of the exists is evaluated with bob bound to a
hard reference to the home directory. (This reference can be created because
the pc label at this point has sufficient creation authority.) The second select
expression, bob.docs, dereferences the hard reference.
3.4.3 Operational semantics of λ0persist
The small-step operational semantics of λ0persist is given in Figure 3.5. The no-
tation e{v/x} denotes capture-avoiding substitution of value v for variable x in
expression e. The value of a memory location that has failed or been garbage-
collected is .
Let M represent a memory that is a finite partial map from typed mem-
ory locations mS to closed record values, and let ⟨e,M⟩ be a system configura-
tion. A small evaluation step is a transition from ⟨e,M⟩ to another configuration⟨e′,M ′⟩, written ⟨e,M⟩→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩.
To avoid using undefined memory locations, we restrict the form of ⟨e,M⟩.
Let locs(e) represent the set of locations appearing explicitly in e. A memory M
is well-formed only if every address m appears at most once in dom(M), and
for any location mS in dom(M), locs(M(mS)) ⊆ dom(M). A configuration ⟨e,M⟩
is well-formed only if M is well-formed, locs(e) ⊆ dom(M), and e has no free
variables. Evaluation preserves well-formed configurations (see Lemma 10 in
Section 3.7.3).
Most of the operational semantics rules are straightforward, but a few de-
serve more explanation.
The record constructor {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S (rule CREATE) creates a new memory lo-
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[APPLY] ⟨(λ(x ∶τ)[pc]. e) v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e{v/x},M⟩
[LET] ∀p. v ≠ p⟨let x = v in e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e{v/x},M⟩[IF-TRUE] ⟨if true then e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e1,M⟩[IF-FALSE] ⟨if false then e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2,M⟩
[CREATE] m = newloc(M)⟨{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨mS ,M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}]⟩[PARALLEL-RESULT ] ⟨v1∥v2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗,M⟩ [SELECT] M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}⟨mS .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨vc,M⟩[ASSIGN] M(mS) ≠  ∀p. v ≠ p⟨mS .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗,M[mS .xc ↦ v]⟩[DANGLE-SELECT ] M(mS) =  p = persist(mS)⟨mS .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩ [DANGLE-ASSIGN ] M(m
S) =  p = persist(mS)⟨mS .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩[EXISTS-TRUE ] M(mS) ≠ ⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e1{mS/x},M⟩[EXISTS-FALSE ] M(mS) = ⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2,M⟩
[ EVAL-CONTEXT] ⟨e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩⟨E[e],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨E[e′],M ′⟩ [FAIL-PROP] ⟨F [p] ,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩
E ∶∶= soft [ ⋅ ] ∣ let x = [ ⋅ ] in e ∣ [ ⋅ ]∥e ∣ e∥[ ⋅ ]
F ∶∶= soft [ ⋅ ] ∣ let x = [ ⋅ ] in e
[PROG-STEP] ⟨e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩⟨e,M⟩→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩ [GC] gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩)⟨e,M⟩→ ⟨e,M[G↦ ]⟩
Figure 3.5: Small-step operational semantics for ordinary (non-adversarial) ex-
ecution of λ0persist
cation mS to hold the record. The component S specifies the base type and
storage label of the record. The storage label governs at what nodes the ob-
ject can be created. The function newloc(M) deterministically generates a fresh
memory location. If address-space(M) represents the set of location names in
M (i.e., {m ∶ ∃S.mS ∈ dom(M)}), then newloc(M) /∈ address-space(M) and
newloc(M ′) = newloc(M) if address-space(M ′) = address-space(M).
Parallel composition expressions e1∥e2 evaluate to the unit value (rule
PARALLEL-RESULT).
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The field-selection expression v.x (rules SELECT and DANGLE-SELECT) eval-
uates v to a memory location mS . If the location has not failed, the result of
the selection is the value of the field x of the record at that location. Otherwise,
a p-persistence failure occurs, where p is the persistence level of mS , written
p = persist(mS).
The field-assignment expression v1.x ∶= v2 evaluates v1 to a memory location
mS (rules ASSIGN and DANGLE-ASSIGN) If the location has not failed, v2 is as-
signed into the field x of the record at that location; otherwise, a p-persistence
failure occurs (where p = persist(mS)). The notation M[mS.xc ↦ v] denotes the
memory resulting from updating with value v the field xc of the record at loca-
tion mS .
Persistence failures propagate outward dynamically (FAIL-PROP) until the
whole program fails. The full λpersist language, defined in Section 3.5, can handle
these failures.
In rule EVAL-CONTEXT, E represents an ordinary evaluation context,
whereas F , in rule FAIL-PROP, specifies the contexts from which persistence
failures propagate. Contexts are given as a term with a single hole (denoted by[ ⋅ ]) in redex position. The syntax of E specifies the evaluation order.
The soft-reference expression soft e evaluates e to a hard reference and turns
it into a soft reference. The soft-reference test (exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2) promotes
the soft reference v (if valid) to a hard reference bound to x and evaluates e1. If
the reference is invalid, e2 is evaluated instead.
In rule GC, the notation gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩) means that G is a set of locations that
is collectible. G is considered collectible if it has no GC roots (i.e., hard references
in e), and no location outside G has a hard reference into G.
Definition 1 (GC roots). A location mS is a GC root in an expression e, written
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root(mS, e), if it is a hard reference in e. This is formally defined by the following
inference rules:
[R1]
root(mS ,mS) [R2] root(m
S , e) ∀mS00 . e ≠mS00
root(mS , soft e)
[R3] ∃i. root(mS , vi)
root(mS ,{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S′) [R4] root(m
S , v)
root(mS , v.x)
[R5] ∃i. root(mS , vi)
root(mS , v1.x ∶= v2) [R6] root(m
S , e)
root(mS , λ(x ∶τ)[pc]. e)
[R7] ∃i. root(mS , vi)
root(mS , v1 v2) [R8] ∃i. root(m
S , ei)
root(mS , let x = e1 in e2)
[R9] ∃i. root(mS , ei)
root(mS , if e1 then e2 else e3) [R10] ∃i. root(m
S , ei)
root(mS , exists e1 as x ∶ e2 else e3)
[R11] ∃i. root(mS , ei)
root(mS , e1∥e2)
λpersist , defined in Section 3.5, adds R12; and [λpersist ], defined in Section 3.6, adds R13:
[R12] ∃i. root(mS , ei)
root(mS , try e1 catch p∶ e2) [R13] root(m
S , e)
root(mS , [e])
Definition 2 (Collectible groups). A set of locations G is a collectible group in a
configuration ⟨e,M⟩, written gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩), if it does not contain any roots of e, and
no location outside G has a hard reference into G.
gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩) def.⇐⇒
G ⊆ dom(M)
∧ (∄mS ∈ G. root(mS, e))
∧ ∀mS00 ∈ dom(M). (M(mS00 ) ≠  ∧ ∃mS ∈ G. root(mS,M(mS00 )))⇒mS00 ∈ G
3.4.4 Subtyping in λ0persist
The subtyping judgement ⊢ τ1 ≤ τ2 states that any value of type τ1 can be treated
as a value of type τ2. Subtyping in λ0persist is the least reflexive and transitive
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[S1] n >m⊢ {x1 ∶τ1, . . . , xn ∶τn}r ≤ {x1 ∶τ1, . . . , xm ∶τm}r
[S2] ⊢ R1 ≤ R2⊢ soft R1 ≤ soft R2 [S3]
⊢ b1 ≤ b2⊢ w2 ≼ w1⊢ (b1)w1 ≤ (b2)w2
[S4] ⊢ τ2 ≤ τ1 ⊢ τ ′1 ≤ τ ′2 ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc2⊢ τ1 pc1ÐÐ→ τ ′1 ≤ τ2 pc2ÐÐ→ τ ′2[S5] ⊢ a+1 ≼ a+2 ⊢ a−2 ≼ a−1 ⊢ p2 ≼ p1⊢ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+1 ,a−1 ,p1) ≤ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+2 ,a−2 ,p2)
Figure 3.6: Subtyping rules for λ0persist
relation consistent with the rules given in Figure 3.6. Rule S1 gives standard
width subtyping on records. Because records are mutable, there is no depth
subtyping.
Subtyping on soft references is covariant (rule S2). While hard references
may be soundly used as soft references, this is omitted for simplicity.
Rule S3 gives contravariant subtyping on integrity labels. Rule S4 gives
standard subtyping on functions; the additional pc component is covariant.
These are the opposite of the rules typically seen in work on information-flow
security, accounting for our use of the trust ordering.
Rule S5 gives subtyping for labelled reference types. Subtyping is covariant
on the a+ component of the reference label and contravariant on the other two
components. This ensures the bounds specified by the reference label of the
subtype are at least as precise as those of the supertype.
3.4.5 Static semantics of λ0persist
Typing rules for λ0persist are given in Figure 3.7. The notation auth
+(r), auth−(r),
and persist(r) give the upper authority (a+), lower authority (a−), and persis-
tence (p) component of a reference label r, respectively. The notation auth+(s)
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[T-BOOL] b ∈ {true, false}
Γ;pc ⊢ b ∶ bool⊺ [T-UNIT] Γ;pc ⊢ ∗ ∶ 1
[T-VAR] Γ(x) = τ
Γ;pc ⊢ x ∶ τ [T-BOTTOM] p ≠ ⊺Γ;pc ⊢ p ∶ τ
[T-LOC] ⊢wf S ∶ rectype S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)
Γ;pc ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺ [T-SOFT] Γ;pc ⊢ e ∶ RwΓ;pc ⊢ soft e ∶ (soft R)w
[T-IF]
Γ;pc ⊢ v ∶ boolw
Γ;pc ⊓w ⊢ ei ∶ τ (∀i)⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓w
Γ;pc ⊢ if v then e1 else e2 ∶ τ ⊓w [T-PARALLEL]
Γ;pc ⊢ ei ∶ τi (∀i)⊢ auth+(τi) ≼ pc (∀i)
Γ;pc ⊢ e1∥e2 ∶ 1
[T-ABS]
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′ ⊢ e ∶ τ⊢wf (τ ′ pc′Ð→ τ)⊺ ∶ type ⊢ pc′ ≼ pc
Γ;pc ⊢ λ(x ∶τ ′)[pc′]. e ∶ (τ ′ pc′Ð→ τ)⊺ [T-APP]
Γ;pc ⊢ v1 ∶ (τ ′ pc′Ð→ τ)w
Γ;pc ⊢ v2 ∶ τ ′⊢ pc′ ≼ pc ⊓w
Γ;pc ⊢ v1 v2 ∶ τ ⊓w
[T-RECORD]
⊢wf S ∶ rectype S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) Γ;pc ⊢ vi ∶ τ ′i (∀i)⊢ τ ′i ≤ τi (∀i) ⊢ auth+(τ ′i) ≼ pc (∀i) ⊢ integ(τi) ≼ pc (∀i) ⊢ p ≼ pc
Γ;pc ⊢ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺
[T-SELECT]
Γ;pc ⊢ v ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc
w′ = w ⊓ persist(r)
Γ;pc ⊢ v.xc ∶ τc ⊓w′ [T-ASSIGN]
Γ;pc ⊢ v1 ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc
Γ;pc ⊢ v2 ∶ τ⊢ τ ⊓ pc ⊓w ≤ τc⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓w
Γ;pc ⊢ v1.xc ∶= v2 ∶ 1
[T-EXISTS]
Γ;pc ⊢ v ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w ⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓w
w′ = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w Γ, x ∶({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc ⊓w′ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ
Γ;pc ⊓w′ ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓w′
Γ;pc ⊢ exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2 ∶ τ ⊓w′
[T-LET]
Γ;pc ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′ ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc
w = integ(τ ′) pc′ = pc ⊓w
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′ ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc′
Γ;pc ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 ∶ τ ⊓w [T-SUBSUME] Γ;pc ⊢ e ∶ τ
′ ⊢ τ ′ ≤ τ
Γ;pc ⊢ e ∶ τ
Figure 3.7: Typing rules for λ0persist
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[WT1] ⊢wf boolw ∶ type [WT2] ⊢wf R⊺ ∶ type⊢wf (soft R)w ∶ type [WT3] ⊢wf 1 ∶ type
[WT4]
⊢ pc ≼ w ⊢ auth+(τ1) ⊔ auth+(τ2) ≼ pc⊢wf τ1 ∶ type ⊢wf τ2 ∶ type⊢wf (τ1 pcÐ→ τ2)w ∶ type
[WT5]
⊢wf τi ∶ type (∀i) ⊢ auth+(τi) ≼ a+ (∀i)⊢ a+ ≼ w ⊓ p ⊢ a− ≼ a+⊢wf ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w ∶ type
[WT6] ⊢wf ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺ ∶ type ⊢ integ(τi) ≼ p (∀i)⊢wf {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) ∶ rectype
Figure 3.8: Well-formedness of types
and persist(s) give the authority and persistence component of a storage label,
respectively. The notation auth+(τ) gives the authority level needed to create a
hard reference to a value of type τ , the integrity of τ is integ(τ), and τ ⊓` denotes
the type obtained by tainting (meeting) the integrity of τ with `:
auth+(bool) = auth+(1) = auth+(soft R) = 
integ(bw) = w (bw) ⊓ ` = bw⊓` auth+(τ1 pcÐ→ τ2) = pc
integ(1) = ⊺ 1 ⊓ ` = 1 auth+({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s) = auth+(s)
The typing context includes a type assignment Γ and the program-counter
label pc. Γ is a finite partial map from variables x to types τ , expressed as a
finite list of x ∶ τ entries. We write x ∶ τ ∈ Γ and Γ(x) = τ interchangeably. For
an expression e that is well-typed in a context Γ;pc, the type checker produces a
type τ . The typing assertion Γ;pc ⊢ e ∶ τ , therefore, means that the expression e
has type τ under type assignment Γ with program-counter label pc.
Most of the typing rules are standard rules, extended to ensure that the pc is
sufficiently high to obtain any hard references that may result from evaluating
subexpressions, and that the pc is suitably tainted where appropriate.
Rule T-BOTTOM says persistence failures can have any well-formed type.
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Rule T-ABS checks function values. It ensures that the function’s program-
counter label pc′ accurately summarizes the authority levels of the references
contained in the closure, and that the pc is high enough to create this closure.
The body is checked with program-counter label pc′, so in rule T-APP, the func-
tion can only be used by code with sufficient integrity.
Rule T-RECORD checks the creation of records. It requires that the annota-
tion S be well-formed. Also, the pc must be high enough to create any hard
references that appear in the fields, and to write to the fields themselves.
When using a hard reference v1, the pc must have sufficient authority to
possess v1 (rules T-SELECT and T-ASSIGN). When assigning through v1, hard
references contained in the assigned value v2 also require authority. Since the
integrity and persistence of v1 can affect whether the assignment succeeds, we
taint the pc with these labels before comparing with the authority requirement
of v2.
Rule T-EXISTS checks soft-reference validity tests. It ensures that the pc has
the authority to promote the reference.
The rules for determining the well-formedness of types are given in Fig-
ure 3.8. In rule WT5, a reference type ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w is well-formed only if
the upper authority label a+ is an upper bound on the authority levels of the
field types τi. This ensures that the upper authority label is an accurate sum-
mary of the authority required by the fields. We also require a+ be bounded
from above by the integrity w of the reference, since low-integrity data should
not influence the creation of high-authority references. To ensure that hosts are
able to create hard references to the objects they store, we also require auth+(r)
to be bounded from above by the persistence level p of the record.
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⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ SOFT-SELECT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨m
S .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩⟨(softmS).xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ SOFT-ASSIGN
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨m
S .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣TRY-VAL
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ∀p
′. v ≠ p′⟨try v catch p∶ e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ TRY-CATCH
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ p ≼ p
′
⟨try p′ catch p∶ e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e,M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣TRY-ESC
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ p /≼ p
′
⟨try p′ catch p∶ e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p′ ,M⟩ E ∶∶= . . . ∣ try [ ⋅ ] catch p∶ e
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣T-SOFT-SELECT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺ ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc
p = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w ⊢H ≼ p
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v.xc ∶ τc ⊓ p, p
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣T-SOFT-ASSIGN
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺ p = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v2 ∶ τ,⊺ ⊢ τ ⊓ pc ⊓ p ≤ τc ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓ p ⊢H ≼ p
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1.xc ∶= v2 ∶ 1, p
[T-TRY]
Γ;pc;H, p ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X1 w = ⊓
p′∈X1(p ⊔ p′)
Γ;pc ⊓w ⊓ integ(τ);H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc
Γ;pc;H ⊢ try e1 catch p∶ e2 ∶ τ ⊓w, (X1/p) ⊓X2
Figure 3.9: Additional small-step evaluation and typing rules for λpersist
3.5 Ensuring referential integrity
In a distributed system, references can span trust domains, so to be secure and
reliable, program code must in general be ready to encounter a dangling refer-
ence, one perhaps created by the adversary. Therefore, we extend λ0persist with
persistence-failure handlers to obtain the full λpersist language (see Appendix 3.A.1
for its full syntax). The type system of λpersist forces the programmer to be aware
of and to handle all potential failures.
Because low-persistence references may be used frequently, handling persis-
tent failures immediately at each use would be awkward. Instead, λpersist factors
out failure-handling code from ordinary code by treating failures as a kind of
exception.
The value of (try e1 catch p∶ e2) is the value of evaluating e1. If a dangling
pointer at persistence level p or higher is encountered, the error-handling ex-
pression e2 is evaluated instead. A try expression creates a context (e1) in which
the programmer can write simpler code under the assumption that certain per-
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sistence failures are impossible, yet without sacrificing the property that all fail-
ures are handled.
3.5.1 Persistence handler levels
To track the failures that can be handled in the current context, a set of persis-
tence levelsH is used. Formally,H is drawn from the bounded meet-semilattice
given by the upper powerdomain of persistence levels. The elements of the
powerdomain are the finitely generated subsets2 of L, modulo equivalence re-
lation (3.1). The ordering on these elements is given by (3.2). If we choose
maximal sets to represent the equivalence classes, then the meet operation is set
union.
A ∼ B def.⇐⇒ ∀` ∈ L. ((∃a ∈ A. a ≼ `)⇔ (∃b ∈ B. b ≼ `)) (3.1)
A ≼℘ B def.⇐⇒ ∀b ∈ B. ∃a ∈ A. a ≼ b (3.2)
Functions λ(x ∶ τ)[pc;H]. e and function types τ1 pc,HÐÐ→ τ2 are extended with
an H component, which is an upper bound on the H label of the caller. It gives
a set of lower bounds on the persistence levels of references that the function
follows.
3.5.2 Example
Returning to the directory example in Figure 3.1, Alice can add a place to the
list of sightseeing ideas with the code below. This code starts at Alice’s docs
directory, traverses the reference to the scratchpad, and invokes an add method
to add a museum.
2Non-empty subsets that are either finite or contain .
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let pad = docs.scratchpad
in try pad.add "Rodin Museum"
catch : ...
The expression pad.add follows a hard reference to the scratchpad. Despite the
hard reference, a try is needed because Alice does not trust host U to persist the
scratchpad.
3.5.3 Operational semantics of λpersist
The small-step operational semantics of λpersist extends that of λ0persist with the
rules in Figure 3.9. Two rules are for using soft references directly, and three
are for persistence-failure handlers. Failures propagate outward dynamically
(TRY-ESC) until either they are handled by a failure handler (TRY-CATCH), or
the whole program fails.
The persistence-failure handler try e1 catch p∶ e2 handles p-persistence fail-
ures. (Failures that occur at persistence levels higher than p are also considered
to be p-persistence failures.) If e1 fails with such a failure, then e2 is evaluated;
otherwise the result of the try is that of e1. Persistence-failure handlers enable e1
to call functions that require more trust (lowerH) than provided by the context.
Appendix 3.A.2 gives the full operational semantics for λpersist .
3.5.4 Subtyping in λpersist
The subtyping rules are the same as for λ0persist , except that function subtyping
is also contravariant on the H component. Full subtyping rules are given in
Appendix 3.A.3.
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[CREATE] m = newloc(M) S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s v′i = vi ▸α τi⟨{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨mS ,M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i}]⟩
[SELECT]
M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}
S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)⟨mS .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨vc ▸α p,M⟩ [ASSIGN]
M(mS) ≠  ∀p′. v ≠ p′
S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)
M ′ =M[mS .xc ↦ v ▸α τc]⟨mS .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M ′⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣DANGLE-SELECT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
M(mS) = 
S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)⟨mS .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣DANGLE-ASSIGN
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
M(mS) = 
S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)⟨mS .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ SOFT-SELECT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨m
S .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩ S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)⟨(softmS).xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v ▸α (a ⊓ p),M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ SOFT-ASSIGN
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨m
S .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩ S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′ ▸α (a ⊓ p),M ′⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣EXISTS-TRUE
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ M(m
S) ≠  S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨(e1{mS/x}) ▸α (a ⊓ p),M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣EXISTS-FALSE
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ M(m
S) ≠  S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2 ▸α (a ⊓ p),M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-SELECT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨[mS].xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[mS .xc],M⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-ASSIGN
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨[mS].xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[mS .xc ∶= v],M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ BRACKET-SOFT-SELECT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨[softm
S].xc,M⟩
eÐ→ ⟨[(softmS).xc],M⟩ ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ BRACKET-SOFT-ASSIGN
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨[softm
S].xc ∶= v,M⟩
eÐ→ ⟨[(softmS).xc ∶= v],M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-SOFT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨soft [mS],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[softmS],M⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣DOUBLE-BRACKET
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨[[v]],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[v],M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-EXISTS
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨exists [v] as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩eÐ→ ⟨[exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2],M⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-APPLY
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨[λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e] v,M⟩eÐ→ ⟨[(λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e) v],M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-TRY
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨try [v] catch p∶ e,M⟩eÐ→ ⟨[try v catch p∶ e],M⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-IF
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨if [v] then e1 else e2,M⟩eÐ→ ⟨[if v then e1 else e2],M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-LET
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ∀p. v ≠ p⟨let x = [v] in e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[e{[v]/x}],M⟩⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-CONTEXT
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨e,M⟩
eÐ→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩⟨[e],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[e′],M ′⟩
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣BRACKET-FAIL
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ ⟨F [[p]],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[p],M⟩
Figure 3.10: Small-step operational semantics extensions for ordinary execution
of [λpersist]
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3.5.5 Static semantics of λpersist
The typing rules for λpersist extend those for λ0persist . They augment the typing
context with a handler environment H, indicating the set of persistence failures
the evaluation context can handle. For an expression e that is well-typed in a
context Γ;pc;H, typing judgements additionally produce an effect X , which is
a set indicating the persistence failures e can produce during evaluation. The
typing assertion Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X , therefore, means that the expression e has
type τ and effect X under type assignment Γ, current program-counter label pc,
and handler environment H.
The typing rules for λ0persist are converted straightforwardly to thread H andX through typing judgements. Rules T-SELECT and T-ASSIGN gain premises
to ensure the context has a suitable handler in case dereferences fail. Ap-
pendix 3.A.4 gives the full set of converted rules.
Figure 3.9 gives three new typing rules. T-SOFT-SELECT and T-SOFT-ASSIGN
check direct uses of soft references. They taint the integrity of the dereference
with auth−(r) because the result of the dereference is affected by those able to
create a hard reference and thereby prevent the referent from being garbage-
collected (Section 3.2.5). Rule T-TRY checks try expressions. To reflect the in-
stallation of a p-persistence handler, p is added to the handler environment H
when checking e1. The value w in the typing rule is a conservative summary of
the persistence errors that can occur while evaluating e1 and not handled by the
p-persistence handler. Because evaluation of e2 depends on the result of e1, the
pc label for evaluating e2 is tainted by w. In this rule, the notation X /p denotes
the subset of persistence errors X not handled by p.
H/p ∆= {p′ ∈ H ∶ p /≼ p′}
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[α-CREATE]
m = newloc(M) ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}S ∶ R⊺,⊺⊢α[wf] M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}] α /≼ persist(S)⟨e,M⟩↝α ⟨e,M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}]⟩
[α-ASSIGN]
mS ∈ dom(M) M(mS) ≠  S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ [v] ∶ τc,⊺ ⊢α[wf] M[mS .xc ↦ [v]]⟨e,M⟩↝α ⟨e,M[mS .xc ↦ [v]]⟩[α-FORGET] mS ∈ dom(M) α /≼ persist(S)⟨e,M⟩↝α ⟨e,M[mS ↦ ]⟩
Figure 3.11: Effects caused by the α-adversary
3.6 The power of the adversary
The power of the adversary is modelled by extending the operational semantics
of Figure 3.5 with additional transitions. To support reasoning about what an
adversary may have affected in a partially evaluated program, λpersist is aug-
mented to include bracketed forms. We call the resulting augmented language[λpersist]. We write [e] to indicate an expression that may have been influenced
by the adversary, and [v] to indicate an influenced value. Doubly bracketed
values are considered expressions and not values.
The extended syntax and the rule for typing bracketed forms appear below.
Extensions for the operational semantics appear in Figure 3.10.
Values v ∶∶= . . . ∣ [v]
Terms e ∶∶= . . . ∣ [e]
[T-BRACKET]
Γ;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X
α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓ `
Γ;pc;H ⊢ [e] ∶ τ ⊓ `,X
The operational semantics is extended by adding new rules that propagate
brackets in the obvious manner. Rules CREATE, SELECT, DANGLE-SELECT,
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ASSIGN, DANGLE-ASSIGN, SOFT-SELECT, SOFT-ASSIGN, EXISTS-TRUE, and
EXISTS-FALSE are amended to ensure low-integrity expressions are bracketed.
To do this, they use the auto-bracketing function e ▸α `. The notation e ▸α τ is
shorthand for e ▸α integ(τ).
e ▸α ` = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
e, if ⊢ α ≼ ` or ∃e′. e = [e′];[e] , otherwise.
Also, rules TRY-VAL and LET are amended to prevent a transition when
v is bracketed, and rules that disallow transitions on bottom values (p) are
amended to prevent transitions on bracketed bottom values.
It is important to know that any evaluation of a program in the original lan-
guage can be simulated in the augmented language, which amounts to showing
that the rules cover all the ways that brackets can appear. A straightforward in-
duction proves this (see Lemma 1 in Section 3.7).
Rules for the adversary’s transitions are given in Figure 3.11. Adversaries
may create new records, modify existing records, or remove records from mem-
ory altogether, but their ability is bounded by an integrity label α ∈ L. Such
an α-adversary has all creation authority except α and higher, can modify any
record field except those with α (or higher) integrity, and can delete any record
except those with α (or higher) persistence. A small evaluation step taken in the
presence of an α-adversary is a transition from a machine configuration ⟨e,M⟩
to another configuration ⟨e′,M ′⟩, written ⟨e,M⟩→α ⟨e′,M ′⟩.
While it is reasonable to allow the adversary to create ill-typed values, an im-
plementation with run-time type checking can catch ill-typed values when they
cross between hosts and replace them with well-typed default values. There-
fore, the adversary’s transitions embody a simplifying assumption that the ad-
versary can only create well-typed values.
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Rule α-CREATE lets the adversary create records at new memory locations.
The premise ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}S ∶ R⊺,⊺ ensures that the records are well-typed
values and that new hard references satisfy the restrictions on the adversary.
The premise ⊢α[wf] M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}] ensures that the resulting memory is
well-formed (formally defined in Section 3.7.1), so the adversary cannot create
references to unknown memory locations.
Rule α-ASSIGN lets the adversary modify existing records. The premise
M(mS) ≠  ensures that the record being modified still exists in memory. The
premise ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ [v] ∶ τc,⊺ ensures that the assignment is well-typed and that
new hard references satisfy the restrictions on the adversary. The premise⊢α[wf] M[mS.xc ↦ [v]] ensures that the resulting memory is well-formed, so the
adversary cannot create references to unknown memory locations.
Rule α-FORGET lets the adversary drop records from memory. The premise
α /≼ persist(S) restricts the persistence level of dropped records.
3.7 Results
The goal of λpersist is to prevent accidental persistence and to ensure that the ad-
versary cannot damage referential integrity or cause storage attacks. Accidental
persistence is prevented by the use of persistence policies. We now show how
to formalize the other security properties and prove that λpersist satisfies these
properties.
3.7.1 Well-formedness
To ensure we consider only sensible memories and configurations, we define
well-formedness for memories, and use that in the definition for configurations.
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Definition 3 (Well-formed λpersist memory). A λpersist memory M is well-formed,
written ⊢wf M , if each record stored in M satisfies two conditions: the record’s type
corresponds to the type of the record’s location in M , and every location mentioned in
the record is valid in M .
More precisely, whenever M maps a reference mS to a record value {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi},
• S is well-formed,
• each vi has the appropriate type (as specified by S),
• the locations mentioned in the field values vi are in the domain of M :
⊢wf M def.⇐⇒ (M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi} ∧ S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)
⇒ ⊢wf S ∶ rectype
∧ (∀i. ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vi ∶ τi,⊺)
∧ locs({ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}) ⊆ dom(M))
Our notion of a well-formed configuration relies on knowing when a loca-
tion is non-collectible (cannot be garbage collected), which we now define.
Definition 4 (Non-collectible locations). A memory location mS is non-collectible
in a configuration ⟨e,M⟩, written nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩), if it is reachable from a GC root of e
through a path of hard references.
This is defined formally by the following induction rules:
[NC1] root(mS, e)
nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩) [NC2]
root(mS11 , e) M(mS11 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}∃c. nc(mS, ⟨vc,M⟩)
nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩)
Well-formedness of configurations is parameterized on an adversary α.
Definition 5 (Well-formed λpersist configuration). A λpersist configuration ⟨e,M⟩ is
well-formed, written ⊢αwf ⟨e,M⟩, if the following all hold:
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• M is well-formed;
• the locations mentioned in e are valid in M ;
• no non-collectible high-persistence location is deleted; and
• if G is a minimal collectible group in which a high-persistence location is deleted,
then all locations in G are also deleted.
Formally,
⊢αwf ⟨e,M⟩ def.⇐⇒ ⊢wf M ∧ locs(e) ⊆ dom(M)∧(∀mS.nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩)∧ ⊢ α ≼ persist(S)⇒M(mS) ≠ )∧(∀G. gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩) ∧ (∄G′ ⊆ G. gc(G′, ⟨e,M⟩))∧(∃mS00 ∈ G. ⊢ α ≼ persist(S0) ∧M(mS00 ) = )⇒ ∀mS ∈ G. M(mS) = )
A λpersist configuration is well-formed in a non-adversarial setting, written ⊢wf ⟨e,M⟩,
if it is well-formed with respect to the  adversary.
Corresponding well-formedness conditions are defined similarly for [λpersist]
memories, written ⊢α[wf] M and ⊢[wf] M , and for [λpersist] configurations, written⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩ and ⊢[wf] ⟨e,M⟩. Well-formedness of [λpersist] memories is param-
eterized on an α-adversary, because values appearing in low-integrity record
fields must be bracketed.
Definition 6 (Well-formed [λpersist] memory). A [λpersist] memoryM is well-formed
with respect to an adversary α (written ⊢α[wf] M ) if it is a well-formed λpersist memory
and all low-integrity field values are bracketed:
⊢α[wf] M def.⇐⇒ ⊢wf M ∧ (M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi} ∧ S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s ∧ α /≼ integ(τi)⇒ ∃v′. vi = [v′])
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Definition 7 (Well-formed [λpersist] configuration). A [λpersist] configuration⟨e,M⟩ is well-formed if it is a well-formed λpersist configuration with a well-formed[λpersist] memory. A configuration is well-formed in a non-adversarial setting if it is
well-formed in the presence of a  adversary.
⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩ def.⇐⇒ ⊢α[wf] M∧ ⊢αwf ⟨e,M⟩⊢[wf] ⟨e,M⟩ def.⇐⇒ ⊢[wf] ⟨e,M⟩
3.7.2 Completeness of [λpersist] evaluation
For [λpersist] to be adequate for reasoning about referential security properties of
λpersist , we must be able to simulate any λpersist execution in [λpersist]. This is a
completeness property. To do this, we first need to define what it means for a[λpersist] configuration to simulate a λpersist configuration. This involves defining
a correspondence on expressions and heaps between the two languages.
We write e1 ≲ e2 to denote that the λpersist term e1 corresponds to the [λpersist]
term e2. The terms correspond if erasing brackets from e2 produces e1.
Definition 8 (Correspondence between [λpersist] and λpersist expressions). A[λpersist] expression e is related to a λpersist expression e′, written ⊢ e ≲ e′, if the two
are equal when brackets in e are removed. This is formally defined by the following
induction rules.
e = e
⊢ e ≲ e
⊢ e ≲ e′
⊢ [e] ≲ e′
⊢ e ≲ e′
⊢ λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e ≲ λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e′⊢ vi ≲ ui (∀i)
⊢ v1 v2 ≲ u1 u2
⊢ ei ≲ e′i (∀i)
⊢ if e1 then e2 else e3 ≲ if e′1 then e′2 else e′3
⊢ vi ≲ ui (∀i)
⊢ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ≲ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}S
(rules continued on next page)
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⊢ v ≲ u
⊢ v.x ≲ u.x
⊢ vi ≲ ui (∀i)
⊢ v1.x ∶= v2 ≲ u1.x ∶= u2
⊢ e ≲ e′
⊢ soft e ≲ soft e′
⊢ ei ≲ e′i (∀i)
⊢ e1∥e2 ≲ e′1∥e′2⊢ ei ≲ e′i (∀i)
⊢ exists e1 as x ∶ e2 else e3 ≲ exists e′1 as x ∶ e′2 else e′3⊢ ei ≲ e′i (∀i)
⊢ try e1 catch p∶ e2 ≲ try e′1 catch p∶ e′2
⊢ ei ≲ e′i (∀i)
⊢ let x = e1 in e2 ≲ let x = e′1 in e′2
This correspondence on expressions naturally induces a correspondence on
heaps, and the two together give the correspondence on configurations.
Definition 9 (Correspondence between [λpersist] and λpersist memories). A[λpersist] memory M1 is related to a λpersist memory M2, written ⊢ M1 ≲ M2, if they
map the same set of locations, and the memories map each location to values that are
related.
⊢M1 ≲M2 def.⇐⇒ dom(M1) = dom(M2)
∧ ∀mS ∈ dom(M1). M1(mS) =M2(mS) = 
∨ ⊢M1(mS) ≲M2(mS)
Definition 10 (Correspondence between [λpersist] and λpersist configurations). A[λpersist] configuration ⟨e1,M1⟩ is related to a λpersist configuration ⟨e2,M2⟩, written⊢ ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≲ ⟨e2,M2⟩, if both the expressions and the memories are related:
⊢ ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≲ ⟨e2,M2⟩ def.⇐⇒ ⊢ e1 ≲ e2∧ ⊢M1 ≲M2
We can now state and prove the completeness of [λpersist].
Lemma 1 (Completeness of [λpersist] with respect to λpersist ). Let ⟨e1,M1⟩ be a well-
formed λpersist configuration with e1 well-typed. Let ⟨e2,M2⟩ be a well-formed [λpersist]
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configuration corresponding to ⟨e1,M1⟩, with e2 well-typed. If ⟨e1,M1⟩ takes a→ tran-
sition to ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩, then there exists a configuration ⟨e′2,M ′2⟩ corresponding to ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩
such that ⟨e2,M2⟩→∗α ⟨e′2,M ′2⟩.
⊢αwf ⟨e1,M1⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X∧ ⊢α[wf] ⟨e2,M2⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X∧ ⊢ ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≲ ⟨e2,M2⟩ ∧ ⟨e1,M1⟩→ ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩
⇒ ∃e′2,M ′2. ⟨e2,M2⟩→∗α ⟨e′2,M ′2⟩ ∧ ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩ ≲ ⟨e′2,M ′2⟩
Proof. Induction on the derivation of ⟨e1,M1⟩→α ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩.
3.7.3 Soundness of [λpersist ] type system
We prove the type system sound via the usual method of proving type preserva-
tion (Lemma 9) and progress (Lemma 13). Because we are only concerned with
well-formed configurations, it is important to know that they are preserved by
the operational semantics. This is captured by Lemma 10.
We first show some preliminary results for weakening the typing context.
Lemma 2 (Type-environment weakening). Extra type assumptions can be safely
added to typing contexts: Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ∧ x /∈ FV(e)⇒ Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X .
Lemma 3 (pc weakening). The pc label in a typing context can be safely raised.
⊢ pc ≼ pc′ ∧ Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ⇒ Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X .
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Rules T-BOOL, T-UNIT, T-LOC, T-BOTTOM, and T-VAR are trivial base cases.
Rule T-ABS follows from the transitivity of ≼. Rules T-SOFT, T-PARALLEL, and
T-SUBSUME follow from the induction hypothesis.
Rules T-RECORD, T-SELECT, T-SOFT-SELECT, T-ASSIGN, T-SOFT-ASSIGN,
T-EXISTS, T-APP, T-LET, T-TRY, T-IF, and T-BRACKET follow from the in-
duction hypothesis and the transitivity of ≼. In rules T-ASSIGN and T-SOFT-
ASSIGN, we need to show ⊢ τ⊓pc′⊓p ≤ τc. By assumption, we have ⊢ τ⊓pc⊓p ≤ τc.
Let bw = τ . Then using S3, we can show
⊢ b ≤ b ⊢ w ⊓ pc ⊓ p ≼ w ⊓ pc′ ⊓ p
⊢ τ ⊓ pc′ ⊓ p ≤ τ ⊓ pc ⊓ p ,
and the result follows from transitivity of subtyping.
Lemma 4 (Handler weakening). Extra handler assumptions can be safely added to
the typing context.
⊢ H′ ≼ H ∧ Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ⇒ Γ;pc;H′ ⊢ e ∶ τ,X
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X .
Rules T-BOOL, T-UNIT, T-LOC, T-BOTTOM, T-VAR, T-ABS, and T-PARALLEL
are trivial base cases.
Rules T-SOFT, T-RECORD, T-SELECT, T-ASSIGN, T-SOFT-SELECT, T-SOFT-
ASSIGN, T-EXISTS, T-APP, T-LET, T-IF, T-SUBSUME, and T-BRACKET follow
from the induction hypothesis.
Rule T-TRY follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact thatH′∪{p} ≼H ∪ {p}.
Corollary 5 summarizes these results.
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Corollary 5 (Context weakening). Suppose Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X with x /∈ FV(e),
pc ≼ pc′ and H′ ≼ H. Then
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′;H′ ⊢ e ∶ τ,X
We can now prove the substitution lemma.
Lemma 6 (Substitution). Γ, x ∶ τ ′;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺⇒ Γ;pc;H ⊢
e{v/x} ∶ τ,X .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ, x ∶ τ ′;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X . Note that since
v was typed in an empty type assignment (Γ = ∅), we must have FV(v) = ∅.
Rules T-BOOL, T-UNIT, T-LOC, and T-BOTTOM are trivial base cases.
Rules T-SOFT, T-RECORD, T-SELECT, T-ASSIGN, T-SOFT-SELECT, T-SOFT-
ASSIGN, T-APP, T-PARALLEL, T-TRY, T-IF, T-SUBSUME, and T-BRACKET follow
from the definition of substitution and the induction hypothesis.
Case T-VAR:
Suppose e = x. Then e{v/x} = v and τ ′ = τ and the result holds in this case
via Corollary 5 and T-SUBSUME. Alternatively, suppose e = y ≠ x. In this
case, e{v/x} = e and the result holds trivially.
Case T-ABS (e = λ(y ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1):
If y = x, then e{v/x} = e and the result holds trivially. Alternatively, sup-
pose y ≠ x. We have FV(v) = ∅, so e{v/x} = λ(y ∶ τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1{v/x}. Let
Γ′ = Γ, x ∶τ ′. From the typing of e, we have
Γ, x ∶τ ′, y ∶τ1;pc1;H1 ⊢ e1 ∶ τ2,H1⊢wf (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ2)⊺ ∶ type ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc;H ⊢ λ(y ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1 ∶ (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ2)⊺,⊺ ,
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where τ = (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ2)⊺ and X = ⊺. So, we know Γ, x ∶τ ′, y ∶τ1;pc1;H1 ⊢ e1 ∶
τ2,H1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we have Γ, y ∶ τ1;pc1;H1 ⊢
e1{v/x} ∶ τ2,H1. So the result holds in this case via an application of T-ABS:
Γ, y ∶τ1;pc1;H1 ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ2,H1⊢wf (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ2)⊺ ∶ type ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc
Γ;pc;H ⊢ λ(y ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1{v/x} ∶ (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ2)⊺,⊺ .
Case T-EXISTS (exists u as y ∶ e1 else e2):
From the typing of e, we have
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc;H ⊢ u ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓w w′ = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w
Γ, x ∶τ ′, y ∶({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′′,X1
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′′,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc′
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc;H ⊢ exists u as y ∶ e1 else e2 ∶ τ ′′ ⊓w′,X1 ⊓X2 ,
where pc′ = pc⊓w′, τ = τ ′′⊓w′, andX = X1⊓X2. By the induction hypothesis,
we therefore have
Γ;pc;H ⊢ u{v/x} ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺ (3.3)
Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e2{v/x} ∶ τ ′′,X2 (3.4)
Suppose y = x. Then e{v/x} = exists u{v/x} as y ∶ e1 else e2{v/x}, so from
(3.3) and (3.4), the result holds in this case via an application of T-EXISTS:
Γ;pc;H ⊢ u{v/x} ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓w w′ = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w
Γ, y ∶({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′′,X1
Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e2{v/x} ∶ τ ′′,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ exists u{v/x} as y ∶ e1 else e2{v/x} ∶ τ ′′ ⊓w′,X1 ⊓X2 .
104
Alternatively, suppose y ≠ x. We have FV(v) = ∅, so e{v/x} =
exists u{v/x} as y ∶ e1{v/x} else e2{v/x}. From the typing of e, we know
Γ, x ∶ τ ′, y ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′′,X1. By the induction hypothesis, we
have Γ, y ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc′;H ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ ′′,X1. From this, (3.3), and (3.4),
the result holds in this case via an application of T-EXISTS:
Γ;pc;H ⊢ u{v/x} ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓w w′ = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w
Γ, y ∶({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc′;H ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ ′′,X1
Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e2{v/x} ∶ τ ′′,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ exists u{v/x} as y ∶ e1{v/x} else e2{v/x} ∶ τ ′′ ⊓w′,X1 ⊓X2 .
Case T-LET (e = let y = e1 in e2):
From the typing of e, we have
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,X1 ⊢ auth+(τ1) ≼ pc w = (⊓X1) ⊓ integ(τ1)
pc′ = pc ⊓w Γ, x ∶τ ′, y ∶τ1;pc′;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ2,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ2) ≼ pc′
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc;H ⊢ let y = e1 in e2 ∶ τ2 ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2 ,
where τ = τ2⊓w and X = X1⊓X2. By the induction hypothesis, we therefore
have
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ1,X1. (3.5)
Suppose y = x. Then e{v/x} = let x = e1{v/x} in e2, so from (3.5), the result
holds in this case via an application of T-LET:
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ1,X1 ⊢ auth+(τ1) ≼ pc w = (⊓X1) ⊓ integ(τ1)
pc′ = pc ⊓w Γ, y ∶τ1;pc′;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ2,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ2) ≼ pc′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ let y = e1{v/x} in e2 ∶ τ2 ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2 .
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Alternatively, suppose y ≠ x. We have FV(v) = ∅, so e{v/x} = let y =
e1{v/x} in e2{v/x}. From the typing of e, we know Γ, x ∶ τ ′, y ∶ τ1;pc′;H ⊢
e2 ∶ τ2,X2. By the induction hypothesis, we have Γ, y ∶ τ1;pc′;H ⊢ e2{v/x} ∶
τ2,X2. From this and (3.5), the result holds in this case via an application
of T-LET:
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ1,X1 ⊢ auth+(τ1) ≼ pc w = (⊓X1) ⊓ integ(τ1)
pc′ = pc ⊓w Γ, y ∶τ1;pc′;H ⊢ e2{v/x} ∶ τ2,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ2) ≼ pc′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ let y = e1{v/x} in e2{v/x} ∶ τ2 ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2 .
Lemma 7 (Effect bound). The effect of a well-typed expression is bounded from below
by its handler environment.
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ⇒ H ≼ X
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X . Rule T-TRY relies on
the easily proved fact that if H ∪ {p} ≼ X1, then H ≼ X1/p.
Lemma 8 (Value typing). The handler environment is irrelevant for typing non-
bottom values. Such a value v can also be typed with any pc that has the authority
of the references that appear in v, and can have any effect bounded from below by the
handler environment. Formally,
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ,X ∧ (∀p. v ≠ p ∧ v ≠ [p])∧ ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc′∧ ⊢ H′ ≼ X ′⇒ Γ;pc′;H′ ⊢ v ∶ τ,X ′
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ,X .
We are now ready to prove type preservation for [λpersist].
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Lemma 9 (Type preservation). Let M be a well-formed memory. Let e be an expres-
sion with type τ and effect X . Let α ∈ L. If the configuration ⟨e,M⟩ takes an →α
transition, then the new expression e′ will also have type τ and effect X :
⊢α[wf] M ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X∧ ⟨e,M⟩→α ⟨e′,M ′⟩⇒ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e′ ∶ τ,X .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X .
Given ⟨e,M⟩→α ⟨e′,M ′⟩, the proof proceeds by cases according to the evalu-
ation rules. For cases GC, α-CREATE, α-ASSIGN, and α-FORGET, we have e = e′,
so the result follows trivially.
By Lemma 7, we have H ≼ X .
Case CREATE (⟨{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S,M⟩ →α ⟨mS,M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i}]⟩, where m is fresh,
S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p), and v′i = vi ▸α τi):
We have ∅;pc;H ⊢ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ∶ R⊺,⊺ with R = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p) and ⊢wf S ∶
rectype. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ mS ∶ R⊺,⊺. This is given by trivial
application of T-LOC.
Case APPLY (⟨(λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1) v,M⟩→α ⟨e1{v/x},M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc;H ⊢ λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1 ∶ (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ)⊺,⊺ (3.6)
and ∅;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ1,⊺ (3.7)
with ⊢ H ≼ H1 and H1 = X . We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ,H1.
From the derivation of (3.6), we know
x ∶τ1;pc1;H1 ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,H1
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with ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc. Applying Corollary 5 to this, we get
x ∶τ1;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,H1.
The result follows from this and (3.7) via Lemma 6.
Case SELECT (⟨mS.xc,M⟩ →α ⟨vc ▸α p,M⟩, where M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi} and S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
We have ∅;pc;H ⊢ mS.xc ∶ τc ⊓ p, p and need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ vc ▸α p ∶
τc ⊓ p, p.
From the typing of e, we know ∅;pc;H ⊢ mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺ and ⊢ a ≼
pc with ⊢wf S ∶ rectype. Therefore, the following holds:
• ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ a ≼ pc and
• ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ p.
So, we know ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓ p.
By Lemma 7, we have ⊢ H ≼ p. Since M is well-formed, we also know that∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vc ∶ τc,⊺, so by Lemma 8, we have
∅;pc ⊓ p;H ⊢ vc ∶ τc, p. (3.8)
Suppose ⊢ α ≼ p or vc is bracketed. Then vc ▸α p = vc and the result follows
from (3.8) via Corollary 5 and T-SUBSUME.
Otherwise, α /≼ p and vc is unbracketed. So vc ▸α p = [vc], and the result
follows via T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓ p;H ⊢ vc ∶ τc, p α /≼ p ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓ p
∅;pc;H ⊢ [vc] ∶ τc ⊓ p, p .
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Case DANGLE-SELECT (⟨mS.xc,M⟩ →α ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩, where M(mS) =  and S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
We have ∅;pc;H ⊢ mS.xc ∶ τc ⊓ p, p and need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ p ▸α p ∶
τc ⊓ p, p.
From the typing of e, we know ∅;pc;H ⊢ mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺ and ⊢ a ≼
pc with ⊢wf S ∶ rectype. Therefore, the following holds:
• ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ a ≼ pc and
• ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ p.
So, we know ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓ p.
By Lemma 7, we know ⊢ H ≼ p, so by T-BOTTOM, we have
∅;pc ⊓ p;H ⊢ p ∶ τc, p. (3.9)
Suppose ⊢ α ≼ p. Then p ▸α p = p and the result follows from (3.8) via
Corollary 5 and T-SUBSUME.
Otherwise, α /≼ p. So p ▸α p = [p], and the result follows via T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓ p;H ⊢ p ∶ τc, p α /≼ p ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓ p
∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ τc ⊓ p, p .
Case SOFT-SELECT (⟨(softmS).xc,M⟩ →α ⟨v ▸α (a ⊓ p),M⟩, where S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) and ⟨mS.xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ (softmS).xc ∶ τc ⊓ p′, p and⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc, where p′ = a ⊓ p. So τ = τc ⊓ p′ and X = p. We need to
show ∅;pc;H ⊢ v ▸α p′ ∶ τc ⊓ p′, p.
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From the typing of e, it follows that ⊢wf S ∶ rectype, and therefore, we know⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ p′. Since we also know ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc, we therefore have⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓ p′.
We proceed by cases according to the evaluation rules for ⟨mS.xc,M⟩ eÐ→⟨v,M⟩.
Sub-case SELECT (⟨mS.xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨vc ▸α p,M⟩, where M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}):
We have v = vc ▸α p.
By Lemma 7, we have ⊢ H ≼ p. Since M is well-formed, we also know
that ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vc ∶ τc,⊺, so by Lemma 8, we have
∅;pc ⊓ p′;H ⊢ vc ∶ τc, p. (3.10)
Suppose ⊢ α ≼ p′. Then ⊢ α ≼ p, so v ▸α p′ = v = vc ▸α p = vc. Similarly, if
vc is bracketed, then v▸α p′ = vc. In these cases, the result follows from
(3.10) via Corollary 5 and T-SUBSUME.
Otherwise, α /≼ p′ and vc is unbracketed. So v▸α p′ = [vc] and the result
follows via T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓ p′;H ⊢ vc ∶ τc, p α /≼ p′ ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓ p′
∅;pc;H ⊢ [vc] ∶ τc ⊓ p′, p .
Sub-case DANGLE-SELECT (⟨mS.xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩):
We have v = p ▸α p.
By Lemma 7, we know ⊢ H ≼ p, and we have ⊢ p′ ≼ p by definition, so
by T-BOTTOM, we have ∅;pc ⊓ p′;H ⊢ p ∶ τc ⊓ p′, p.
Suppose ⊢ α ≼ p′. Then ⊢ α ≼ p, so v ▸α p′ = v = p ▸α p = p, and the
result follows via Corollary 5.
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Otherwise, α /≼ p′, so v ▸α p′ = [p], and the result follows via T-
BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓ p′;H ⊢ p ∶ τc ⊓ p′, p α /≼ p′ ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓ p′
∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ τc ⊓ p′, p .
Case ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ →α ⟨∗ ▸α p,M[mS.xc ↦ v′]⟩, where S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢mS.xc ∶= v ∶ 1, p and need to show∅;pc;H ⊢ ∗ ▸α p ∶ 1, p. By Lemma 7, we have ⊢ H ≼ p, so from T-UNIT and
T-SUBSUME, we have ∅;pc ⊓ p;H ⊢ ∗ ∶ 1, p.
If ⊢ α ≼ p, then ∗ ▸α p = ∗, and the result follows by Corollary 5.
Otherwise, α /≼ p and ∗ ▸α p = [∗], and the result follows via T-BRACKET.
Case DANGLE-ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ →α ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩, where S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ mS.xc ∶= v ∶ 1, p and we need
to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ p ▸α p ∶ 1, p. By Lemma 7, we have ⊢ H ≼ p, so by
T-BOTTOM, we have ∅;pc ⊓ p;H ⊢ p ∶ 1, p.
If ⊢ α ≼ p, then p ▸α p = p, and the result follows by Corollary 5.
Otherwise, α /≼ p and p ▸α p = [p], and the result follows via T-BRACKET.
Case SOFT-ASSIGN (⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v,M⟩ →α ⟨v′ ▸α (a ⊓ p),M ′⟩, where⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩ and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ (softmS).xc ∶= v ∶ 1, p. By
Lemma 7, we have ⊢ H ≼ p. Let p′ = a ⊓ p. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢
v′ ▸α p′ ∶ 1, p. We proceed by cases according to the evaluation rules for⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩.
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Sub-case ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M ′⟩):
We have v′ = ∗ ▸α p.
If ⊢ α ≼ p′, then ⊢ α ≼ p, so v′ ▸α p′ = v′ = ∗ ▸α p = ∗. The result follows
from T-UNIT and T-SUBSUME.
Otherwise, α /≼ p′, so v′ ▸α p′ = [∗]. The result follows from T-UNIT,
T-BRACKET, and T-SUBSUME.
Sub-case DANGLE-ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩):
We have v′ = p ▸α p.
If ⊢ α ≼ p′, then ⊢ α ≼ p, so v′ ▸α p′ = v′ = p ▸α p = p. The result follows
from T-BOTTOM.
Otherwise, α /≼ p′, so v′▸αp′ = [p]. The result follows from T-BOTTOM
and T-BRACKET.
Case EXISTS-TRUE (⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩→α ⟨(e1{mS/x}) ▸α w,M⟩,
where S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) and w = a ⊓ p):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc;H ⊢ softmS ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺ ⊢ a ≼ pc w = a ⊓ p
x ∶({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X1∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2
where τ = τ ′ ⊓w and X = X1 ⊓X2. We need to show
∅;pc;H ⊢ (e1{mS/x}) ▸α w ∶ τ,X .
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By T-LOC, we have ∅;pc ⊓ w;H ⊢ mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺. Therefore, by
Lemma 6, we know ∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e1{mS/x} ∶ τ ′,X1. Also, by Lemma 7, we
know ⊢ H ≼ X1 ⊓X2, so by T-SUBSUME, we know
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e1{mS/x} ∶ τ,X .
Suppose ⊢ α ≼ w. Then (e1{mS/x}) ▸α w = e1{mS/x}. The result therefore
follows by Corollary 5.
Otherwise, we have α /≼ w, so (e1{mS/x}) ▸α w = [e1{mS/x}]. The result
therefore follows via T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e1{mS/x} ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X α /≼ w ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [e1{mS/x}] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X
Case EXISTS-FALSE (⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ →α ⟨e2 ▸α w,M⟩, where
S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) and w = a ⊓ p):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc;H ⊢ softmS ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺ ⊢ a ≼ pc w = a ⊓ p
x ∶({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X1∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2
where τ = τ ′ ⊓w and X = X1 ⊓X2. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ e2 ▸α w ∶ τ,X .
Suppose ⊢ α ≼ w. Then e2 ▸α w = e2. The result follows from Corollary 5
and T-SUBSUME.
Otherwise, α /≼ w, so e2 ▸α w = [e2]. By Lemma 7, we know ⊢ H ≼ X1 ⊓ X2.
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The result follows via T-BRACKET and T-SUBSUME:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′,X2 α /≼ w ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X2⊢ H ≼ X1 ⊓X2 ⊢ X1 ⊓X2 ≼ X2
∅;pc;H ⊢ [e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2
Case TRY-VAL (⟨try v catch p∶ e1,M⟩ →α ⟨v,M⟩, where v ≠ p′ and v ≠ [p′] for
all p′):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc;H, p ⊢ v ∶ τ,X1,
for some X1. Since v is a non-bottom value, the result ∅;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ,X
follows via Lemma 8.
Case TRY-CATCH (⟨try p catch p′∶ e2,M⟩→α ⟨e2,M⟩, where ⊢ p′ ≼ p):
We have p′ ≼ p, so from the typing of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓ p ⊓ integ(τ1);H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ1,X ,
where τ = τ1 ⊓ p. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X . This follows from
Corollary 5 and T-SUBSUME.
Case TRY-ESC (⟨try p catch p′∶ e2,M⟩→α ⟨p,M⟩, where p′ /≼ p):
We have p′ /≼ p, so from the typing of e, it follows that H ≼ X ≼ p. We need
to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ p ∶ τ,X . This follows from T-BOTTOM and T-SUBSUME.
Case PARALLEL-RESULT (⟨v1∥v2,M⟩→α ⟨∗,M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have τ = 1 and X = ⊺. The result ∅;pc;H ⊢ ∗ ∶ 1,⊺
follows trivially from T-UNIT.
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Case IF-TRUE (⟨if true then e1 else e2),M⟩→α ⟨e1,M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X1, where X ≼ X1. We need
to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X , which follows from Lemma 7 and T-SUBSUME.
Case IF-FALSE (⟨if false then e1 else e2,M⟩→α ⟨e2,M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X2, where X ≼ X2. We need
to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X , which follows from Lemma 7 and T-SUBSUME.
Case LET (⟨let x = v in e1,M⟩→α ⟨e1{v/x},M⟩, where v /∈ {p, [p]} for all p):
Since v is a non-bottom value, by Lemma 8, it can be typed with ⊺ effect.
From the typing of e, then, we have
∅;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ1,⊺
and
x ∶τ1;pc ⊓ integ(τ1);H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X .
We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1{v/x} ∶ τ,X , which follows from Corollary 5
and Lemma 6.
Case EVAL-CONTEXT (⟨E[e1],M⟩→α ⟨E[e′1],M ′⟩, where ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩):
We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ E[e′1] ∶ τ,X . We proceed by cases according to
the structure of E[e1].
Case soft e1:
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ Rw,X , where τ =(soft R)w. By the induction hypothesis, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ e′1 ∶ Rw,X ,
so the result follows via T-SOFT.
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Cases e1∥e2 and e2∥e1:
We show case e1∥e2. The other case follows symmetrically. From the
typing of e, we have ∅;pc;⊺ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,⊺. By the induction hypothesis,
we have ∅;pc;⊺ ⊢ e′1 ∶ τ1,⊺, so the result follows via T-PARALLEL.
Case try e1 catch p∶ e2:
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H, p ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,X1, where τ = τ1 ⊓w
with w = ⊓p′∈X1(p ⊔ p′) and X = (X1/p) ⊓X2. By the induction hypoth-
esis, we have ∅;pc;H, p ⊢ e′1 ∶ τ1,X1, so the result follows via T-TRY.
Case let x = e1 in e2:
From the typing of e, we have∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,X1, where ⊢ auth+(τ1) ≼
pc and ⊢ X1 ≼ X . By the induction hypothesis, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ e′1 ∶
τ1,X1, so the result follows via T-LET.
Case FAIL-PROP (⟨F [p],M⟩→α ⟨p,M⟩):
We have ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X and need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ p ∶ τ,X . From
the typing of e, it follows that ⊢ H ≼ X ≼ p ≠ ⊺, so the result follows from
T-BOTTOM and T-SUBSUME.
Case BRACKET-SELECT (⟨[mS].xc,M⟩→α ⟨[mS.xc],M⟩):
Without loss of generality, assume S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). Then, from the typing
of e, we have ∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
α /≼ w ⊢ a ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS] ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺⊢ a ≼ pc w′ = w ⊓ p ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS].xc ∶ τc ⊓w′, p ,
where τ = τc ⊓w′ and X = p. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS.xc] ∶ τc ⊓w′, p.
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By the typing of mS , we know ⊢wf S ∶ rectype, and so, ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ a ≼ pc ⊓
w. Therefore, the result follows from an application of T-SELECT, followed
by T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺⊢ a ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS.xc ∶ τc ⊓ p, p α /≼ w ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS.xc] ∶ τc ⊓w′, p .
Case BRACKET-SOFT-SELECT (⟨[softmS].xc,M⟩→α ⟨[(softmS).xc],M⟩):
Without loss of generality, assume S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). Then, from the typing
of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ softmS ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
α /≼ w ⊢ a ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [softmS] ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc w′ = w ⊓ a ⊓ p ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc;H ⊢ [softmS].xc ∶ τc ⊓w′, p ,
where τ = τc ⊓ w′ and X = p. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [(softmS).xc] ∶
τc ⊓w′, p.
By the typing of mS , we know ⊢wf S ∶ rectype, and so, ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ a ≼
pc⊓w. Therefore, the result follows from T-SOFT-SELECT and T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ softmS ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓w w′ = w ⊓ a ⊓ p ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ (softmS).xc ∶ τc ⊓w′, p
α /≼ w ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [(softmS).xc] ∶ τc ⊓w′, p .
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Case BRACKET-ASSIGN (⟨[mS].xc ∶= v,M⟩→α ⟨[mS.xc ∶= v],M⟩):
Without loss of generality, assume S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). Then, from the typing
of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
α /≼ w ⊢ a ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS] ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺ ⊢ a ≼ pc ∅;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺⊢ τ ′ ⊓ pc ⊓w ≤ τc ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS].xc ∶= v ∶ 1, p ,
where τ = 1 and X = p. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS.xc ∶= v] ∶ 1, p.
From ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ w and Lemma 8, we know ∅;pc ⊓ w;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺.
The result then follows from an application of T-ASSIGN followed by T-
BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺ ⊢ a ≼ pc∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺ ⊢ τ ′ ⊓ pc ⊓w ≤ τc⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS.xc ∶= v ∶ 1, p α /≼ w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS.xc ∶= v] ∶ 1, p .
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Case BRACKET-SOFT-ASSIGN(⟨[softmS].xc ∶= v,M⟩→α ⟨[(softmS).xc ∶= v],M⟩):
Without loss of generality, assume S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). Then, from the typing
of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ softmS ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
α /≼ w ⊢ a ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [softmS] ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺ ∅;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺⊢ τ ′ ⊓ pc ⊓w ≤ τc ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc;H ⊢ [softmS].xc ∶= v ∶ ∗, p ,
where τ = 1 and X = p. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [(softmS).xc ∶= v] ∶ 1, p.
From ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ w and Lemma 8, we know ∅;pc ⊓ w;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺.
The result then follows from T-SOFT-ASSIGN and T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ softmS ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺ ∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ v ∶ τ,⊺⊢ τ ′ ⊓ pc ⊓w ≤ τc ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ (softmS).xc ∶= v ∶ 1, p
α /≼ w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [(softmS).xc ∶= v] ∶ 1, p .
Case BRACKET-SOFT (⟨soft [mS],M⟩→α ⟨[softmS],M⟩):
Without loss of generality, assume S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). Then, from the typing
of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
α /≼ w ⊢ a ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [mS] ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺
∅;pc;H ⊢ soft [mS] ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺ ,
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where τ = (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w and X = ⊺. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢[softmS] ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺. This follows via an application of T-
SOFT followed by T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ softmS ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺ α /≼ w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [softmS] ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))w,⊺ .
Case BRACKET-EXISTS(⟨exists [v] as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩→α ⟨[exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2],M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ v ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺
α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w⊓`,⊺⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊓ ` w′ = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w ⊓ `
x ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w⊓`;pc ⊓w′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X1∅;pc ⊓w′;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w′
∅;pc;H ⊢ exists [v] as x ∶ e1 else e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w′,X1 ⊓X2
where τ = τ ′ ⊓ w′ and X = X1 ⊓ X2. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢[exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ w′,X1 ⊓ X2. To do this, we need to know
that x ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc ⊓ w′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X1, which can be demonstrated
by an easy induction on the derivation of x ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w⊓`;pc ⊓ w′;H ⊢
e1 ∶ τ ′,X1. The result therefore follows via an application of T-EXISTS and
T-BRACKET.
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∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ v ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊓ ` w′′ = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w
x ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc ⊓ ` ⊓w′′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X1∅;pc ⊓ ` ⊓w′′;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ ` ⊓w′′
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w′′,X1 ⊓X2
α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓w′′) ≼ pc ⊓ ` ⊓w′′ ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w′,X1 ⊓X2
(Note that w′ = ` ⊓w′′.)
Case BRACKET-APPLY(⟨[λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1] v2,M⟩→α ⟨[(λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1) v2],M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have
x ∶τ1;pc1;H1 ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,H1⊢wf (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ ′)⊺ ∶ type ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1 ∶ (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ ′)⊺,⊺
α /≼ w ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1] ∶ (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ ′)w,⊺∅;pc;H ⊢ v2 ∶ τ1,⊺ ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢ H ≼ H1
∅;pc;H ⊢ [λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1] v2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,H1 ,
where τ = τ ′ ⊓ w and X = H1. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [(λ(x ∶
τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1) v2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,H1.
By WT4, from ⊢wf (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ ′)⊺ ∶ type, we know ⊢ auth+(τ1) ⊔ auth+(τ ′) ≼
pc1. Since we also know from the above derivation that ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc ⊓ w, it
therefore follows that ⊢ auth+(τ1) ≼ pc ⊓w (3.11)
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and ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc⊓w. From the above derivation, we also have∅;pc;H ⊢
v2 ∶ τ1,⊺. Applying Lemma 8 to this and (3.11), we have ∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ v2 ∶
τ1,⊺. The result then follows from an application of T-APP followed by
T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1 ∶ (τ1 pc1,H1ÐÐÐ→ τ ′)⊺,⊺∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ v2 ∶ τ1,⊺ ⊢ pc1 ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢ H ≼ H1
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ (λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1) v2 ∶ τ ′,H1
α /≼ w ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [(λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1) v2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,H1 .
Case BRACKET-TRY (⟨try [v] catch p∶ e2,M⟩→α ⟨[try v catch p∶ e2],M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓ `;H, p ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,X1
α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H, p ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X1 w = ⊓
p′∈X1(p ⊔ p′)∅;pc ⊓w ⊓ integ(τ ′ ⊓ `);H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓ `) ≼ pc
∅;pc;H ⊢ try [v] catch p∶ e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓ ` ⊓w, (X1/p) ⊓X2 ,
where τ = τ ′ ⊓ ` ⊓w and X = (X1/p) ⊓X2.
We need to show
∅;pc;H ⊢ [try v catch p∶ e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ ` ⊓w, (X1/p) ⊓X2.
Note that integ(τ ′ ⊓ `) = integ(τ ′) ⊓ ` and auth+(τ ′) = auth+(τ ′ ⊓ `) =
auth+(τ ′ ⊓ ` ⊓ w). The result then follows from S3, T-SUBSUME, T-TRY,
and T-BRACKET:
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∅;pc ⊓ `;H, p ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,X1
⊢ integ(τ ′) ⊓ ` ≼ integ(τ ′)
⊢ τ ′ ≤ τ ′ ⊓ `
∅;pc ⊓ `;H, p ⊢ v ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X1
w = ⊓
p′∈X1(p ⊔ p′)∅;pc ⊓ ` ⊓w ⊓ integ(τ ′ ⊓ `);H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓ `) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ try v catch p∶ e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓ ` ⊓w, (X1/p) ⊓X2
α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓ ` ⊓w) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [try v catch p∶ e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ ` ⊓w, (X1/p) ⊓X2 .
Case BRACKET-IF (⟨if [v] then e1 else e2,M⟩→α ⟨[if v then e1 else e2],M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ v ∶ boolw,⊺ α /≼ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ boolw⊓`,⊺∅;pc ⊓w ⊓ `;H ⊢ ei ∶ τ ′,Xi (∀i) ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ if [v] then e1 else e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w ⊓ `,X1 ⊓X2 ,
where τ = τ ′ ⊓ w ⊓ ` and X = X1 ⊓ X2. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢[if v then e1 else e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w ⊓ `,X1 ⊓X2.
Since auth+(τ ′ ⊓w) = auth+(τ ′) and ⊢ pc ⊓w ⊓ ` ≼ pc ⊓ `, we therefore have⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓w) ≼ pc ⊓ `. The result then follows from T-IF and T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ v ∶ boolw,⊺∅;pc ⊓ ` ⊓w;H ⊢ ei ∶ τ ′,Xi (∀i) ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ ` ⊓w
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ if v then e1 else e2 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2
α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓w) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [if v then e1 else e2] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w ⊓ `,X1 ⊓X2 .
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Case BRACKET-LET (⟨let x = [v] in e1,M⟩ →α ⟨[e1{[v]/x}],M⟩, where v ≠ p for
all p):
By Lemma 8, we know [v] can be typed with ⊺ effect. Therefore, from the
typing of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′′,⊺
α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′′ ⊓ `,⊺ ⊢ auth+(τ ′′ ⊓ `) ≼ pc
w = integ(τ ′′ ⊓ `) x ∶τ ′′ ⊓ `;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ let x = [v] in e1 ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X ,
where τ = τ ′ ⊓w. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [e1{[v]/x}] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X .
From the derivation above, we know ∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′′ ⊓ `,⊺. Since
auth+(τ ′′ ⊓ `) = auth+(τ ′′), from ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc ⊓ ` above, we have⊢ auth+(τ ′′ ⊓ `) ≼ pc ⊓ `. Therefore, by Lemma 8, we know
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′′ ⊓ `,⊺. (3.12)
From the derivation above, we also know x ∶τ ′′ ⊓ `;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X . By
definition, ⊢ w ≼ `, so by Corollary 5, we know x ∶τ ′′⊓`;pc⊓`;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X .
Applying Lemma 6 to this and (3.12), we have
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e1{[v]/x} ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X .
Since auth+(τ ′⊓w) = auth+(τ ′) and ⊢ w ≼ `, from ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓w above,
we have ⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓w) ≼ pc ⊓ `.
Finally, by Lemma 7, we have ⊢ H ≼ X .
124
The result, then, follows from T-SUBSUME and T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e1{[v]/x} ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X⊢ H ≼ X
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e1{[v]/x} ∶ τ ′ ⊓w,X α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′ ⊓w) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [e1{[v]/x}] ∶ τ ′ ⊓w ⊓ `,X .
Case DOUBLE-BRACKET (⟨[[v]],M⟩→α ⟨[v],M⟩):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′,X α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [[v]] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X ,
where τ = τ ′⊓`. We need to show∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′⊓`,X . By Corollary 5, we
know ∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′,X . The result then follows via S3 and T-SUBSUME:
∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′,X
⊢ integ(τ ′) ⊓ ` ≼ integ(τ ′)
⊢ τ ′ ≤ τ ′ ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [v] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X .
Case BRACKET-CONTEXT (⟨[e1],M⟩→α ⟨[e′1],M ′⟩, where ⟨e1,M⟩→α ⟨e′1,M ′⟩):
From the typing of e, we have
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [e1] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X ,
where τ = τ ′ ⊓ `. We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [e′1] ∶ τ,X .
By the induction hypothesis, we have ∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e′1 ∶ τ ′,X . The result
follows by T-BRACKET:
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e′1 ∶ τ ′,X α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [e′1] ∶ τ ′ ⊓ `,X .
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Case BRACKET-FAIL (⟨F [[p]],M⟩→α ⟨[p],M⟩):
We need to show ∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ τ,X . We proceed by cases according to
the structure of F [[p]].
Case soft [p]:
From the typing of e, we have
p ≠ ⊺ ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ p ∶ R⊺, p α /≼ w ⊢ auth+(R⊺) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ Rw, p
∅;pc;H ⊢ soft [p] ∶ (soft R)w, p ,
where τ = (soft R)w and X = p. The result follows via T-BOTTOM and
T-BRACKET:
p ≠ ⊺ ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ p ∶ (soft R)⊺, p
α /≼ w ⊢ auth+((soft R)⊺) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ (soft R)w, p .
Case let x = [p] in e2:
From the typing of e, we have
p ≠ ⊺ ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ p ∶ τ1, p α /≼ ` ⊢ auth+(τ1) ≼ pc ⊓ `
∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ τ1 ⊓ `, p⊢ auth+(τ1 ⊓ `) ≼ pc w = p ⊓ integ(τ1 ⊓ `)
x ∶τ1 ⊓ `;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ2,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ2) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ let x = [p] in e2 ∶ τ2 ⊓w,X2 ⊓ p ,
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where τ = τ2 ⊓w and X = X2 ⊓ p. By construction, ⊢ w ≼ `, so we know
α /≼ w. By Lemma 7, we also know ⊢ H ≼ X2⊓p. The result follows via
T-BOTTOM, T-BRACKET and T-SUBSUME:
p ≠ ⊺ ⊢ H ≼ p
∅;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ p ∶ τ2, p
α /≼ w ⊢ auth+(τ2) ≼ pc ⊓w
∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ τ2 ⊓w,p ⊢ H ≼ X2 ⊓ p ⊢ X2 ⊓ p ≼ X2
∅;pc;H ⊢ [p] ∶ τ2 ⊓w,X2 ⊓ p .
We now show that well-formedness is also preserved during execution.
Lemma 10 (Well-formedness preservation). If ⟨e,M⟩ is a well-formed configuration
wherein e is well-typed, and ⟨e,M⟩ takes an →α transition, then the new configuration⟨e′,M ′⟩ will also be well-formed:
⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ∧ ⟨e,M⟩→α ⟨e′,M ′⟩⇒⊢α[wf] ⟨e′,M ′⟩ .
Proof. First, note that dom(M) ⊆ dom(M ′). This can be shown by an easy induc-
tion on the derivation of ⟨e,M⟩→α ⟨e′,M ′⟩.
We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of ⟨e,M⟩ →α ⟨e′,M ′⟩.
Given ⟨e,M⟩ →α ⟨e′,M ′⟩, the proof proceeds by cases according to the evalua-
tion rules.
Rules DANGLE-SELECT, DANGLE-ASSIGN, PARALLEL-RESULT, TRY-ESC,
FAIL-PROP, and BRACKET-FAIL, are trivial base cases in which locs(e′) = ∅ and
M ′ =M . Rules SELECT, and SOFT-SELECT follow from the definition of ⊢α[wf] M .
Rules APPLY, EXISTS-TRUE, EXISTS-FALSE, TRY-VAL, TRY-CATCH, IF-TRUE,
IF-FALSE, LET, BRACKET-SELECT, BRACKET-SOFT-SELECT, BRACKET-ASSIGN,
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BRACKET-SOFT-ASSIGN, BRACKET-SOFT, BRACKET-EXISTS, BRACKET-APPLY,
BRACKET-TRY, BRACKET-IF, BRACKET-LET, and DOUBLE-BRACKET follow be-
cause in these cases, locs(e′) ⊆ locs(e), M ′ =M , and root(mS, e′)⇒ root(mS, e).
Rule GC follows from the fact that ⊢α[wf] M and that minimal collectible
groups must be disjoint.
Rules α-CREATE and α-ASSIGN follow trivially from the transition rules.
Rule α-FORGET follows from the fact that ⊢α[wf] M .
Case CREATE (⟨{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S,M⟩ →α ⟨mS,M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi ▸α τi}]⟩, where mS is
fresh and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s):
We show ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vi ∶ τi,⊺ for arbitrary i; the rest of this case follows from⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩.
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ vi ∶ τi,⊺. From this, the result
follows via Lemma 8 and T-BRACKET.
Case ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ →α ⟨∗ ▸α p,M[mS ↦ v ▸α τc]⟩, where S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
From the typing of e and by T-SUBSUME, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τc,⊺. By
Lemma 8, we have ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ v ∶ τc,⊺, and the rest of this case follows from⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩.
Case SOFT-ASSIGN (⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v,M⟩ →α ⟨v′ ▸α (a ⊓ p),M ′⟩, where⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩ and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
If M(mS) = , then we have locs(e′) = ∅ and M ′ = M , and the result fol-
lows.
Otherwise,M(mS) ≠ , so from the definition of ⊢α[wf] ⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v,M⟩,
we can obtain ⊢α[wf] ⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M⟩, and the rest follows similarly to the
previous case.
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Case EVAL-CONTEXT (⟨E[e1],M⟩→α ⟨E[e′1],M ′⟩, where ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩):
Since ⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩, we know ⊢α[wf] ⟨e1,M⟩. Proceeding by cases according to
the structure of E[e1], in each case we have ∅;pc1;H1 ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,X1 (for some
pc1,H1, τ1, and X1). So, by the induction hypothesis, we have ⊢α[wf] ⟨e′1,M ′⟩.
From this and the fact that ⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩, the result follows.
Case BRACKET-CONTEXT (⟨[e1],M⟩→α ⟨[e′1],M ′⟩, where ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩):
Since ⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩, we know ⊢α[wf] ⟨e1,M⟩. From the typing of e, we have∅;pc′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,X , for some appropriate pc′ and τ1. So, by the induction
hypothesis, we have ⊢α[wf] ⟨e′1,M ′⟩, and therefore ⊢α[wf] ⟨e′,M ′⟩.
Corollary 11 (Preservation).
⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ∧ ⟨e,M⟩→∗α ⟨e′,M ′⟩⇒⊢α[wf] ⟨e′,M ′⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e′ ∶ τ,X
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 9 and 10 by induction on the number of →α
transitions taken.
Corollary 12 (Preservation (non-adversarial execution)).
⊢[wf] ⟨e,M⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ∧ ⟨e,M⟩→∗ ⟨e′,M ′⟩⇒⊢[wf] ⟨e′,M ′⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e′ ∶ τ,X
Proof. This follows by Corollary 11 and the definition of ⊢[wf] ⟨e,M⟩.
Lemma 13 (Progress). Let ⟨e,M⟩ be a configuration wherein e has type τ and effectX , and the locations appearing in e are mapped byM . Then either e is a value, or ⟨e,M⟩
can take an eÐ→ transition:
∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ∧ locs(e) ⊆ dom(M)⇒ e is a value ∨ ∃e′,M ′. ⟨e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩
(Doubly bracketed values are considered expressions and not values.)
129
Proof. By induction on the derivation of ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X . We proceed by cases
according to the syntax of e. Note that since e is typed in an empty type context
(Γ = ∅), we must have FV(e) = ∅.
Case e = v:
Trivial since e is a value.
Case e = v1 v2:
From the typing of e, we know that v1 is a value with an arrow type and ⊺
effect, so it is either an abstraction λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1 or a bracketed value[v′1]. In the former case, by APPLY, we have
⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨(λ(x ∶τ1)[pc1;H1]. e1) v2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e1{v2/x},M⟩ .
In the latter case, by BRACKET-APPLY, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨[v′1] v2,M⟩ eÐ→⟨[v′1 v2],M⟩.
Case e = if v1 then e2 else e3:
From the typing of e, we know that v1 is a value with bool type and ⊺ ef-
fect, so either v1 = true, v1 = false, or v1 is a bracketed value [v′1]. If v1 = true,
then by IF-TRUE, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨if true then e2 else e3,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2,M⟩. If
v1 = false, then by IF-FALSE, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨if false then e2 else e3,M⟩ eÐ→⟨e3,M⟩. Otherwise, v1 = [v′1] and by BRACKET-IF, we have ⟨e,M⟩ =⟨if [v′1] then e2 else e3,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[if v′1 then e2 else e3],M⟩.
Case e = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S :
Trivial by CREATE.
Case e = v.xc:
From the typing of e, we know v is a value with record type and ⊺ effect, so
it is either a bracketed hard reference (v = [mS]), a bracketed soft reference
(v = [softmS]), a hard reference (v =mS), or a soft reference (v = softmS).
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In the first case (v = [mS]), by BRACKET-SELECT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ =⟨[mS].xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[mS.xc],M⟩. In the second case (v = [softmS]),
by BRACKET-SOFT-SELECT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨[softmS].xc,M⟩ eÐ→⟨[(softmS).xc],M⟩.
In the third (v = mS) and fourth (v = softmS) cases, assume without loss
of generality S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). Since locs(e) ⊆ dom(M), we must have mS ∈
dom(M). There are two sub-cases to consider. In each sub-case, we will
show ⟨mS.xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′′,M⟩, for some v′′, thereby proving the case of a
hard reference (v = mS). The case of a soft reference (v = softmS) follows
by SOFT-SELECT: ⟨(softmS).xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′′ ▸α (a ⊓ p),M⟩.
1. Case M(mS) ≠ :
Without loss of generality, assume M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}. Then, by SE-
LECT, ⟨mS.xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨vc ▸α p,M⟩ .
2. Case M(mS) = :
By DANGLE-SELECT, ⟨mS.xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩.
Case e = v.xc ∶= v′:
From the typing of e, we know that v is a value with record type and ⊺ ef-
fect, so it must be either a bracketed hard reference (v = [mS]), a bracketed
soft reference (v = [softmS]), a hard reference (v = mS), or a soft reference
(v = softmS).
In the first case (v = [mS]), by BRACKET-ASSIGN, we have ⟨e,M⟩ =⟨[mS].xc ∶= v′,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[mS.xc ∶= v′],M⟩.
In the second case (v = [softmS]), by BRACKET-SOFT-ASSIGN, we have⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨[softmS].xc ∶= v′,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[(softmS).xc ∶= v′],M⟩.
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For the remaining cases, suppose v = mS or v = softmS . Then, since
locs(e) ⊆ dom(M), we must have mS ∈ dom(M). Without loss of gener-
ality, assume S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). From the typing of e, we also know that v′
is a value with ⊺ effect, so v′ ≠ p′ and v′ ≠ [p′] for all p′. There are two
sub-cases to consider. In each sub-case, we will show ⟨mS.xc ∶= v′,M⟩ eÐ→⟨v′′′,M ′⟩, for some v′′′ and some M ′, thereby proving the case of a hard
reference (v = mS). The case of a soft reference (v = softmS) follows by
SOFT-ASSIGN: ⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v′,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′′′ ▸α (a ⊓ p),M ′⟩.
1. Case M(mS) ≠ :
Without loss of generality, assume M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}. Then, by AS-
SIGN, ⟨mS.xc ∶= v′,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M[mS.xc ↦ v′ ▸α τc]⟩ .
2. Case M(mS) = :
By DANGLE-ASSIGN, ⟨mS.xc ∶= v′,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M⟩.
Case e = exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2:
From the typing of e, we know that v is a value with soft reference type,
so it is either a bracketed value (v = [v′]) or a soft reference (v = softmS).
In the first case (v = [v′]), by BRACKET-EXISTS, we have
⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨exists [v′] as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[exists v′ as x ∶ e1 else e2],M⟩
The second case (v = softmS) splits into two sub-cases. Assume S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) without loss of generality. IfM(mS) ≠ , then by EXISTS-TRUE,
we have
⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨(e1{mS/x}) ▸α (a ⊓ p),M⟩
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Otherwise, M(mS) = , and by EXISTS-FALSE, we have
⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2 ▸α (a ⊓ p),M⟩
Case e = soft e1:
From the typing of e, we know that ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ Rw,X , where τ =(soft R)w. Since locs(e) ⊆ dom(M), we must also have locs(e1) ⊆ dom(M),
so by the induction hypothesis, either e1 is a value or ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩,
for some e′1 and M ′. There are four cases to consider:
1. e1 is a value p,
2. e1 is a bracketed value [v],
3. e1 is some other value, and
4. ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩.
In case 1, by FAIL-PROP, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨soft p,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩.
In case 2, by BRACKET-SOFT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨soft [v],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[soft v],M⟩.
In case 3, e1 must be a hard reference mS , so e = softmS is also a value.
In case 4, by EVAL-CONTEXT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨soft e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨soft e′1,M ′⟩.
Case e = e1∥e2:
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;⊺ ⊢ ei ∶ τi,⊺ for i ∈ {1,2}. Since
locs(e) ⊆ dom(M), we must also have locs(ei) ⊆ dom(M), so by the in-
duction hypothesis, either e1 and e2 are both values, or (without loss of
generality) ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩, for some e′1 and M ′.
If e1 and e2 are both values, then by PARALLEL-RESULT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ =⟨e1∥e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗,M⟩.
Otherwise, by EVAL-CONTEXT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨e1∥e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1∥e2,M ′⟩.
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Case e = try e1 catch p∶ e2:
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H, p ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,X1, where τ = τ1 ⊓w with
w = ⊓p′∈X1(p ⊔ p′). Since locs(e) ⊆ dom(M), we must also have locs(e1) ⊆
dom(M), so by the induction hypothesis, either e1 is a value or ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→⟨e′1,M ′⟩, for some e′1 and M ′. There are five cases to consider:
1. e1 is a value p′ and ⊢ p ≼ p′,
2. e1 is a value p′ and p /≼ p′,
3. e1 is a bracketed value [v],
4. e1 is some other value v, and
5. ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩.
In case 1, by TRY-CATCH, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨try p′ catch p∶ e2,M⟩ eÐ→⟨e2,M⟩.
In case 2, by TRY-ESC, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨try p′ catch p∶ e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p′ ,M⟩.
In case 3, by BRACKET-TRY, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨try [v] catch p∶ e2,M⟩ eÐ→⟨[try v catch p∶ e2],M⟩.
In case 4, by TRY-VAL, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨try v catch p∶ e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩.
Finally, in case 5, by EVAL-CONTEXT, we have
⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨try e1 catch p∶ e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨try e′1 catch p∶ e2,M ′⟩
Case e = let x = e1 in e2:
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,X1. Since locs(e) ⊆ dom(M),
we must also have locs(e1) ⊆ dom(M), so by the induction hypothesis,
either e1 is a value or ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩, for some e′1 and M ′. There are
five cases to consider:
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1. e1 is a bottom value p,
2. e1 is a bracketed bottom value [p],
3. e1 is some other bracketed value [v],
4. e1 is some other value v, and
5. ⟨e1,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′⟩.
In case 1, by FAIL-PROP, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨let x = p in e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩.
In case 2, by BRACKET-FAIL, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨let x = [p] in e2,M⟩ eÐ→⟨[p],M⟩.
In case 3, by BRACKET-LET, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨let x = [v] in e2,M⟩ eÐ→⟨[e2{[v]/x}],M⟩.
In case 4, by LET, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨let x = v in e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2{v/x},M⟩.
In case 5, by EVAL-CONTEXT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨let x = e1 in e2,M⟩ eÐ→⟨let x = e′1 in e2,M ′⟩.
Case e = [e′]:
From the typing of e, we have ∅;pc′;H ⊢ e′ ∶ τ ′,X . Since locs(e) ⊆ dom(M),
we must also have locs(e′) ⊆ dom(M), so by the induction hypothesis, ei-
ther e′ is a value or ⟨e′,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′′,M ′⟩.
If e′ is a bracketed value [v], then by DOUBLE-BRACKET, we have ⟨e,M⟩ =⟨[[v]],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[v],M⟩.
If e′ is some other value v, then e = [v] is a value.
Otherwise, by BRACKET-CONTEXT, we have ⟨e,M⟩ = ⟨[e′],M⟩ eÐ→⟨[e′′],M ′⟩.
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Corollary 14 (Soundness of [λpersist]).
⊢α[wf] ⟨e,M⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X⇒ ⟨e,M⟩ ⇑ ∨∃v ∈ Val,M ′. ⟨e,M⟩ eÐ→∗ ⟨v,M ′⟩
Proof. This follows from Corollary 11 and Lemma 13 by induction on the num-
ber of eÐ→ transitions taken.
3.7.4 Limited adversary influence
The key to proving both referential integrity and immunity to storage attacks
is to show that the adversary cannot meaningfully influence the high-integrity
parts of the program and memory. This property is similar to noninterfer-
ence [29], and similarly can be expressed using an equivalence relation on con-
figurations. Two configurations are equivalent if they agree on all high-integrity
parts of the program and of the memory.
The property states that for any execution influenced by the adversary, there
is a corresponding, equivalent execution in which the adversary is not present.
Hence, the adversary’s influence is not significant. More precisely, each config-
uration ⟨e1,M1⟩ reached via the language augmented by adversarial transitions
must be equivalent to some configuration ⟨e2,M2⟩ reachable by purely non-
adversarial execution. This is a possibilistic security property, which is prob-
lematic for confidentiality properties [70], but is acceptable for integrity.
Because the two executions being compared operate on different heaps, with
the adversary behaving differently in the two executions, the addresses cho-
sen when records are allocated may differ. However, the structure of the high-
integrity part of the heap should still correspond. A homomorphism φ is used to
relate corresponding locations in the two heaps that are high-integrity or high-
persistence.
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Definition 11 (High-integrity homomorphism). An injective partial function φ ∶
dom(M1) ⇀ dom(M2) is a high-integrity homomorphism from M1 to M2 if it
satisfies the following:
• Injective: mS11 ≠mS22 ∧ {mS11 ,mS22 } ⊆ dom(φ)⇒ φ(mS11 ) ≠ φ(mS22 );
• Type-preserving: mS22 = φ(mS11 )⇒ S1 = S2; and
• Isomorphous when the domain and range are restricted to the high-integrity and
high-persistence locations in M1 and M2:
φ∣D ∶D ↣→ R,
where D = {mS ∈ dom(M1) ∣ ⊢ α ≼ integ(S)∨ ⊢ α ≼ persist(S)} and R = {mS ∈
dom(M2) ∣ ⊢ α ≼ integ(S)∨ ⊢ α ≼ persist(S)}. The notation integ(S) denotes
the integrity of a record with type S: the least upper bound of its fields’ integrity.
integ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s) =⊔
i
integ(τi)
We are now ready to define our notion of expression equivalence. The ex-
pression e1 is considered to be equivalent to e2 via a high-integrity homomor-
phism φ, written φ(e1) ≈α e2, if e1 is equal to e2 (modulo bracketed expressions)
when the memory locations in e1 are transformed via φ. This is defined formally
in Figure 3.12.
To ensure that high-integrity dereferences yield equivalent results, we also
define an equivalence relation on memories: M1 and M2 are equivalent via φ,
written φ(M1) ≈α M2, if whenever mS ∈ dom(φ) is not deleted, then φ(mS) maps
to an equivalent record. We also require that if mS ∈ dom(φ) is a deleted high-
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φ(x) ≈α x b ∈ {true, false}φ(b) ≈α b φ(∗) ≈α ∗ φ(m
S
1 ) =mS2
φ(mS1 ) ≈α mS2
φ(e) ≈α e′
φ(λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e) ≈α λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e′ φ(p) ≈α p
φ(vi) ≈α v′i (∀i)
φ(v1 v2) ≈α v′1 v′2 φ(ei) ≈α e
′
i
(∀i)
φ(if e1 then e2 else e3) ≈α if e′1 then e′2 else e′3
φ(vi) ≈α v′i (∀i)
φ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S) ≈α {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i}S
φ(v) ≈α v′
φ(v.x) ≈α v′.x φ(vi) ≈α v
′
i
(∀i)
φ(v1.x ∶= v2) ≈α v′1.x ∶= v′2
φ(e) ≈α e′
φ(soft e) ≈α soft e′ φ([e]) ≈α [e′] φ(ei) ≈α e
′
i
(∀i)
φ(e1∥e2) ≈α e′1∥e′2
φ(ei) ≈α e′i (∀i)
φ(exists e1 as x ∶ e2 else e3) ≈α exists e′1 as x ∶ e′2 else e′3
φ(ei) ≈α e′i (∀i)
φ(try e1 catch p∶ e2) ≈α try e′1 catch p∶ e′2 φ(ei) ≈α e
′
i
(∀i)
φ(let x = e1 in e2) ≈α let x = e′1 in e′2
Figure 3.12: Equivalence of expressions in [λpersist]
authority, high-persistence location, then so is φ(mS). Formally,
φ(M1) ≈α M2 def.⇐⇒ ∀mS ∈ dom(φ).
(M1(mS) ≠ 
⇒M2(φ(mS)) ≠  ∧ φ(M1(mS)) ≈α M2(φ(mS)))
∧ (⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ⊓ persist(S) ∧M1(mS) = 
⇒M2(φ(mS)) = )
Together, these two equivalence definitions induce a natural equivalence rela-
tion on configurations:
φ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≈α ⟨e2,M2⟩ def.⇐⇒ φ(e1) ≈α e2 ∧ φ(M1) ≈α M2.
A [λpersist] program has limited adversary influence if equivalent initial config-
urations produce equivalent final configurations.
We use this equivalence relation to formalize referential integrity: the ad-
versary must be unable to cause a persistence failure in the high-integrity parts
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of the program (expression equivalence), and unable to cause the deletion of
high-authority, high-persistence objects (memory equivalence).
3.7.5 Storage attacks
To formalize immunity to storage attacks, we first show that the adversary is
unable to cause more high-persistence locations to be allocated. This is captured
by the equivalence relation, since all high-persistence locations are mapped by
the homomorphism.
We also need to show that the adversary is unable to cause more high-
authority locations to become reachable through hard references. Lemma 20
shows that this is implied by limited adversary influence.
Lemma 15. Let e be well-typed in a low-integrity context. Assume that if e is a memory
location, then it is low-authority. If mS is a GC root in e, then mS must be low-
authority:
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X ∧ α /≼ pc∧(e ∈ dom(M)⇒ α /≼ auth+(τ)) ∧ root(mS, e)⇒ α /≼ auth+(S)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of root(mS, e).
Case R1 (e =mS):
Without loss of generality, assume S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p), where α /≼ a. We have
τ = ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺, so auth+(τ) = auth+(S) and the result follows trivially.
Case R2 (e = soft e′, where ∀mS′1 . e′ ≠mS′1 ):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, e′). From the typing
of e, we have Γ;pc;H ⊢ e′ ∶ Rw,X . Therefore, the induction hypothesis
applies, and the result follows.
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Case R3 (e = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S′):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, vc) for some c.
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;H ⊢ vc ∶ τ ′,⊺, where ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc.
From this, we also know α /≼ auth+(τ ′).
Therefore, the induction hypothesis applies, and the result follows.
Case R4 (e = v.x):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, v).
From the typing of e, we have Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺, where either τ ′ =({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w with ⊢ a+ ≼ pc, or τ ′ = (soft R)w for some R. We therefore
know α /≼ auth+(τ ′).
Therefore, the induction hypothesis applies, and the result follows.
Case R5 (e = v1.x ∶= v2):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, vi), for some i ∈ {1,2}.
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 ∶ τ ′,⊺ (where either τ ′ =({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w with ⊢ a+ ≼ pc, or τ ′ = (soft R)w for some R) and
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v2 ∶ τ ′′,⊺, where ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc. Therefore, α /≼ auth+(τ ′) and
α /≼ auth+(τ ′′). So, the induction hypothesis applies for i ∈ {1,2}, and the
result follows.
Case R6 (e = λ(x ∶τ ′)[pc′;H′]. e′):
From the typing of e, we know ⊢wf τ ∶ type, ⊢ pc′ ≼ pc, and Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′;H′ ⊢
e′ ∶ τ ′′,H′, where τ = τ ′ pc′,H′ÐÐÐ→ τ ′′. Since α /≼ pc, we have α /≼ pc′. From ⊢wf
τ ∶ type, we know ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc′, so we therefore know α /≼ auth+(τ ′′).
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we know root(mS, e′). Therefore, the
induction hypothesis applies, and the result follows.
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Case R7 (e = v1 v2):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, vi) for some i ∈ {1,2}.
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 ∶ (τ ′ pc′,H′ÐÐÐ→ τ)w,⊺, Γ;pc;H ⊢ v2 ∶
τ ′,⊺, and ⊢wf (τ ′ pc′,H′ÐÐÐ→ τ)w ∶ type, with ⊢ pc′ ≼ pc. Therefore, α /≼ pc′.
From the derivation of ⊢wf (τ ′ pc′,H′ÐÐÐ→ τ)w ∶ type, we have ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc
and ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc. We therefore know α /≼ auth+(τ ′).
So, the induction hypothesis applies for i ∈ {1,2}, and the result follows.
Case R8 (e = let x = e1 in e2):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, ei), for some i ∈ {1,2}.
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X1 and Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′;H ⊢ e2 ∶
τ ′′,X2, where ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc, pc′ = pc ⊓w, and ⊢ auth+(τ ′′) ≼ pc′, for some
w. Therefore, it follows that α /≼ pc′, α /≼ auth+(τ ′), and α /≼ auth+(τ ′′).
So, the induction hypothesis applies for i ∈ {1,2}, and the result follows.
Case R9 (e = if v then e1 else e2):
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ boolw,⊺ and Γ;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ ei ∶
τ ′,Xi (for i ∈ {1,2}), where ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc. From this, we therefore know
α /≼ auth+(τ ′).
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have either root(mS, v) or
root(mS, ej), for some j ∈ {1,2}. In all cases, the induction hypothesis
applies, and the result follows.
Case R10 (e = exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2):
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺ and Γi;pc ⊓
w′;H ⊢ ei ∶ τ ′,Xi (for i ∈ {1,2}), where ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ w′. From this, we
therefore know α /≼ auth+(τ ′).
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From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have either root(mS, v) or
root(mS, ej), for some j ∈ {1,2}. In all cases, the induction hypothesis
applies, and the result follows.
Case R11 (e = e1∥e2):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, ei) for some i ∈ {1,2}.
Without loss of generality, assume i = 1.
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;⊺ ⊢ e1 ∶ τ1,⊺ and ⊢ auth+(τ1) ≼ pc.
From this, we also know α /≼ auth+(τ1).
Therefore, the induction hypothesis applies, and the result follows.
Case R12 (e = try e1 catch p∶ e2):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, ei), for some i ∈ {1,2}.
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc;H, p ⊢ e1 ∶ τ ′,X1 and Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e2 ∶
τ ′,X2, where ⊢ pc′ ≼ pc and ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc. From this, we also know
α /≼ pc′ and α /≼ auth+(τ ′).
So, the induction hypothesis applies for i ∈ {1,2}, and the result follows.
Case R13 (e = [e′]):
From the derivation of root(mS, e), we have root(mS, e′).
From the typing of e, we know Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e′ ∶ τ ′,X , where ⊢ pc′ ≼ pc and⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc. From this, it follows that α /≼ pc′ and α /≼ auth+(τ ′).
Therefore, the induction hypothesis applies, and the result follows.
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Lemma 16. Let e1 and e2 be well-typed expressions, both of type τ , that are equivalent
via a high-integrity homomorphism φ. If mS is a high-authority GC root in e1, then
φ(mS) is also a GC root in ⟨e2,M2⟩.
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X ∧ Γ;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X
∧ φ(e1) ≈α e2∧ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ∧ root(mS, e1)
⇒ root(φ(mS), e2)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of root(mS, e1). The proof proceeds by
cases according to the syntax of e1. The result holds vacuously in cases e1 = x,
e1 = true, e1 = false, e1 = ∗, and e1 = softmS11 , since ¬root(mS, e1) in these cases.
Case e1 =mS11 :
Since root(mS,mS11 ), we must have mS11 = mS . Therefore, from φ(e1) ≈α e2,
we have e2 = φ(mS), and the result follows via Rule R1.
Case e1 = λ(x ∶τ ′)[pc′;H′]. e3:
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = λ(x ∶ τ ′)[pc′;H′]. e4, where φ(e3) ≈α e4.
From the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ, x ∶ τ ′;pc′;H′ ⊢ e3 ∶ τ ′′,H′ and
Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′;H′ ⊢ e4 ∶ τ ′′,H′, for some pc′, H′, and τ ′′. From the derivation of
root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, e3). Therefore, we can apply the induction
hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), e4), and the result follows via Rule R6.
Case e1 = v1 v2:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, v1) or root(mS, v2).
Without loss of generality, assume root(mS, v1). From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have
e2 = v3 v4, where φ(v1) ≈α v3. From the typing of e1 and e2, we have
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 ∶ τ ′,⊺ and Γ;pc;H ⊢ v3 ∶ τ ′,⊺, for some τ ′. Therefore, we can
apply the induction hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), v1), and the result
follows via Rule R7.
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Case e1 = if e3 then e4 else e5:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, ek) for some k ∈{3,4,5}. From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = if e′3 then e′4 else e′5, where φ(ei) ≈α e′i
for i ∈ {3,4,5}. From the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ;pc′;H ⊢ ek ∶ τ ′,X ′
and Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e′k ∶ τ ′,X ′, for some pc′, τ ′, and X ′. Therefore, we can apply
the induction hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), e′k), and the result follows
via Rule R9.
Case e1 = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S1 :
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, vk) for some k.
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}S1 , where φ(vi) ≈α ui for all i. From
the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ;pc;H ⊢ ek ∶ τ ′,⊺ and Γ;pc;H ⊢ e′k ∶ τ ′,⊺,
for some τ ′. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain
root(φ(mS), uk), and the result follows via Rule R3.
Case e1 = v.x:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, v). From φ(e1) ≈α
e2, we have e2 = u.x, where φ(v) ≈α u. From the typing of e1 and e2, we
have Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ τ ′,⊺ and Γ;pc;H ⊢ u ∶ τ ′,⊺, for some τ ′. Therefore, we
can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), u), and the result
follows via Rule R4.
Case e1 = v1.x ∶= v2:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, vk) for some k.
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = u1.x ∶= u2, where φ(vi) ≈α ui for i ∈ {1,2}.
From the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ;pc;H ⊢ vk ∶ τ ′,⊺ and Γ;pc;H ⊢
uk ∶ τ ′,⊺, for some τ ′. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis to
obtain root(φ(mS), uk), and the result follows via Rule R5.
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Case e1 = soft e3:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, e3) and e3 is not a
memory location. From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = soft e4, where φ(e3) ≈α e4;
therefore, e4 is not a memory location. From the typing of e1 and e2, we
have Γ;pc;H ⊢ e3 ∶ τ ′,X and Γ;pc;H ⊢ e4 ∶ τ ′,X , for some τ ′. Therefore,
we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), e4), and the
result follows via Rule R2.
Case e1 = e3∥e4:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, ek) for some k ∈{3,4}. From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = e′3∥e′4, where φ(ei) ≈α e′i for i ∈ {3,4}.
From the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ;pc;⊺ ⊢ ek ∶ τ ′,⊺ and Γ;pc;⊺ ⊢
e′k ∶ τ ′,⊺, for some τ ′. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis to
obtain root(φ(mS), e′k), and the result follows via Rule R11.
Case e1 = exists e3 as x ∶ e4 else e5:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, ek) for some k ∈{3,4,5}. From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = exists e′3 as x ∶ e′4 else e′5, where
φ(ei) ≈α e′i for i ∈ {3,4,5}. From the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ′;pc′;H ⊢
ek ∶ τ ′,X ′ and Γ′;pc′;H ⊢ e′k ∶ τ ′,X ′, for some Γ′, pc′, τ ′ and X ′. Therefore,
we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), e′k), and the
result follows via Rule R10.
Case e1 = let x = e3 in e4:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, ek) for some k ∈{3,4}. From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = let x = e′3 in e′4, where φ(ei) ≈α e′i for
i ∈ {3,4}. From the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ′;pc′;H ⊢ ek ∶ τ ′,X ′ and
Γ′;pc′;H ⊢ e′k ∶ τ ′,X ′, for some Γ′, pc′, τ ′, and X ′. Therefore, we can apply
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the induction hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), e′k), and the result follows
via Rule R8.
Case e1 = try e3 catch p∶ e4:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, ek) for some k ∈{3,4}. From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we have e2 = try e′3 catch p∶ e′4, where φ(ei) ≈α e′i for
i ∈ {3,4}. From the typing of e1 and e2, we have Γ;pc′;H ⊢ ek ∶ τ ′,X ′ and
Γ;pc′;H ⊢ e′k ∶ τ ′,X ′, for some pc′, τ ′, and X ′. Therefore, we can apply the
induction hypothesis to obtain root(φ(mS), e′k), and the result follows via
Rule R12.
Case e1 = [e3]:
From the derivation of root(mS, e1), we know root(mS, e3). From the typ-
ing of e1, we know Γ;pc⊓`;H ⊢ e3 ∶ τ ′,X for some ` and τ ′, where α /≼ ` and⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc ⊓ `. Therefore, by Lemma 15, we must have α /≼ auth+(S),
which contradicts the assumption ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S). So, this case holds vac-
uously.
Lemma 17. SupposemS is a high-authority location that is a GC root in the well-typed
value v. Then v must have high-authority type.
⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ∧ root(mS, v) ∧ ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ v ∶ τ,⊺
⇒ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(τ)
Proof. Since root(mS, v), the value v must either be equal to mS , be a lambda
abstraction λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e, or be a bracketed value [v′].
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Case v =mS :
We therefore have ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ mS ∶ τ,⊺. So ⊢ auth+(S) ≼ auth+(τ). Therefore,⊢ α ≼ auth+(τ), as desired.
Case v = λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e:
From the derivation of root(mS, v), we have root(mS, e). So, we must have
τ = τ1 pc,HÐÐ→ τ2, for some τ1 and some τ2. Therefore, auth+(τ) = pc.
Suppose α /≼ pc. From the typing of v, we know x ∶ τ1;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ2,H and⊢wf τ1 pc,HÐÐ→ τ2 ∶ type. Therefore, we also know ⊢ auth+(τ2) ≼ pc, and hence,
α /≼ auth+(τ2). Since root(mS, e), by Lemma 15, we must have α /≼ auth+(S),
a contradiction. So, we must have ⊢ α ≼ pc = auth+(τ), as desired.
Case v = [v′]:
From the derivation of root(mS, v), we have root(mS, v′). From the typing
derivation of v, we know ∅; `;⊺ ⊢ v′ ∶ τ ′,⊺ and ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ `, where α /≼ `.
Therefore, α /≼ auth+(τ ′). Since root(mS, v′), by Lemma 15, we must have
α /≼ auth+(S), a contradiction. This case therefore holds vacuously.
Lemma 18. Suppose mS is a high-authority location that is non-collectible in the con-
figuration ⟨v,M⟩, where M is well-formed and the value v has type τ . Then τ must be
high-authority.
⊢α[wf] M∧ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ∧ nc(mS, ⟨v,M⟩) ∧ ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ v ∶ τ,⊺⇒ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(τ)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of nc(mS, ⟨v,M⟩).
Case NC1:
We have root(mS, v). The result follows via Lemma 17.
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Case NC2:
We have root(mS11 , v), M(mS11 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}, and nc(mS, ⟨vc,M⟩) for some
c. Without loss of generality, assume S1 = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p). From ⊢α[wf] M , we
have ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vc ∶ τc,⊺. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis
to obtain ⊢ α ≼ auth+(τc). From ⊢α[wf] M , we know ⊢wf S1 ∶ rectype, and
therefore, ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ a. Hence, ⊢ α ≼ a = auth+(S1). The result follows
via Lemma 17.
Corollary 19. Suppose mS is a high-authority location that is non-collectible in the
configuration ⟨mS11 ,M⟩, where M is well-formed. Then mS11 is high-integrity, high-
authority, and high-persistence.
⊢α[wf] M∧ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ∧ nc(mS, ⟨mS11 ,M⟩)⇒ ⊢ α ≼ integ(S1) ⊓ auth+(S1) ⊓ persist(S1)
Proof. Since ⊢α[wf] M , we must have ⊢wf S1 ∶ rectype, and so, ⊢ auth+(S1) ≼
integ(S1) ⊓ persist(S1). It therefore suffices to show that mS11 is high-authority.
This follows from Lemma 18.
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We now show that limited adversary influence is sufficient to demonstrate
immunity to storage attacks.
Lemma 20. Let ⟨e1,M1⟩ be a well-formed configuration, wherein e1 has type τ . Let⟨e2,M2⟩, wherein e2 also has type τ , be a configuration that is well-formed in a non-
adversarial setting. Assume the two configurations are equivalent via a high-integrity
homomorphism φ. If mS is a high-authority non-collectible location in ⟨e1,M1⟩, then
φ(mS) is also non-collectible in ⟨e2,M2⟩.
⊢α[wf] ⟨e1,M1⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X∧ ⊢[wf] M2 ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X∧ φ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≈α ⟨e2,M2⟩∧ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ∧ nc(mS, ⟨e1,M1⟩)
⇒ nc(φ(mS), ⟨e2,M2⟩)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of nc(mS, ⟨e1,M1⟩).
Case NC1:
We have root(mS, e1). By Lemma 16, we therefore have root(φ(mS), e2),
and the result follows by NC1.
Case NC2:
We have root(mS11 , e1) and nc(mS, ⟨vc,M1⟩) for somemS11 , whereM1(mS11 ) ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}. It therefore follows that nc(mS, ⟨mS11 ,M1⟩), ⊢α[wf] ⟨mS11 ,M1⟩, and⊢α[wf] ⟨vc,M1⟩.
Assume mS11 ≠mS . (Otherwise, we would have root(mS, e1), and the argu-
ment for Case NC1 applies.)
Since mS is high-authority and nc(mS, ⟨mS11 ,M1⟩), by Corollary 19, we
know mS11 is high-integrity, high-authority, and high-persistence.
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Since root(mS11 , e1) and mS11 is high-authority, by Lemma 16, we know
root(φ(mS11 ), e2).
From φ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≈α ⟨e2,M2⟩, we know φ(M1) ≈α M2. So, from M1(mS11 ) ≠ ,
we have M2(φ(mS11 )) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}, where φ(vc) ≈α uc, for some Ð⇀ui .
Since ⊢α[wf] M1 and ⊢[wf] M2, we also know ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vc ∶ τc,⊺ and ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ uc ∶
τc,⊺, for some τc. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis to get
nc(φ(mS), ⟨uc,M2⟩).
The result follows via NC2.
3.7.6 Referential security
Lemma 21. Let mS be part of a group G that is collectible in ⟨e,M⟩. If mS is non-
collectible in ⟨mS11 ,M⟩, then mS11 must also be in G.
gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩) ∧mS ∈ G ∧ nc(mS, ⟨mS11 ,M⟩)⇒mS11 ∈ G
Proof. By induction on the derivation of nc(mS, ⟨mS11 ,M⟩).
Case NC1:
We have root(mS,mS11 ). From this, it follows that mS11 =mS , and the result
follows trivially.
Case NC2:
We have M(mS11 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}, and nc(mS, ⟨vc,M⟩) for some c. Suppose
root(mS22 , vc) for some mS22 ∈ G. From this, we know root(mS22 ,M(mS11 )),
and from the definition of gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩), we have mS11 ∈ G, as desired.
We proceed by cases according to the derivation of nc(mS, ⟨vc,M⟩) to find
such an mS22 .
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Case NC1:
We have root(mS, vc), so choose mS22 =mS .
Case NC2:
We have root(mS33 , vc), M(mS33 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}, and nc(mS, ⟨uc′ ,M⟩) for
some mS33 and some c′. It therefore follows that nc(mS, ⟨mS33 ,M⟩). So,
we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain mS33 ∈ G. Therefore,
we can choose mS22 =mS33 .
Lemma 22. All locations in a collectible group are collectible:
gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩) ∧mS ∈ G⇒ ¬nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩).
Proof. By contradiction. Let mS ∈ G be such that nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩). We proceed by
cases according to the derivation of nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩).
Case NC1:
We have root(mS, e). But from the definition of gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩), no such mS
can exist; a contradiction.
Case NC2:
We have root(mS11 , e), M(mS11 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}, and nc(mS, ⟨vc,M⟩) for some
c. From this, it follows that nc(mS, ⟨mS11 ,M⟩). Therefore, by Lemma 21,
we have mS11 ∈ G. So, from the definition of gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩), we have¬root(mS11 , e), a contradiction.
Lemma 23. Let C ⊆ dom(M) be a set of locations that are collectible in a configuration⟨e,M⟩: ∀mS ∈ C. ¬nc(mS, ⟨e,M⟩).
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Then there is a collectible group that contains C. In particular, let G be the largest
superset ofC such that from every location inG, some location inC is reachable through
a chain of hard references:
∀mS00 ∈ G. ∃mS11 ∈ C. nc(mS11 , ⟨mS00 ,M⟩). (3.13)
Then G is a collectible group: gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩).
Proof. Suppose G is not a collectible group. Then either G contains a GC root in
e, or there is a location outside G with a hard reference into G.
Suppose G contains a GC root mS in e: mS ∈ G ∧ root(mS, e). By construc-
tion of G, let mS11 ∈ C be a location reachable through a chain of hard refer-
ences from mS : nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M⟩). If M(mS) = , then from the derivation of
nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M⟩), we must have mS = mS11 , and so from root(mS, e), we know
nc(mS11 , ⟨e,M⟩), a contradiction. Otherwise, assume M(mS) ≠  and mS ≠ mS11 .
Let Ð⇀vi be such that M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}. From the derivation of nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M⟩),
we know there exists a c such that nc(mS11 , ⟨vc,M⟩). Therefore, by NC2, we have
nc(mS11 , ⟨e,M⟩), a contradiction.
Otherwise, let mS /∈ G be such that M(mS) has a hard reference to some
mS00 ∈ G: root(mS00 ,M(mS)). By construction of G, let mS11 ∈ C be a location
reachable through a chain of hard references from mS00 : nc(mS11 , ⟨mS00 ,M⟩).
We presently show that nc(mS11 , ⟨M(mS),M⟩). If M(mS00 ) = , then
from the derivation of nc(mS11 , ⟨mS00 ,M⟩), we must have mS00 = mS11 , and so
from root(mS00 ,M(mS)), we know nc(mS11 , ⟨M(mS),M⟩). Otherwise, assume
M(mS00 ) ≠  and mS00 ≠ mS11 . Let Ð⇀vi be such that M(mS00 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}.
From the derivation of nc(mS11 , ⟨mS00 ,M⟩), we know there exists a c such that
nc(mS11 , ⟨vc,M⟩). Therefore, by NC2, we have nc(mS11 , ⟨M(mS),M⟩).
So, we know nc(mS11 , ⟨M(mS),M⟩). It therefore follows that nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M⟩).
So, G∪{mS} is a set larger thanG satisfying property (3.13), a contradiction.
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Lemma 24. Let e1 and e2 be well-typed equivalent expressions, and suppose φ(mS) is
a high-authority GC root of e2. Then mS is a GC root of e1.
φ(e1) ≈α e2 ∧ Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X ∧ Γ;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X
∧ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ∧ root(φ(mS), e2)
⇒ root(mS, e1)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of root(φ(mS), e2). Since e2 is well-typed,
by Lemma 15, we know that case R13 holds vacuously.
Lemma 25. Suppose M1 and M2 are well-formed memories. Let φ be a high-integrity
homomorphism such that φ(M1) ≈α M2. LetmS andmS11 be locations inM1 mapped by
φ. Assume mS11 is high-authority and high-persistence. If nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨φ(mS),M2⟩),
then nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M1⟩):
⊢α[wf] M1∧ ⊢α[wf] M2 ∧ φ(M1) ≈α M2∧ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S1) ⊓ persist(S1) ∧ nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨φ(mS),M2⟩)⇒ nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M1⟩).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨φ(mS),M2⟩).
Case NC1:
We must have φ(mS) = φ(mS11 ). Since φ is injective, we know mS =mS11 , so
the result follows by NC1.
Case NC2:
We know there exists someÐ⇀ui and some c such that M2(φ(mS)) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}
and nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨uc,M2⟩). Assume φ(mS) ≠ φ(mS11 ). (Otherwise, the
argument for Case NC1 applies.) Since φ(mS11 ) is high-authority and
nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨φ(mS),M2⟩), by Corollary 19, we know that mS is high-
integrity, high-authority and high-persistence. Since φ(M1) ≈α M2 and
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M2(φ(mS)) ≠ , then we must have M1(mS) ≠ . So let Ð⇀vi be such that
M1(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}.
We show that nc(mS11 , ⟨vc,M1⟩). From this, the result follows via an appli-
cation of NC2:
root(mS,mS) M1(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi} nc(mS11 , ⟨vc,M1⟩)
nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M1⟩).
Consider the two cases in the derivation of nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨uc,M2⟩):
Sub-case NC1:
We have root(φ(mS11 ), uc). From φ(M1) ≈α M2, we know φ(vc) ≈α
uc. From ⊢α[wf] M1 and ⊢α[wf] M2, we know ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vc ∶ τc,⊺ and∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ uc ∶ τc,⊺, for some τc. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 24
to get root(mS11 , vc), and the result follows via NC1.
Sub-case NC2:
Assume ¬root(φ(mS11 ), uc). (Otherwise, the argument in sub-case
NC1 applies.)
We know there exists somemS22 ∈ dom(M2), someÐ⇀ui ′ and some c′ such
that root(mS22 , uc), M2(mS22 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = u′i}, and nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨u′c′ ,M2⟩).
From this, it follows that nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨mS22 ,M2⟩). Since φ(mS11 ) is high-
authority and nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨mS22 ,M2⟩), by Corollary 19, we know that
mS22 is high-integrity, high-authority, and high-persistence.
Since φ is a high-integrity homomorphism, there exists an mS33 such
that mS22 = φ(mS33 ). Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis
to get nc(mS11 , ⟨mS33 ,M1⟩).
We have root(φ(mS33 ), uc). From φ(M1) ≈α M2, we know φ(vc) ≈α
uc. From ⊢α[wf] M1 and ⊢α[wf] M2, we know ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ vc ∶ τc,⊺ and
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∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ uc ∶ τc,⊺, for some τc. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 24
to get root(mS33 , vc).
Since mS22 = φ(mS33 ), from ¬root(φ(mS11 ), uc) and root(mS22 , uc),
we know mS33 ≠ mS11 . Therefore, from the derivation of
nc(mS11 , ⟨mS33 ,M1⟩), we know there exists some Ð⇀vi ′ and some c′′ such
that M1(mS33 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i} and nc(mS11 , ⟨v′c′′ ,M1⟩).
The result follows via NC2:
root(mS33 , vc) M1(mS33 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i} nc(mS11 , ⟨v′c′′ ,M1⟩)
nc(mS11 , ⟨vc,M1⟩)
Lemma 26. Let G be a collectible group in ⟨e,M⟩ with mS11 ∈ G. If nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M⟩),
then mS ∈ G:
gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩) ∧mS11 ∈ G ∧ nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M⟩)⇒mS ∈ G
Proof. By induction on the derivation of nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M⟩).
Case NC1:
We must have mS =mS11 , so the result follows trivially.
Case NC2:
We know there exists some Ð⇀vi and some c such that M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}
and nc(mS11 , ⟨vc,M⟩). Consider the two cases in the derivation of
nc(mS11 , ⟨vc,M⟩):
Sub-case NC1:
We have root(mS11 , vc), so we therefore know root(mS11 ,M(mS)). The
result then follows from the definition of gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩).
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Sub-case NC2:
We know there exists some location mS22 such that root(mS22 , vc) and
nc(mS11 , ⟨mS22 ,M⟩). So, by the induction hypothesis, we know mS22 ∈
G. From root(mS22 , vc), we know root(mS22 ,M(mS)). The result then
follows from the definition of gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩).
Lemma 27. Let M1 and M2 be well-formed memories. Suppose φ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≈α ⟨e2,M2⟩.
Let G be a collectible group in ⟨e1,M1⟩, and let φ(G) denote {φ(mS) ∶ mS ∈ G ∩
dom(φ)}. Let C represent the high-authority, high-persistence members ofG∩dom(φ):
C = {mS ∈ G ∩ dom(φ) ∶ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ⊓ persist(S)}.
Then there exists a set G′ such that φ(G′) is a subset of φ(G), is a collectible group in⟨e2,M2⟩, and contains all members of φ(C):
⊢α[wf] M1∧ ⊢α[wf] M2 ∧ φ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≈α ⟨e2,M2⟩ ∧ gc(G, ⟨e1,M1⟩)⇒ ∃G′.gc(φ(G′), ⟨e2,M2⟩) ∧ φ(C) ⊆ φ(G′) ⊆ φ(G)
Proof. First, we show that φ(C) is a set of collectible locations. Suppose it
isn’t. Then let mS ∈ G ∩ dom(φ) be such that φ(mS) ∈ φ(C) is non-collectible:
nc(φ(mS), ⟨e2,M2⟩). Since φ(mS) is high-authority and high-persistence, by in-
duction on the derivation of nc(φ(mS), ⟨e2,M2⟩), we can show that mS must be
non-collectible: nc(mS, ⟨e1,M1⟩). Therefore, by Lemma 22, G cannot be a col-
lectible group, a contradiction.
Let G′ ⊆ dom(φ) be such that φ(G′) is the largest superset of φ(C) such
that from every location in φ(G′), some location in φ(C) is reachable through
a chain of hard references: ∀mS00 ∈ φ(G′). ∃mS11 ∈ φ(C). nc(mS11 , ⟨mS00 ,M2⟩). By
Lemma 23, we know φ(G′) is a collectible group.
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We now show that φ(G′) is also a subset of φ(G) by showingG′ ⊆ G. Suppose
mS ∈ G′. By construction of G′, let mS11 ∈ C be such that nc(φ(mS11 ), ⟨φ(mS),M2⟩).
From this, by Lemma 25, we know nc(mS11 , ⟨mS,M1⟩). By Lemma 26, then, we
must have mS ∈ G. So G′ ⊆ G.
Lemma 28 (Equivalence substitution). If φ(e1) ≈α e2 and φ(e′1) ≈α e′2, then
φ(e1{e′1/x}) ≈α e2{e′2/x}.
Proof. Simple induction on the derivation of φ(e1) ≈α e2.
Lemma 29 (Auto-bracketing equivalence). Auto-bracketing preserves equivalence:
φ(e1) ≈α e2 ⇒ φ(e1 ▸α τ) ≈α e2 ▸α τ .
Lemma 30. Suppose φ(e1) ≈α e2. Let mS be such that mS /∈ locs(e1) and let φ′ =
φ[mS ↦mS1 ]. Then φ′(e1) ≈α e2.
Lemma 31. Evaluating in a low-integrity context preserves memory equivalence.
Let ⟨e1,M1⟩ be a well-formed configuration, wherein e1 is well-typed in a low-
integrity context. Let M2 be a well-formed memory and suppose ⟨e1,M1⟩ eÐ→∗ ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩.
⊢α[wf] ⟨e1,M1⟩ ∧ α /≼ pc ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X∧ ⊢α[wf] M2 ∧ ⟨e1,M1⟩ eÐ→∗ ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩ .
Then the following holds.
1. φ(M1) ≈α M2 ⇒ φ(M ′1) ≈α M2 and
2. ⊢[wf] ⟨e1,M1⟩ ∧ φ(M2) ≈α M1 ⇒ φ(M2) ≈α M ′1.
Proof. If we can show this is true for the case where a single eÐ→ step is taken,
then the rest follows by induction on the number of eÐ→ steps taken. (We know
the induction hypothesis will apply because of Corollary 11 and Corollary 12.)
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We show the single-step case by induction on the derivation of ⟨e1,M1⟩ eÐ→⟨e′1,M ′1⟩. The proof proceeds by cases according to the evaluation rules.
In cases SELECT, DANGLE-SELECT, SOFT-SELECT, DANGLE-ASSIGN, AP-
PLY, EXISTS-TRUE, EXISTS-FALSE, TRY-VAL, TRY-CATCH, TRY-ESC, PARALLEL-
RESULT, IF-TRUE, IF-FALSE, LET, FAIL-PROP, BRACKET-SELECT, BRACKET-
SOFT-SELECT, BRACKET-ASSIGN, BRACKET-SOFT-ASSIGN, BRACKET-SOFT,
BRACKET-EXISTS, BRACKET-APPLY, BRACKET-TRY, BRACKET-IF, BRACKET-
LET, DOUBLE-BRACKET, and BRACKET-FAIL, the result holds trivially, since
M ′1 =M1.
Case CREATE (⟨{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨mS,M1[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi ▸α τi}]⟩, where m is
fresh and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
1. Suppose φ(M1) ≈α M2. We show that φ(M ′1) ≈α M2.
From the derivation of ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X , we know ⊢ p ≼ pc and⊢ integ(τi) ≼ pc for all i. Therefore, we know mS is neither high-
integrity nor high-persistence. The result then follows from the fact
that mS /∈ dom(φ) and the assumption φ(M1) ≈α M2.
2. Suppose ⊢[wf] ⟨e1,M1⟩ and φ(M2) ≈α M1. We show that φ(M2) ≈α M ′1.
This follows from φ(M2) ≈α M1.
Case ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M1[mS.xc ↦ v ▸α τc]⟩, where
M1(mS) ≠  and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
Let Ð⇀vi ′ and Ð⇀ui be such that M ′1(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i} and M2(φ(mS)) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}.
We therefore have v′c = v ▸α τc.
From ∅;pc;H ⊢ mS.xc ∶= v ∶ τ,X , we know ⊢ τ ′ ⊓ pc ≤ τc, for some τ ′. We
therefore know ⊢ integ(τc) ≼ pc. So, from α /≼ pc, we have α /≼ integ(τc).
Therefore, v′c is a bracketed value: there exists a v′′c such that v′c = [v′′c ].
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From ⊢α[wf] M2 and α /≼ integ(τc), we also know uc is a bracketed value:
uc = [u′c], for some u′c.
1. Suppose φ(M1) ≈α M2. We show that φ(M ′1) ≈α M2.
Assume mS ∈ dom(φ) (otherwise, the result follows directly from
φ(M1) ≈α M2). Since φ(M1) ≈α M2, it suffices to show φ(v′c) ≈α uc.
This is trivial, since v′c = [v′′c ] and uc = [u′c].
2. Suppose ⊢[wf] ⟨e1,M1⟩ and φ(M2) ≈α M1. We show that φ(M2) ≈α M ′1.
Assume mS ∈ im(φ) (otherwise, the result follows directly from
φ(M2) ≈α M1). Since φ(M2) ≈α M1, it suffices to show φ(uc) ≈α v′c.
This is trivial, since uc = [u′c] and v′c = [v′′c ].
Case SOFT-ASSIGN (⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1 ▸α (a ⊓ p),M ′1⟩, where⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩ and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
We proceed by cases according to the evaluation rules for ⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→⟨e′1,M ′1⟩.
Sub-case ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M1[mS.xc ↦ v ▸α τc]⟩):
Let Ð⇀vi ′ and Ð⇀ui be such that M ′1(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i} and M2(φ(mS)) ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}. We therefore have v′c = v ▸α τc.
From ∅;pc;H ⊢ (softmS).xc ∶= v ∶ τ,X , we know ⊢ τ ′ ⊓ pc ≤ τc, for
some τ ′. We therefore know ⊢ integ(τc) ≼ pc. So, from α /≼ pc, we have
α /≼ integ(τc). Therefore, v′c is a bracketed value: there exists a v′′c such
that v′c = [v′′c ].
From ⊢α[wf] M2 and α /≼ integ(τc), we also know uc is a bracketed value:
uc = [u′c], for some u′c.
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1. Suppose φ(M1) ≈α M2. We show φ(M ′1) ≈α M2.
Assume mS ∈ dom(φ) (otherwise, the result follows directly from
φ(M1) ≈α M2). Since φ(M1) ≈α M2, it suffices to show φ(v′c) ≈α uc.
This is trivial, since v′c = [v′′c ] and uc = [u′c].
2. Suppose ⊢[wf] ⟨e1,M1⟩ and φ(M2) ≈α M1. We show φ(M2) ≈α M ′1.
Assume mS ∈ im(φ) (otherwise, the result follows directly from
φ(M2) ≈α M1). Since φ(M2) ≈α M1, it suffices to show φ(uc) ≈α v′c.
This is trivial, since uc = [u′c] and v′c = [v′′c ].
Sub-case DANGLE-ASSIGN (⟨mS.xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M1⟩):
The result holds trivially, since M ′1 =M1.
Case EVAL-CONTEXT (⟨E[e3],M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨E[e′3],M ′1⟩, where ⟨e3,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′3,M ′1⟩):
A case analysis on the syntax of E[ ⋅ ] shows that from the derivation of∅;pc;H ⊢ E[e3] ∶ τ,X , we know ∅;pc;H′ ⊢ e3 ∶ τ ′,X ′, for some H′, τ ′,
and X ′. Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis and obtain the
result.
Case BRACKET-CONTEXT (⟨[e3],M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨[e′3],M ′1⟩, where ⟨e3,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′3,M ′1⟩):
From the derivation of ∅;pc;H ⊢ [e3] ∶ τ,X , we know ∅;pc ⊓ `;H ⊢ e3 ∶
τ ′,X , where α /≼ ` and τ = τ ′ ⊓ `. Therefore, we can apply the induction
hypothesis and obtain the result.
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We can now state our referential security theorem, which encompasses both
referential integrity and, via Lemma 20, immunity to storage attacks.
Theorem 1 (Referential security). Let ⟨e1,M1⟩ be a well-formed configuration
wherein e1 has type τ . Let e2 be an expression also of type τ , and let M2 be well-formed,
such that ⟨e2,M2⟩ is a well-formed non-adversarial configuration. Let φ be a high-
integrity homomorphism from M1 to M2 such that ⟨e1,M1⟩ is equivalent to ⟨e2,M2⟩
via φ. Suppose ⟨e1,M1⟩ takes some number of steps in the presence of an adversary to
another configuration ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩.
⊢α[wf] ⟨e1,M1⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X∧ ⊢[wf] ⟨e2,M2⟩ ∧ ∅;pc;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X∧ ⊢α[wf] M2∧ φ⟨e1,M1⟩ ≈α ⟨e2,M2⟩ ∧ ⟨e1,M1⟩→∗α ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩
Then either ⟨e2,M2⟩ diverges, or it can take some number of steps in the absence of an
adversary to another configuration
∃e′2,M ′2. ⟨e2,M2⟩→∗ ⟨e′2,M ′2⟩ ,
and there exists a high-integrity homomorphism φ′ from M ′1 to M ′2 that extends φ, such
that ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩ is equivalent to ⟨e′2,M ′2⟩ via φ′:
φ′⟨e′1,M ′1⟩ ≈α ⟨e′2,M ′2⟩
Proof. If we can show this is true for the case where a single →α step is taken
to reach ⟨e′1,M ′1⟩, then the rest follows by induction on the number of →α steps
taken. (We know the induction hypothesis will apply because of Corollary 11
and the fact that ⊢[wf] ⟨e2,M2⟩∧ ⊢α[wf] M2 ⇒⊢α[wf] ⟨e2,M2⟩.)
We show the single-step case by induction on the derivation of ⟨e1,M1⟩ →α⟨e′1,M ′1⟩. Assume that ⟨e2,M2⟩ does not diverge. The proof proceeds by cases
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according to the evaluation rules. For each case, we need to show two things
about e′2, M ′2, and φ′:
i. Expression equivalence: φ′(e′1) ≈α e′2 and
ii. Memory equivalence: φ′(M ′1) ≈α M ′2.
It will be obvious by its construction that φ′ is a high-integrity homomorphism
that extends φ.
Case CREATE (⟨{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S,M1⟩ →α ⟨mS1 ,M1[mS1 ↦ {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi ▸α τi}]⟩, where m1 is
fresh and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}S with φ(vi) ≈α ui for all i. By
CREATE, ⟨e2,M2⟩→ ⟨mS2 ,M2[mS2 ↦ {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui ▸α τi}]⟩ ,
where m2 is fresh. Choose φ′ = φ[mS1 ↦mS2 ].
i. We need to show φ′(mS1 ) ≈α mS2 .
This follows by construction of φ′.
ii. We need to show φ′(M ′1) ≈α M ′2, where M ′1 =M1[mS1 ↦ {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi ▸α τi}]
and M ′2 =M2[mS2 ↦ {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui ▸α τi}].
First, let mS′ ∈ dom(φ′) be such that M ′1(mS′) ≠ . We show that
M ′2(φ′(mS′)) ≠  and φ′(M ′1(mS′)) ≈α M ′2(φ′(mS′)).
If mS′ = mS1 , then M ′1(mS′) = M ′1(mS1 ) = {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi ▸α τi} and
M ′2(φ′(mS′)) =M ′2(mS2 ) = {ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui ▸α τi}, so the result follows from the
assumption φ(e1) ≈α e2 via Lemmas 29 and 30. Otherwise, mS′ ≠ mS1 ,
so M ′1(mS′) = M1(mS′) and M ′2(φ′(mS′)) = M2(φ(mS′)). The result
therefore follows from the assumption φ(M1) ≈α M2.
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Now, let mS′ ∈ dom(φ′) be such that ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S′) ⊓ persist(S′) and
M ′1(mS′) = . We show that M ′2(φ′(mS′)) = . Since M ′1(mS′) = ,
we must have mS′ ≠ mS1 , so M ′1(mS′) = M1(mS′) and M ′2(φ′(mS′)) =
M2(φ(mS′)). The result therefore follows from the assumption
φ(M1) ≈α M2.
Case SELECT (⟨mS1 .xc,M1⟩ →α ⟨vc ▸α p,M1⟩, where S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) and
M1(mS1 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 =mS2 .xc, where φ(mS1 ) =mS2 . Therefore, from
φ(M1) ≈α M2, we have M2(mS2 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui} for some Ð⇀ui , where φ(vi) ≈α ui.
So, by SELECT, ⟨e2,M2⟩→ ⟨uc ▸α p,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(vc ▸α p) ≈α uc ▸α p.
This follows via Lemma 29.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case DANGLE-SELECT (⟨mS1 .xc,M1⟩ →α ⟨p ▸α p,M1⟩, where S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)
and M1(mS1 ) = ):
From ⊢α[wf] ⟨mS1 .xc,M1⟩, nc(mS1 , ⟨mS1 .xc,M1⟩), and M1(mS1 ) = , we know
α /≼ p. Therefore, p ▸α p = [p]. From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 =mS2 .xc.
If M2(mS2 ) = , then by DANGLE-SELECT, ⟨e2,M2⟩→ ⟨[p],M2⟩.
Otherwise, without loss of generality, assume M2(mS2 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}. Since
α /≼ p, we have uc ▸α p = [u′c] for some u′c. So, by SELECT, ⟨e2,M2⟩ →⟨[u′c],M2⟩.
Choose φ′ = φ.
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i. We need to show that φ([p]) ≈α [u] for u ∈ {u′c,p}.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show that φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case SOFT-SELECT (⟨(softmS1 ).xc,M1⟩ →α ⟨v′,M1⟩, where ⟨mS1 .xc,M1⟩ eÐ→⟨v,M1⟩, S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)), and v′ = v ▸α (a ⊓ p):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 = ((softmS2 ).xc), where φ(mS1 ) = mS2 . If we
can find u so that ⟨mS2 .xc,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨u,M2⟩, then by SOFT-SELECT, we have⟨e2,M2⟩ = ⟨(softmS2 ).xc,M2⟩→ ⟨u ▸α (a ⊓ p),M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
We proceed by cases according to the evaluation rules for ⟨mS1 .xc,M1⟩ eÐ→⟨v,M1⟩.
Sub-case SELECT (v = vc ▸α p, where M1(mS1 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}):
From φ(M1) ≈α M2, we know M2(mS2 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui} for some Ð⇀ui , where
φ(vi) ≈α ui. So, by SELECT, we have ⟨mS2 .xc,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨uc ▸α p,M2⟩.
Therefore, u = uc ▸α p.
i. We need to show φ((vc ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓ p)) ≈α (uc ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓ p).
This follows via Lemma 29.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Sub-case DANGLE-SELECT (v = p ▸α p, where M1(mS1 ) = ):
First, suppose ⊢ α ≼ a ⊓ p. Then v ▸α (a ⊓ p) = p, u ▸α (a ⊓ p) = u, and⊢ α ≼ p. Therefore, we have mS1 ∈ dom(φ), and so, φ(mS1 ) = mS2 . From
φ(M1) ≈α M2, then, we know M2(mS2 ) = . So, by SELECT, we have⟨mS2 .xc,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M2⟩. Therefore, u = p.
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i. We need to show φ(p) ≈α p.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Now, suppose α /≼ a ⊓ p. Then v ▸α (a ⊓ p) = [p]. If M2(mS2 ) = ,
then by DANGLE-SELECT, ⟨mS2 .xc,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M2⟩. Otherwise,
without loss of generality, assumeM2(mS2 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}. So, by SELECT,⟨mS2 .xc,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨uc ▸α p,M2⟩. Therefore, u ▸α (a ⊓ p) ∈ {(p ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓
p), (uc ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓ p)} = {[p], [u′c]}, for some u′c.
i. We need to show φ([p]) ≈α [u′] for u′ ∈ {u′c,p}.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case ASSIGN (⟨mS1 .xc ∶= v,M1⟩ →α ⟨∗ ▸α p,M1[mS1 .xc ↦ v ▸α τc]⟩, where
M1(mS1 ) ≠  and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 = (mS2 .xc ∶= u) with φ(mS1 ) = mS2 and
φ(v) ≈α u. From φ(M1) ≈α M2, we have M2(mS2 ) ≠ . So, by ASSIGN,⟨mS2 .xc ∶= u,M2⟩→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M2[mS2 .xc ↦ u ▸α τc]⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(∗ ▸α p) ≈α ∗ ▸α p.
This follows via Lemma 29.
ii. We need to show φ(M1[mS1 .xc ↦ v ▸α τc]) ≈α M2[mS2 .xc ↦ u ▸α τc].
First, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ . We show that
M ′2(φ(mS00 )) ≠  and φ(M ′1(mS00 )) ≈α M ′2(φ(mS00 )).
If mS00 =mS1 , then φ(mS00 ) =mS2 . Let Ð⇀vi ′ and Ð⇀ui ′ be such that M ′1(mS1 ) ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i} and M ′2(mS2 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = u′i}. Since φ(v) ≈α u, by Lemma 29, we
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have φ(v ▸α τc) ≈α u ▸α τc. Since v′c = v ▸α τc and u′c = u ▸α τc, we
therefore have φ(v′c) ≈α u′c. Therefore, from φ(M1) ≈α M2, it follows
that φ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i}) ≈α {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = u′i}.
Otherwise, mS00 ≠ mS1 , so M ′1(mS00 ) = M1(mS00 ) and M ′2(φ(mS00 )) =
M2(φ(mS00 )). The result therefore follows from φ(M1) ≈α M2.
Now, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S0) ⊓ persist(S0) and
M ′1(mS00 ) = . We show that M ′2(φ(mS00 )) = . This follows from
φ(M1) ≈α M2 by construction of M ′1 and M ′2.
Case DANGLE-ASSIGN (⟨mS1 .xc ∶= v,M1⟩ →α ⟨p ▸α p,M1⟩, where S ={ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) and M1(mS) = ):
From ⊢α[wf] ⟨mS1 .xc ∶= v,M1⟩, nc(mS1 , ⟨mS1 .xc ∶= v,M1⟩), and M1(mS1 ) = , we
know α /≼ p. Therefore, p ▸α p = [p].
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 =mS2 .xc ∶= u with φ(mS1 ) =mS2 and φ(v) ≈α u.
If M2(mS2 ) = , then by DANGLE-ASSIGN, ⟨e2,M2⟩→ ⟨[p],M2⟩.
Otherwise, M2(mS2 ) ≠ . Since α /≼ p, we have ∗ ▸α p = [∗]. So, by ASSIGN,⟨e2,M2⟩→ ⟨[∗],M2[mS2 .xc ↦ u ▸α τc]⟩.
Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([p]) ≈α [u′] for u′ ∈ {∗,p}.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M ′1) ≈α M ′2.
First, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ . We show that
M ′2(φ(mS00 )) ≠  and φ(M ′1(mS00 )) ≈α M ′2(φ(mS00 )).
Since M ′1 = M1 and M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ , we must have mS00 ≠ mS1 , so
M ′1(mS00 ) =M1(mS00 ) andM ′2(φ(mS00 )) =M2(φ(mS00 )). The result there-
fore follows from φ(M1) ≈α M2.
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Now, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S0) ⊓ persist(S0) and
M ′1(mS00 ) = . We show that M ′2(φ(mS00 )) = . This follows from
φ(M1) ≈α M2 by construction of M ′2.
Case SOFT-ASSIGN (⟨(softmS1 ).xc ∶= v,M1⟩ →α ⟨v′ ▸α (a ⊓ p),M ′1⟩, where⟨mS1 .xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′1⟩ and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 = ((softmS2 ).xc ∶= u) with φ(mS1 ) =
mS2 and φ(v) ≈α u. If we can find a configuration ⟨u′,M ′2⟩ so that⟨mS2 .xc ∶= u,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨u′,M ′2⟩, then by SOFT-ASSIGN, we have ⟨e2,M2⟩ =⟨(softmS2 ).xc ∶= u,M2⟩→ ⟨u′ ▸α (a ⊓ p),M ′2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
We proceed by cases according to the evaluation rules for ⟨mS1 .xc ∶= v,M1⟩ eÐ→⟨v′,M ′1⟩.
Sub-case ASSIGN (v′ = ∗ ▸α p and M ′1 = M1[mS1 .xc ↦ v ▸α τc], where
M1(mS1 ) ≠ ):
From φ(M1) ≈α M2, we know M2(mS2 ) ≠ . So, by ASSIGN, we have
⟨mS2 .xc ∶= u,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M2[mS2 .xc ↦ u ▸α τc]⟩ .
So u′ = ∗ ▸α p and M ′2 =M2[mS2 .xc ↦ u ▸α τc].
i. We need to show φ((∗ ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓ p)) ≈α (∗ ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓ p).
This follows via Lemma 29.
ii. We need to show φ(M1[mS1 .xc ↦ v ▸α τc]) ≈α M2[mS2 .xc ↦ u ▸α τc].
First, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ . We show that
M ′2(φ(mS00 )) ≠  and φ(M ′1(mS00 )) ≈α M ′2(φ(mS00 )).
If mS00 = mS1 , then φ(mS00 ) = mS2 . Let Ð⇀vi ′ and Ð⇀ui ′ be such that
M ′1(mS1 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i} and M ′2(mS2 ) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = u′i}. Since φ(v) ≈α u,
by Lemma 29, we have φ(v ▸α τc) ≈α u ▸α τc. Since v′c = v ▸α τc
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and u′c = u ▸α τc, we therefore have φ(v′c) ≈α u′c. Therefore, from
φ(M1) ≈α M2, it follows that φ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i}) ≈α {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = u′i}. Otherwise,
mS00 ≠mS1 , soM ′1(mS00 ) =M1(mS00 ) andM ′2(φ(mS00 )) =M2(φ(mS00 )).
The result therefore follows from φ(M1) ≈α M2.
Now, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S0) ⊓ persist(S0)
and M ′1(mS00 ) = . We show that M ′2(φ(mS00 )) = . This follows
from φ(M1) ≈α M2 by construction of M ′1 and M ′2.
Sub-case DANGLE-ASSIGN (v′ = p▸αp andM ′1 =M1, whereM1(mS1 ) = ):
First, suppose ⊢ α ≼ a⊓p. Then v′▸α(a⊓p) = p and u′▸α(a⊓p) = u′, and
from φ(M1) ≈α M2, we know M2(mS2 ) = . So, by DANGLE-ASSIGN,
we have ⟨mS2 .xc ∶= u,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p ▸α p,M2⟩. Therefore, u′ = p ▸α p = p
and M ′2 =M2.
i. We need to show φ(p) ≈α p.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Now, suppose α /≼ a ⊓ p. Then v′ ▸α (a ⊓ p) = [p].
If M2(mS2 ) = , then by DANGLE-ASSIGN, ⟨mS2 .xc ∶= u,M2⟩ eÐ→⟨p ▸α p,M2⟩. Otherwise, M2(mS2 ) ≠ , and by ASSIGN,⟨mS2 .xc ∶= u,M2⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗ ▸α p,M2[mS2 .xc ↦ u ▸α τc]⟩. Therefore, u′ ▸α (a ⊓
p) ∈ {(p ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓ p), (∗ ▸α p) ▸α (a ⊓ p)} = {[p], [∗]}.
i. We need to show φ([p]) ≈α [u′] for u′ ∈ {∗,p}.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M ′1) ≈α M ′2.
First, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ . We show that
M ′2(φ(mS00 )) ≠  and φ(M ′1(mS00 )) ≈α M ′2(φ(mS00 )).
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Since M ′1 = M1 and M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ , we must have mS00 ≠ mS1 , so
M ′1(mS00 ) = M1(mS00 ) and M ′2(φ(mS00 )) = M2(φ(mS00 )). The result
therefore follows from φ(M1) ≈α M2.
Now, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that ⊢ α ≼ persist(S0) and
M ′1(mS00 ) = . We show that M ′2(φ(mS00 )) = . This follows from
φ(M1) ≈α M2 by construction of M ′2.
Case APPLY (⟨(λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e3) v1,M1⟩→α ⟨e3{v1/x},M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = ((λ(x ∶ τ)[pc;H]. e4) v2),
where φ(e3) ≈α e4 and φ(v1) ≈α v2. By APPLY, we have⟨(λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e4) v2,M2⟩→ ⟨e4{v2/x},M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e3{v1/x}) ≈α e4{v2/x}.
This follows by Lemma 28.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case EXISTS-TRUE (⟨exists softmS1 as x ∶ e3 else e4,M1⟩→α⟨(e3{mS1 /x}) ▸α (a ⊓ p),M1⟩, where M1(mS1 ) ≠  and S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = exists softmS2 as x ∶ e5 else e6, where
φ(mS1 ) = mS2 and φ(e3) ≈α e5. Since φ(M1) ≈α M2 and M1(mS1 ) ≠ , we
know M2(mS2 ) ≠ , so by EXISTS-TRUE, we have
⟨exists softmS2 as x ∶ e5 else e6,M2⟩→ ⟨(e5{mS2 /x}) ▸α (a ⊓ p),M2⟩
Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ((e3{mS1 /x}) ▸α (a ⊓ p)) ≈α (e5{mS2 /x}) ▸α (a ⊓ p).
This follows by Lemmas 28 and 29.
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ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case EXISTS-FALSE (⟨exists softmS1 as x ∶ e3 else e4,M1⟩ →α ⟨e4 ▸α (a ⊓ p),M1⟩,
where S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) and M1(mS1 ) = ):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = exists softmS2 as x ∶ e5 else e6, where
φ(mS1 ) = mS2 and φ(e4) ≈α e6. We proceed by cases according to whether⊢ α ≼ a ⊓ p.
Sub-case ⊢ α ≼ a ⊓ p:
We therefore know e4▸α (a⊓p) = e4 and ⊢ α ≼ p. So, from φ(M1) ≈α M2
and M1(mS1 ) = , we know M2(mS2 ) = , so by EXISTS-FALSE, we have⟨exists softmS2 as x ∶ e5 else e6,M2⟩→ ⟨e6,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e4) ≈α e6.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Sub-case α /≼ a ⊓ p:
We therefore have e4 ▸α (a ⊓ p) = [e′4] for some e′4. If M2(mS2 ) = ,
then by EXISTS-FALSE, we have ⟨exists softmS2 as x ∶ e5 else e6,M2⟩ →⟨[e′6],M2⟩, for some e′6. Otherwise, by EXISTS-TRUE, we have⟨exists softmS2 as x ∶ e5 else e6,M2⟩ → ⟨[e′5],M2⟩, for some e′5. Choose
φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([e′4]) ≈α [e′′2 ] for e′′2 ∈ {e′5, e′6}.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
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Case TRY-VAL (⟨try v1 catch p∶ e3,M1⟩ →α ⟨v1,M1⟩, where ∀p′. v1 ≠ p′ and∀v′1. v1 ≠ [v′1]):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (try v2 catch p∶ e4), where φ(v1) ≈α
v2 and φ(e3) ≈α e4. From this, it follows that by TRY-VAL, we have⟨try v2 catch p∶ e4,M2⟩→ ⟨v2,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(v1) ≈α v2.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case TRY-CATCH (⟨try p′ catch p∶ e3,M1⟩→α ⟨e3,M1⟩, where ⊢ p ≼ p′):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (try p′ catch p∶ e4), where φ(e3) ≈α e4.
By TRY-CATCH, we have ⟨try p′ catch p∶ e4,M2⟩→ ⟨e4,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e3) ≈α e4.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case TRY-ESC (⟨try p′ catch p∶ e3,M1⟩→α ⟨p′ ,M1⟩, where p /≼ p′):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (try p′ catch p∶ e4). By TRY-ESC, we
have ⟨try p′ catch p∶ e4,M2⟩→ ⟨p′ ,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(p′) ≈α p′ .
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
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Case PARALLEL-RESULT (⟨v1∥v2,M1⟩→α ⟨∗,M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = u1∥u2, where φ(vi) ≈α ui for i ∈ {1,2}.
By PARALLEL-RESULT, we have ⟨u1∥u2,M2⟩→ ⟨∗,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(∗) ≈α ∗.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case IF-TRUE (⟨if true then e3 else e4,M1⟩→α ⟨e3,M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (if true then e5 else e6), where φ(e3) ≈α
e5. By IF-TRUE, we have ⟨if true then e5 else e6,M2⟩ → ⟨e5,M2⟩. Choose
φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e3) ≈α e5.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case IF-FALSE (⟨if false then e3 else e4,M1⟩→α ⟨e4,M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (if false then e5 else e6), where φ(e4) ≈α
e6. By IF-FALSE, we have ⟨if false then e5 else e6,M2⟩ → ⟨e6,M2⟩. Choose
φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e4) ≈α e6.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
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Case LET (⟨let x = v1 in e3,M1⟩ →α ⟨e3{v1/x},M1⟩, where ∀p. v1 ≠ p and∀v′1. v1 ≠ [v′1]):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (let x = v2 in e4), where φ(v1) ≈α v2 and
φ(e3) ≈α e4. By LET, we have ⟨let x = v2 in e4,M2⟩→ ⟨e4{v2/x},M2⟩. Choose
φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e3{v1/x}) ≈α e4{v2/x}.
This follows by Lemma 28.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case EVAL-CONTEXT (⟨E[e3],M1⟩→α ⟨E[e′3],M ′1⟩, where ⟨e3,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′3,M ′1⟩):
We proceed by cases according to the syntax of E[ ⋅ ]. We only show the
case E[ ⋅ ] = try [ ⋅ ] catch p∶ e4; the other cases follow similarly.
Sub-case E[ ⋅ ] = (try [ ⋅ ] catch p∶ e4):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know e2 = (try e5 catch p∶ e6), where φ(e3) ≈α e5
and φ(e4) ≈α e6. To apply the induction hypothesis, we need:
• ⊢α[wf] ⟨e3,M1⟩ and ⊢[wf] ⟨e5,M2⟩
These follow from
⊢α[wf] ⟨try e3 catch p∶ e4,M1⟩
and ⊢[wf] ⟨try e5 catch p∶ e6,M2⟩ .
• ∅;pc;H′ ⊢ e3 ∶ τ ′,X ′ and ∅;pc;H′ ⊢ e5 ∶ τ ′,X ′, for some H′, τ ′, X ′
These follow from the typing derivations for try e3 catch p∶ e4 and
try e5 catch p∶ e6.
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• ⊢α[wf] M2 and φ⟨e3,M1⟩ ≈α ⟨e5,M2⟩.
These are given.
Therefore, we can apply the induction hypothesis to get a configura-
tion ⟨e′5,M ′2⟩ and a high-integrity homomorphism φ′ from M ′1 to M ′2
that extends φ, such that ⟨e5,M2⟩→ ⟨e′5,M ′2⟩ and
φ′⟨e′3,M ′1⟩ ≈α ⟨e′5,M ′2⟩. (3.14)
So, by EVAL-CONTEXT, we have
⟨try e5 catch p∶ e6,M2⟩→ ⟨try e′5 catch p∶ e6,M ′2⟩ .
From (3.14), we know φ′⟨try e′3 catch p∶ e4,M ′1⟩ ≈α ⟨try e′5 catch p∶ e6,M ′2⟩,
as desired.
In case E[ ⋅ ] = soft [ ⋅ ], where e2 = soft e4, to apply the induction hypoth-
esis, we need the additional fact that since e3 is not a value, neither is e4,
and therefore ⊢α[wf] ⟨soft e3,M1⟩ and ⊢[wf] ⟨soft e4,M2⟩ imply ⊢α[wf] ⟨e3,M1⟩
and ⊢[wf] ⟨e4,M2⟩.
Case FAIL-PROP (⟨F [p],M1⟩→α ⟨p,M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = F ′[p]. By FAIL-PROP, we have⟨F ′[p],M2⟩→ ⟨p,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(p) ≈α p.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
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Case GC (⟨e1,M1⟩→α ⟨e1,M1[G↦ ]⟩, where gc(G, ⟨e1,M1⟩)):
By Lemma 27, letG′ be such that C ⊆ G′ ⊆ φ(G) and gc(G′, ⟨e2,M2⟩), where
C = {φ(mS) ∶mS ∈ G ∩ dom(φ)∧ ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S) ⊓ persist(S)}
and
φ(G) = {φ(mS) ∶mS ∈ G ∩ dom(φ)}.
Then, by GC, we have ⟨e2,M2⟩→ ⟨e2,M2[G′ ↦ ]⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e1) ≈α e2.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1[G↦ ]) ≈α M2[G′ ↦ ].
First, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ . We show that
M ′2(φ(mS00 )) ≠  and φ(M ′1(mS00 )) ≈α M ′2(φ(mS00 )).
Since M ′1(mS00 ) ≠ , we know mS00 /∈ G and φ(mS00 ) /∈ G′. Therefore,
M ′1(mS00 ) =M1(mS00 ) and M ′2(φ(mS00 )) =M2(φ(mS00 )), so the result fol-
lows from the assumption φ(M1) ≈α M2.
Now, let mS00 ∈ dom(φ) be such that ⊢ α ≼ auth+(S0) ⊓ persist(S0)
and M ′1(mS00 ) = . We show that M ′2(φ(mS00 )) = . If mS00 ∈ G, then
φ(mS00 ) ∈ G′, and the result follows by construction of M ′2. Otherwise,
mS00 /∈ G, and so, φ(mS00 ) /∈ G′. Therefore, M ′1(mS00 ) = M1(mS00 ) and
M ′2(φ(mS00 )) =M2(φ(mS00 )), so the result follows from the assumption
φ(M1) ≈α M2.
Cases BRACKET-SELECT and BRACKET-SOFT-SELECT(⟨[v].xc,M1⟩→α ⟨[v.xc],M1⟩, where v ∈ {mS11 , softmS11 }):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = [u].xc. From the grammar, we
must have u ∈ {mS22 , softmS22 }. If u = mS22 , then by BRACKET-SELECT,
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⟨[mS22 ].xc,M2⟩→ ⟨[mS22 .xc],M2⟩. Otherwise, u = softmS22 , and by BRACKET-
SOFT-SELECT, ⟨[softmS22 ].xc,M2⟩→ ⟨[(softmS22 ).xc],M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([v.xc]) ≈α [u.xc].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case BRACKET-ASSIGN (⟨[v1].xc ∶= v2,M1⟩→α ⟨[v1.xc ∶= v2],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = [u1].xc ∶= u2. By BRACKET-ASSIGN,
we have ⟨[u1].xc ∶= u2,M2⟩→ ⟨[u1.xc ∶= u2],M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([v1.xc ∶= v2]) ≈α [u1.xc ∶= u2].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case BRACKET-SOFT (⟨soft [v],M1⟩→α ⟨[soft v],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = soft [e3]. Since ⟨e2,M2⟩ is assumed
to not diverge, ⟨e3,M2⟩ cannot diverge either. So, by Corollary 14, there
is a configuration ⟨u,M ′2⟩ such that ⟨e3,M2⟩ eÐ→∗ ⟨u,M ′2⟩. Then by EVAL-
CONTEXT, BRACKET-CONTEXT, and BRACKET-SOFT, we have
⟨soft [e3],M2⟩→∗ ⟨soft [u],M ′2⟩→ ⟨[soft u],M ′2⟩ .
Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([soft v]) ≈α [soft u].
This is trivial.
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ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M ′2.
This follows by Lemma 31.
Case BRACKET-EXISTS(⟨exists [v] as x ∶ e3 else e4,M1⟩→α ⟨[exists v as x ∶ e3 else e4],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = exists [u] as x ∶ e5 else e6. By BRACKET-
EXISTS, we have
⟨exists [u] as x ∶ e5 else e6,M2⟩→ ⟨[exists u as x ∶ e5 else e6],M2⟩
Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([exists v as x ∶ e3 else e4]) ≈α [exists u as x ∶ e5 else e6].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case BRACKET-APPLY (⟨[v1] v2,M1⟩→α ⟨[v1 v2],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = ([u1] u2). By BRACKET-APPLY, we
have ⟨[u1] u2,M2⟩→ ⟨[u1 u2],M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([v1 v2]) ≈α [u1 u2].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
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Case BRACKET-TRY (⟨try [v] catch p∶ e3,M1⟩→α ⟨[try v catch p∶ e3],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (try [e4] catch p∶ e5). Since ⟨e2,M2⟩
is assumed to not diverge, ⟨e4,M2⟩ cannot diverge either. So, by Corol-
lary 14, there is a configuration ⟨u,M ′2⟩ such that ⟨e4,M2⟩ eÐ→∗ ⟨u,M ′2⟩. Then
by EVAL-CONTEXT, BRACKET-CONTEXT, and BRACKET-TRY, we have
⟨try [e4] catch p∶ e5,M2⟩→∗ ⟨try [u] catch p∶ e5,M ′2⟩→ ⟨[try u catch p∶ e5],M ′2⟩ .
Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([try v catch p∶ e3]) ≈α [try u catch p∶ e5].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M ′2.
This follows by Lemma 31.
Case BRACKET-IF (⟨if [v] then e3 else e4,M1⟩→α ⟨[if v then e3 else e4],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (if [u] then e5 else e6). By BRACKET-IF,
we have
⟨if [u] then e5 else e6,M2⟩→ ⟨[if u then e5 else e6],M2⟩ .
Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([if v then e3 else e4]) ≈α [if u then e5 else e6].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
178
Case BRACKET-LET (⟨let x = [v] in e3,M1⟩ →α ⟨[e3{[v]/x}],M1⟩, where ∀p. v ≠p):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = (let x = [u] in e4). If ∀p. u ≠ p, then by
BRACKET-LET, we have
⟨let x = [u] in e4,M2⟩→ ⟨[e4{[u]/x}],M2⟩ .
Otherwise, let p be such that u = p. Then, by BRACKET-FAIL, we have
⟨let x = [u] in e4,M2⟩→ ⟨[p],M2⟩ .
Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([e3{[v]/x}]) ≈α [e′′2 ], where e′′2 ∈ {e4{[u]/x},p}.
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case DOUBLE-BRACKET (⟨[[v]],M1⟩→α ⟨[v],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = [e′′2 ], so we trivially have ⟨[e′′2 ],M2⟩→∗⟨[e′′2 ],M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([v]) ≈α [e′′2 ].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case BRACKET-CONTEXT (⟨[e3],M1⟩→α ⟨[e′3],M ′1⟩, where ⟨e3,M1⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′3,M ′1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, we know that e2 = [e4], and we trivially have ⟨[e4],M2⟩ eÐ→
∗ ⟨[e4],M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
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i. We need to show φ([e′3]) ≈α [e4].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M ′1) ≈α M2.
This follows by Lemma 31.
Case BRACKET-FAIL (⟨F [[p]],M1⟩→α ⟨[p],M1⟩):
From φ(e1) ≈α e2, an easy case analysis on the syntax of F [ ⋅ ] shows that⟨e2,M2⟩→ ⟨[p],M2⟩ via BRACKET-FAIL. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ([p]) ≈α [p].
This is trivial.
ii. We need to show φ(M1) ≈α M2.
This is given.
Case α-CREATE (⟨e1,M1⟩ →α ⟨e1,M1[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}]⟩, where mS is fresh,∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}S ∶ R⊺,⊺, ⊢α[wf] M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}, and α /≼ persist(S)) ∶
We trivially have ⟨e2,M2⟩→∗ ⟨e2,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e1) ≈α e2.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐÐ⇀xi = [vi]}]) ≈α M2.
Since mS /∈ dom(φ), this follows from the assumption φ(M1) ≈α M2 by
construction of M ′1.
Case α-ASSIGN (⟨e1,M1⟩ →α ⟨e1,M1[mS.xc ↦ [v]]⟩, where mS ∈ dom(M1),
M1(mS) ≠ , S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s, ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ [v] ∶ τc,⊺, and ⊢α[wf] M1[mS.xc ↦ [v]]):
We trivially have ⟨e2,M2⟩→∗ ⟨e2,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
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i. We need to show φ(e1) ≈α e2.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1[mS.xc ↦ [v]]) ≈α M2.
If mS /∈ dom(φ), then this follows from the assumption φ(M1) ≈α M2
by construction of M ′1.
Suppose mS ∈ dom(φ). Then it suffices to show that φ(M ′1(mS)) ≈α
M2(φ(mS)), since the rest follows from φ(M1) ≈α M2.
Let Ð⇀vi , Ð⇀v′i , and Ð⇀ui be such that M1(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi} M ′1(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = v′i}
and M2(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = ui}. From φ(M1) ≈α M2, we know φ(vi) ≈α ui for
all i. By construction of M ′1, we have v′c = [v] and v′i = vi for i ≠ c.
Therefore, it remains to be shown that φ([v]) ≈α uc.
From ∅;⊺;⊺ ⊢ [v] ∶ τc,⊺, we know that α /≼ integ(τc). Therefore, from⊢α[wf] M2, we must have uc = [u], for some u. The result φ([v]) ≈α uc
then follows trivially.
Case α-FORGET (⟨e1,M1⟩ →α ⟨e1,M1[mS ↦ ]⟩, where mS ∈ dom(M1) and α /≼
persist(S)):
We trivially have ⟨e2,M2⟩→∗ ⟨e2,M2⟩. Choose φ′ = φ.
i. We need to show φ(e1) ≈α e2.
This is given.
ii. We need to show φ(M1[mS ↦ ]) ≈α M2.
This follows from the assumption φ(M1) ≈α M2, since α /≼ persist(S).
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3.8 Related work
This chapter identifies and addresses a new problem, referential security. As a
result, little prior work is closely related.
Some prior work has tried to improve referential integrity through system
mechanisms, for example improving the referential integrity of Web hyper-
links [21, 39]. Systems mechanisms for improving referential integrity (and
other aspects of trustworthiness) are orthogonal to the language model pre-
sented here, but could be used to justify assigning persistence, integrity, and
authority levels to nodes.
Liblit and Aiken [44] develop a type system for distributed data structures.
Its explicit two-level hierarchy distinguishes between local pointers meaningful
only to a single processor, and global pointers that are valid everywhere. The
type system ensures that local pointers do not leak into a global context. This
work was extended in [45] to add types for dealing with private vs. shared data.
However, this line of work does not consider security properties that require
defence against an adversary.
Riely and Hennessey study type safety in a distributed system of partially
trusted mobile agents [67] but do not consider referential security.
Our approach builds on prior work on information-flow security, much of
which is summarized by [70]. The Fabric platform described in Chapter 2 has
a high-level language that, like λpersist , includes integrity annotations and ab-
stracts away the locations of objects. Fabric does not enforce referential security,
however, so adding the features described here is an obvious next step.
Chugh et al. [15] develop an approach to dynamically loading untrusted,
mobile JavaScript code and ensuring that the code satisfies necessary security
properties. However, referential security properties are not covered.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Full syntax of λpersist
Policy levels w,a, p, ` ∈ L
Variables x, y ∈ Var PC labels pc ∶∶= w
Memory locations m ∈ Mem Storage labels s ∶∶= (a, p)
Labelled
record types S ∶∶= {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}s Reference labels r ∶∶= (a+, a−, p)
Labelled
reference types R ∶∶= {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r Persistencefailure handlers H ∶∶= Ð⇀pi
Base types b ∶∶= bool ∣ τ1 pc,HÐÐ→ τ2 ∣ R ∣ soft R Types τ ∶∶= bw ∣ 1
Values v, u ∶∶= x ∣ true ∣ false ∣ ∗ ∣mS ∣ softmS ∣ λ(x ∶ τ)[pc;H]. e (∣ p)
Terms e ∶∶= v ∣ v1 v2 ∣ if v1 then e2 else e3 ∣ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ∣ v.x ∣ v1.x ∶= v2∣ soft e ∣ e1∥e2 ∣ exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2 ∣ let x = e1 in e2∣ try e1 catch p∶ e2
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3.A.2 Full small-step operational semantics for ordinary (non-
adversarial) execution of λpersist
[APPLY] ⟨(λ(x ∶τ)[pc;H]. e) v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e{v/x},M⟩
[LET] ∀p. v ≠ p⟨let x = v in e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e{v/x},M⟩[IF-TRUE] ⟨if true then e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e1,M⟩
[IF-FALSE] ⟨if false then e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2,M⟩
[CREATE] m = newloc(M)⟨{ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨mS ,M[mS ↦ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}]⟩[PARALLEL-RESULT ] ⟨v1∥v2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗,M⟩ [SELECT] M(mS) = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}⟨mS .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨vc,M⟩[ASSIGN] M(mS) ≠  ∀p. v ≠ p⟨mS .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨∗,M[mS .xc ↦ v]⟩[DANGLE-SELECT ] M(mS) =  p = persist(mS)⟨mS .xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩ [DANGLE-ASSIGN ] M(m
S) =  p = persist(mS)⟨mS .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩[EXISTS-TRUE ] M(mS) ≠ ⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e1{mS/x},M⟩[EXISTS-FALSE ] M(mS) = ⟨exists softmS as x ∶ e1 else e2,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e2,M⟩
[ EVAL-CONTEXT] ⟨e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩⟨E[e],M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨E[e′],M ′⟩ [FAIL-PROP] ⟨F [p] ,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p,M⟩
E ∶∶= soft [ ⋅ ] ∣ let x = [ ⋅ ] in e ∣ [ ⋅ ]∥e ∣ e∥[ ⋅ ] ∣ try [ ⋅ ] catch p∶ e
F ∶∶= soft [ ⋅ ] ∣ let x = [ ⋅ ] in e
[ SOFT-SELECT] ⟨mS .xc,M⟩
eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩⟨(softmS).xc,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩ [ SOFT-ASSIGN] ⟨m
S .xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩⟨(softmS).xc ∶= v,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v′,M ′⟩[TRY-VAL] ∀p′. v ≠ p′⟨try v catch p∶ e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨v,M⟩ [ TRY-CATCH] p ≼ p
′
⟨try p′ catch p∶ e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e,M⟩[TRY-ESC] p /≼ p′⟨try p′ catch p∶ e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨p′ ,M⟩
[PROG-STEP] ⟨e,M⟩ eÐ→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩⟨e,M⟩→ ⟨e′,M ′⟩ [GC] gc(G, ⟨e,M⟩)⟨e,M⟩→ ⟨e,M[G↦ ]⟩
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3.A.3 Full subtyping rules for λpersist
[S1] n >m⊢ {x1 ∶τ1, . . . , xn ∶τn}r ≤ {x1 ∶τ1, . . . , xm ∶τm}r [S2]
⊢ R1 ≤ R2
⊢ soft R1 ≤ soft R2
[S3]
⊢ b1 ≤ b2⊢ w2 ≼ w1
⊢ (b1)w1 ≤ (b2)w2 [S4]
⊢ τ2 ≤ τ1 ⊢ τ ′1 ≤ τ ′2⊢ pc1 ≼ pc2 ⊢H2 ≼H1
⊢ τ1 pc1,,H1ÐÐÐÐ→ τ ′1 ≤ τ2 pc2,,H2ÐÐÐÐ→ τ ′2
[S5] ⊢ a+1 ≼ a+2 ⊢ a−2 ≼ a−1 ⊢ p2 ≼ p1⊢ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+1 ,a−1 ,p1) ≤ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+2 ,a−2 ,p2)
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3.A.4 Full typing rules for λpersist
[T-BOOL] b ∈ {true, false}
Γ;pc;H ⊢ b ∶ bool⊺,⊺ [T-UNIT] Γ;pc;H ⊢ ∗ ∶ 1,⊺ [T-VAR] Γ(x) = τΓ;pc;H ⊢ x ∶ τ,⊺
[T-BOTTOM] p ≠ ⊺ ⊢H ≼ p
Γ;pc;H ⊢ p ∶ τ, p [T-LOC] ⊢wf S ∶ rectype S = {
ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p)
Γ;pc;H ⊢mS ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
[T-PARALLEL] Γ;pc;⊺ ⊢ ei ∶ τi,⊺ (∀i)
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1∥e2 ∶ 1,⊺ [T-SOFT] Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ Rw,XΓ;pc;H ⊢ soft e ∶ (soft R)w,X
[T-IF]
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ boolw,⊺
Γ;pc ⊓w;H ⊢ ei ∶ τ,Xi (∀i) ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓w
Γ;pc;H ⊢ if v then e1 else e2 ∶ τ ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2
[T-ABS] Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′;H′ ⊢ e ∶ τ,H′ ⊢wf (τ ′ pc′,H′ÐÐÐ→ τ)⊺ ∶ type ⊢ pc′ ≼ pc
Γ;pc;H ⊢ λ(x ∶τ ′)[pc′;H′]. e ∶ (τ ′ pc′,H′ÐÐÐ→ τ)⊺,⊺
[T-APP] Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 ∶ (τ
′ pc′,H′ÐÐÐ→ τ)w,⊺ Γ;pc;H ⊢ v2 ∶ τ ′,⊺⊢ pc′ ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢H ≼H′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 v2 ∶ τ ⊓w,H′
[T-RECORD]
⊢wf S ∶ rectype S = {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,p) Γ;pc;H ⊢ vi ∶ τ ′i ,⊺ (∀i)⊢ τ ′i ≤ τi (∀i) ⊢ auth+(τ ′i) ≼ pc (∀i) ⊢ integ(τi) ≼ pc (∀i) ⊢ p ≼ pc
Γ;pc;H ⊢ {ÐÐÐ⇀xi = vi}S ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a,a,p))⊺,⊺
[T-SELECT] Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ ({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w,⊺ ⊢ a+ ≼ pc w′ = w ⊓ p ⊢H ≼ p
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v.xc ∶ τc ⊓w′, p
[T-ASSIGN] Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 ∶ ({
ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w,⊺ ⊢ a+ ≼ pc Γ;pc;H ⊢ v2 ∶ τ,⊺⊢ τ ⊓ pc ⊓w ≤ τc ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢H ≼ p
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1.xc ∶= v2 ∶ 1, p
[T-SOFT-SELECT ]
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w,⊺ ⊢ auth+(τc) ≼ pc
w′ = w ⊓ a− ⊓ p ⊢H ≼ p
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v.xc ∶ τc ⊓w′, p
[T-SOFT-ASSIGN]
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1 ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}(a+,a−,p))w,⊺ Γ;pc;H ⊢ v2 ∶ τ,⊺⊢ τ ⊓ pc ⊓w ≤ τc ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓w ⊢H ≼ p
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v1.xc ∶= v2 ∶ 1, p
[T-EXISTS]
Γ;pc;H ⊢ v ∶ (soft {ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w,⊺ ⊢ auth+(r) ≼ pc ⊓w
w′ = auth−(r) ⊓ persist(r) ⊓w Γ, x ∶({ÐÐÐ⇀xi ∶ τi}r)w;pc ⊓w′;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X1
Γ;pc ⊓w′;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc ⊓w′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ exists v as x ∶ e1 else e2 ∶ τ ⊓w′,X1 ⊓X2
[T-TRY]
Γ;pc;H, p ⊢ e1 ∶ τ,X1 w = ⊓
p′∈X1(p ⊔ p′)
Γ;pc ⊓w ⊓ integ(τ);H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc
Γ;pc;H ⊢ try e1 catch p∶ e2 ∶ τ ⊓w, (X1/p) ⊓X2
[T-LET] Γ;pc;H ⊢ e1 ∶ τ
′,X1 ⊢ auth+(τ ′) ≼ pc w = (⊓X1) ⊓ integ(τ ′)
pc′ = pc ⊓w Γ, x ∶τ ′;pc′;H ⊢ e2 ∶ τ,X2 ⊢ auth+(τ) ≼ pc′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 ∶ τ ⊓w,X1 ⊓X2
[T-SUBSUME] Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ ′,X ′ ⊢ τ ′ ≤ τ ⊢H ≼ X ⊢ X ≼ X ′
Γ;pc;H ⊢ e ∶ τ,X
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
Federated systems provide new services and capabilities by integrating dis-
tributed information systems across independent administrative domains. We
are entering an era in which federated systems are widely used to share infor-
mation and computation. This dissertation examines the challenge of designing
and building federated information systems that are secure and reliable. In do-
ing so, it makes two key contributions.
The first contribution is the design and implementation of Fabric, a platform
for building federated information systems with confidentiality and integrity
assurances. Fabric aims to make secure distributed applications easier to de-
velop, and to enable the secure integration of information systems controlled
by different organizations.
The second contribution is the identification of referential security vulnera-
bilities, which arise in federated systems with persistent information. We for-
mally characterize these vulnerabilities, and introduce a high-level language for
modelling, analyzing, and preventing them.
4.1 Securely sharing computation and storage
Chapter 2 presented Fabric, a new distributed platform for general secure shar-
ing of information and computation resources. Fabric provides a high-level ab-
straction for secure, consistent, distributed general-purpose computations using
distributed, persistent information. Persistent information is conveniently pre-
sented as language-level objects connected by pointers. Fabric exposes security
assumptions and policies explicitly and declaratively. It flexibly supports both
data-shipping and function-shipping styles of computation. Results from im-
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plementing complex, realistic systems in Fabric, such as CMS and SIF, suggest
it has the expressive power and performance to be useful in practice.
Fabric led to some technical contributions. Fabric extends the Jif program-
ming language with new features for distributed programming, while showing
how to integrate those features with secure information flow. This integration
requires a new trust ordering on information-flow labels, and new implementa-
tion mechanisms such as writer maps and hierarchical two-phase commit.
4.2 Defining and enforcing referential security
While Fabric perhaps goes farther toward the goal of securely and transpar-
ently sharing distributed resources than prior systems, it does not guarantee
availability in the way that it does confidentiality and integrity. Chapter 3 iden-
tified formalized a class of referential security properties that is important for
availability of distributed systems with persistence, and showed that referential
security requirements can be expressed through label annotations. It introduced
λpersist , a high-level language for modelling referential security issues in a dis-
tributed system, and it demonstrated how to enforce these security properties,
through static analysis expressed as a type system for the language. The type
system was validated by formal proofs that λpersist programs enforce the new
security properties.
4.3 Future work
There are many hard problems left to solve to make the task of building secure,
reliable federated systems easy enough to be achievable by programmers who
are not security experts.
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The obvious next step is to integrate the features of λpersist with Fabric’s lan-
guage. This would help evaluate how well its types guide programmers in
designing distributed computing systems.
With advanced type systems, such as those in Fabric and λpersist , program-
mer annotation burden is a common concern. More techniques are needed for
reducing this burden while maintaining safety guarantees. For example, Fabric
applications have @s and @w annotations for specifying the stores on which to
place objects, and the workers on which to make remote calls. Inferring these
annotations by automatically partitioning programs and data, while maintain-
ing security and optimizing performance, is an interesting problem and would
reduce annotation burden.
Persistent objects introduce the problem of schema evolution and its security
implications. We have recently developed support in Fabric for basic class evo-
lution [3]. Supporting full schema evolution securely and intuitively remains an
open and difficult problem.
The performance of Fabric is limited by its strong consistency guarantees.
Much of the computational overhead at the worker is due to transaction log-
ging. Reducing this overhead, perhaps through a principled weakening of con-
sistency guarantees, or by leveraging recent work on transactional memory,
would be valuable.
Fabric’s hierarchical commit protocol depends on the availability of the
transaction coordinator. As discussed in Section 2.4.3, Fabric weakens its safety
guarantees for stronger availability guarantees by timing out prepared transac-
tions. Adding consensus mechanisms to the commit protocol appears to be a
promising approach to recovering safety.
Future information systems must be secure and reliable while supporting
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mutually distrusting participants. An important goal is to put the construction
of these systems within the reach of the everyday programmer. Higher-level
programming models are a key aspect of attaining this goal, and this has been
a guiding principle of the work presented here. I hope that the contributions of
this dissertation will in some way help achieve this goal.
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